Manifestation à Paris le 4 juillet 2010 à Trocadero Commémoration du Massacre des Ouïghours

Le 5 juillet 2009, les jeunes ouïghours organisaient une protestation pacifique dans la ville d’Urumchi, la capitale régionale du Turkestan Oriental. Les forces de sécurité chinoises ont démontré une extrême violence pour disperser et réprimer toute protestation. Des nombreux témoignages auprès des organisations humanitaires et auprès des médias indiquent que les forces de sécurité ont perpétré des mises à mort des manifestants. Les autorités ont arrêté des milliers de personnes lors des événements de Juillet 2009.

Un nombre incalculable d’Ouïghours ont disparus, y compris de jeunes adolescents. Au moins 24 Ouïghours ont été arbitrairement condamnés à mort par le Tribunal populaire intermédiaire d’Urumchi et plusieurs autres personnes ont été condamnées à des peines de mort avec sursis, des peines de prison à perpétuité et à différentes peines de prison. Tous les Ouïghours condamnés à ce jour ont été condamnés lors de procès non-transparents, tenus par la politisation ci-dessus et par l’absence de toute procédure.L'arrestation et condamnation non-transparent continue.

Le Congrès Mondial Ouïghour et les organisations des Droits de l'Homme appellent l'ONU à une enquête internationale sur le massacre et arrestations. Il existe des inquiétudes légitimes que les Ouïghours détenus dans le cadre des incidents de Juillet 2009 ont été soumis à de cruelles tortures lors de leur détention.

Le Congrès Mondial Ouïghour, l'autorité suprême représentative des Ouïghours en exil, a décidé d'organiser cette première commémoration du massacre du 5 Juillet 2009, à Paris, dans la capitale de la France libre et démocratique.

Notre but est la démocratie, la justice et l'autodétermination, notre démarche est pacifique.

Venez nombreux pour soutenir un peuple qui vit dans l'injustice et l'inégalité coloniale dans son propre pays.

The Khalilzad-DNO Affair and the Galbraith Parallels

The Khalilzad-DNO Affair and the Galbraith Parallels
Posted by Reidar Visser on Thursday, 24 June 2010 15:14

The recent nomination of the former US ambassador to Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, to a position on the board of DNO, a Norwegian private company engaged in oil deals in Kurdistan, has already generated big headlines. Part of the reason is that following Peter Galbraith, Khalilzad is the second key US figure involved in constitutional issues during the years 2003–2005 to acquire business interests in Kurdistan.

Continued disagreement between the Kurds and Baghdad over supremacy and governance issues in the oil sector makes this kind of dual involvement into a particularly touchy area.

Certain parallels to Peter Galbraith do exist in this case, but the differences also remain considerable. In the first place, the timing of Khalilzad’s involvement with DNO seems somewhat tidier. Khalilzad quit his diplomatic mission in Iraq in 2007 and his involvement with DNO started after that date (and only became formalised recently after he was nominated for the DNO board by the Emirati company RAK, which has a big stake in DNO shares).

Conversely, Peter Galbraith continued to advise the Kurds during the constitutional negotiations in August 2005 even after he had started receiving money from DNO and had also acquired his “stake” in the Tawke oil project.

Secondly, to the extent that he is known to have had any direct impact on legal frameworks directly relating to the oil sector, Khalilzad was unsuccessful. Khalilzad failed in his offensive to getting a package of oil legislation passed in early 2007; Galbraith, by way of contrast, was successful in obtaining constitutional accept for many of the principles he authored in late 2003 and early 2004 about regional influence in the oil sector (or at least a sufficient degree of legal ambiguity to create problems for Baghdad).

In fact, the parts of the Iraqi constitution with which Khalilzad is most clearly associated are the last-minute amendments that were designed to encourage participation in Sunni Muslim areas in the 15 October 2005 constitutional referendum, including, importantly, the key point about a one-off batch of constitutional revisions with no supermajorities required in parliament (which of course could ultimately reverse everything the Kurds have been dreaming of with respect to regional influence in the oil sector and, in a worst-case scenario for DNO, the business prospects with which Khalilzad has now become associated).

The closest parallel to Galbraith is probably the fact that both he and Khalilzad appear happy to continue to advise US public opinion about the best US policy also after their involvement in Kurdish oil. Galbraith’s penmanship in support of some kind of decentralised solution for Iraq has already generated two books (The End of Iraq and Unintended Consequences), whereas Khalilzad just months ago wrote an op-ed in The Financial Times in which he advocated US support for a coalition government consisting of Iraqiyya, State of Law and the Kurdistan list, with Nuri al-Maliki and Ayad Allawi taking turns as premier. This is of course an interesting position, given that in theory, Maliki and Allawi alone actually have a sufficient number of deputies to form a government without the Kurds but that they nevertheless persist in attempts at negotiating with Arbil instead of with each other.

This position by Khalilzad on the issue of government formation is also one which is apparently being viewed with interest by the Obama administration. In a recent interview with BBC Hard Talk, Ambassador Chris Hill was asked whether the next government would include the Sadrists (apparently, this scenario is favoured by BBC reporters as the epitome of tragedy in Iraq). Hill replied by saying something to the effect that this was not necessarily the case. “There are four parties”, he began, apparently thinking of the old four-way formula once favoured by the Bush administration of Daawa-ISCI-Kurds-Sunnis, with Iraqiyya apparently serving as “Sunnis” instead of Tawafuq this time.

But then he started with the details, first mentioning just State of Law and Iraqiyya, and pausing to emphasise that those parties alone held “almost” enough seats to form a government (they actually have more than enough, but it is good news that this scenario is now at least being considered in Washington). He then mentioned the Kurds briefly (as per the Khalilzad proposal) and moved on to other issues before ISCI (or the Sadrist-free rump INA) was even mentioned.

In his commentary on Iraqi affairs, Khalilzad has made it clear that he has a far better understanding of what is going on in Iraq south of Kurdistan than Galbraith, who was always on thin ice whenever he ventured to comment on Baghdad politics. But with his recent involvement as a nominee for the DNO board, Khalilzad no longer enjoys any neutrality on the Iraqi scene: He is effectively a proponent of the vision of a strongly decentralised Iraq that is favoured by those who envisage an autonomous Kurdish oil sector.

Any future policy advice on his part about any aspect of US Iraq policy – like the advisability of this or that coalition combination – will be tainted, like that of Galbraith, by business interests that dictate a preference for a weak Baghdad and an oil minister favouring regional interests over national ones.
http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/

Northern Iraq Observations 2: Influence of the Iraq Parliamentary Elections on the Kurdish Interior Politics

Oytun Orhan, ORSAM Middle East Researcher
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=231

The events in the north of Iraq during the elections and the results of the elections have shown that the Kurdish politics has not normalized yet. It is seen that a movement, which may receive general support from the Kurds throughout all the areas that they live, are not present yet. The primary reason for that is the Kurdish voters still favor regional and tribal allegiances while casting their votes.



Besides, the political parties do not allow other political parties to propagate freely in their own areas. That control, which was previously upheld by violence, is now maintained through legal means. Each party dominated the areas they are strong in. Those views are shared by most Kurdish opinion leaders. Especially the Goran (Change) Movement frequently expresses their views on the frauds during the elections. However, it is strongly believed that if there had been free elections in Duhok, the Kurdish Islamist parties would have won.

The most important outcome of the elections in terms of the Kurdish interior politics is that KDP’s strength in the north has grown further. It is even to the extent that, some experts that we talked in Arbil has labeled KDP as “the sole authority”. The most probable outcome of such a view is that the alliance between KDP and PUK, which rests on the distribution of resources in half shares, might collapse. KDP might consider that its weight in the alliance has distinctively risen, so it does not have to share resources with PUK in half shares. During our talks in Arbil, in which KDP is dominant, it is observed that such views started to emerge. Above all, KDP has gained the psychological upper ground compared to PUK. The practical outcome of this might be the increasing share of KDP on resources, posts and privileges due to increased pressure over PUK. However, it is not realistic that KDP will be the sole determinant factor in the Kurdish politics.



Issues like “Kirkuk, Article 140, oil, the status of the peshmarga, presidency”, which the Kurds consider as “national problems” need the collaboration of the Kurdish parties, which hinder the KDP to gain the advantages of the election victory to the full extent. According to Dr. Sabah Suphi Hayder, the Head of the Department of Political Science in Salahaddin University, “the greatest factors that unite the Kurds are Kirkuk and the status of disputed areas”. KDP is unable to acquire advantages for the Kurds in those issues by working alone. For this reason, KDP officials evaluate the strategic alliance in a deliberate way. In the words of Pistivan Sadik, the Arbil representative of KDP, “strategic alliance is a national issue and Kurdish national interests come first. For this reason the strategic alliance will never collapse”.



Besides, KDP needs the support of PUK, for the regional government presidency. The last factor that drives KDP towards carrying on the strategic alliance is the increasing power of the Kurdish Islamist parties. KDP would want to keep PUK on its side against the Kurdish Islamists. All political groups in the Kurdish region are focused on the provincial elections that are to be held in October. Each party will individually take place in this election. Questioning the strategic alliance between KDP and PUK is mostly postponed to the post-elections period.

In this context the Kurds, leaving aside their problems, have signed an agreement on May 8th 2010, In order to have a stronger position in Baghdad. Five Kurdish parties, which won seats In the Parliament, have decided on acting together as a united front in Baghdad. The united front will enter the government negotiations on behalf of all five parties and all Kurdish parties will enter the government. Each party will have a share based on its proportion in the Parliament. The Kurds seek to compensate for their relative weakness after the elections. In the words of Dr. Sabah Suphi Hayder, the Head of the Department of Political Science in Salahaddin University, “the Kurds have to unite against the others despite their problems within each other”. This means that the Kurds consider Baghdad as a means to protect and further their acquisitions in the Kurdish region.

It was not possible in the previous election, to determine the power base of each party, because the parties took place in the blocs and the closed list system was adopted. It is now clearly known for the first time that which party is strong where, for the reason that the open list system was adopted. KDP won 30 seats and is the indisputable winner in terms of the Kurdish interior politics. Considering the results in a different perspective suggests that KDP’s success relies on its formulation of election strategy. Yet, the Goran and PUK are over KDP in terms of the vote count. PUK and Goran representatives that we talked in Sulaimany stated that it is completely a failure in the election strategy.KDP achieved success through focusing on candidates that are less in number. Asos Hadi, journalist from Sulaimany, puts that “KDP got 600,000 votes, while Goran got 420,000 and PUK got 410,000. The total votes of Goran and PUK exceed those of KDP; however KDP won more seats in the Parliament than PUK and Goran combined. This is totally a failure in election strategy.” Considering the distribution of votes, it is early to suggest that KDP is the center of attraction for the Kurds. However, it can be said that KDP’s political strength compared to the other political parties will rise.

One of the most critical issues regarding the Kurdish interior politics is the future of PUK and Talabani. PUK lost a great deal of political power in the regional parliamentary elections of 2009. The Goran Movement, which was established by former members of PUK, got 24% of total votes in the regional parliamentary elections. Although PUK has slowed its decline against the Goran Movement in March 7 Elections, the dual structure of the Kurdish politics based on KDP and PUK has collapsed. The future of PUK, which was dealt the most severe blow by the mentioned collapse, is focused on the period after Talabani. Talabani’s charismatic leadership is seen as the power that holds PUK together. However, Talabani has problems related to his health and the period after him is being discussed in a covert way. PUK will have difficult times, if Talabani retires from politics. The PUK Congress, which will be held in October, is of great importance, because it will shed some light on the period after Talabani. After the Congress, it is expected that significant changes will take place within PUK and important signals about the post-Talabani period will be seen. Now there are six fractions within PUK competing against each other. Talabani’s presence is considered as the factor hindering conflict and disintegration. According to Cemal Hüseyin, Editor-in-Chief of the Gele Kurdistan TV, which is the media arm of PUK, “the post-Congress PUK will in no way same as the pre-Congress PUK”.

Finally, looking at the perceptions among the Kurds on the results in Kirkuk province, it is possible to say that the results were blow the expectations. PUK and Goran candidates that we had the opportunity to talk before the election, predicted that the Kurds would gain eight and the Arabs would gain four seats out of the twelve seats of Kirkuk. They predicted that the Turkmans wil at most gain one single seat or none at all. Therefore, it was unexpected for the Kurds that they won six seats, the Arabs won four seats and the Turkmans won two seats. Besides, Al-Iraqiya list is the first in total votes cast. The results rule out the legitimate grounds for the claims of the Kurds over Kirkuk.



Kurdish politicians and opinion leaders that we talked after the elections were adamant that he results do not constitute a defeat for the Kurds. They claim that total votes of all Kurdish parties are more that the votes won by al-Iraqiya. However, it can be said that the Kurds are in second position in the total votes cast as well. That is because; the Turkmans and Arabs were divided into several parties just like the Kurds. Therefore, it is seen that non-Kurdish votes are greater in number when all Kurdish parties’ votes and all Arab and Turkman parties’ votes are compared.


June 15 2010

SYRIA: Number of Iraqi refugees revised downwards

It has been hard for agencies to reach Iraqis in urban areas to register them

DAMASCUS, 20 June 2010 (IRIN) - The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has revised downwards the number of Iraqi refugees it has registered in Syria.

“In 2010 we issued revised figures for the number of registered Iraqi refugees based on the verification of their presence in Syria throughout 2009,” said Wafa Amr, a spokesperson for UNHCR in Damascus.

Those refugees who did not make contact with the office for more than four months and did not pick up food vouchers for two months had their files deactivated, according to UNHCR.

More than a quarter of the Iraqi population registered in Syria was deregistered - 58,000 files were deactivated - leaving 165,493 registered refugees at end-April this year. However, if a deregistered refugee re-approaches the agency, UNHCR says their file “may be reactivated after an in-depth assessment”.

UNHCR attributes the revision of its numbers to “returns, deaths and departures for third countries”.

Since the start of the war, UNHCR Syria has registered more than 260,000 Iraqi refugees. UNHCR has assisted 1,200 refugees to return, while around 21,000 Iraqis have left the country without the agency's assistance.

Funding problems

The true number of Iraqi refugees is considered to be higher than UNHCR registrations, although significantly lower than the 1.2 million figure given by the Syrian authorities.

Many refugees did not want to register or have been hard for UNHCR to reach in their urban setting.

“If we look at the numbers officially registered, such a small minority has been reached,” said Elizabeth Campbell, a senior advocate at Refugees International, a US advocacy group. “Not many refugees are returning.”

Funding has been an issue for refugee agencies owing to the global financial crisis. At the same time, budgetary requirements have risen; at the end of 2009, UNHCR requested a US$10 billion budget for all its programmes, the largest ever.

However, UNHCR said the revision was not connected to financial considerations. “This revision has nothing to do with donors' pressure to reduce funding; rather it is about UNHCR's credibility in using more accurate numbers,” said Amr.

Several other factors are at work, which makes determining the refugee status of Iraqis harder than in other cases. Syria is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, meaning they are regarded as visitors by Syria – the same as economic migrants.

Many of the refugees came with funds and received remittances from Baghdad. This, say some agencies, made donors less inclined to view them as refugees.

With Iraqis settling in urban areas rather than a camp setting it has been hard for agencies to reach them to register them.

In addition, the mobility of the Iraqi community - often commuting back home - has caused some to challenge their status as refugees.

“There's nothing unique about Iraqi refugees going and coming back to test the waters,” said Campbell. “Mobility is essential for economic or personal reasons; it doesn't mean they don't still need protection.”

“Iraqis registered with UNHCR who commute between Syria and Iraq are still considered refugees in need of protection and assistance,” said Amr. “Many return to Iraq to assess the security situation and have not deactivated their files.”

Iraqi refugees in Syria said it made sense to deactivate files of people who had left but were concerned that their trips back to Iraq often take longer than expected, causing them to be out of touch for long periods.

“Sometimes we think we will go back just for a month to see the situation, but then the possibility of coming back to Syria can change or something may happen with our family,” said one man from Baghdad, who asked not to be named.

Campbell said that if the reduced numbers did not match the picture in the field, many refugees could be put in a difficult position: “If money and support is disappearing, the refugees will have to make difficult decisions – a life of poverty in Syria or an unsafe return to Iraq.”

sb/at/mw


[
Report can be found online at:
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=89549
[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]

Iraq police shoot dead power cuts protester

By SAAD ABDUL-KADIR (AP)

Iraqis chant slogans demanding more electricity in Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, 550 kilometers (340 miles) southeast of Baghdad, Iraq, Saturday, June 19, 2010.

June 19, 2010

BAGHDAD — A protest over electricity shortages in Iraq's southern port city of Basra turned deadly on Saturday when troops fatally shot a demonstrator, police officials said, underscoring rising tension over the country's lack of basic services.

Police in Basra said one protester died and three were wounded when security forces opened fire on the demonstrators. They said five protesters were arrested.Hundreds rallied outside Basra's provincial council building, demanding a more consistent electricity supply to their homes and businesses and carrying banners reading: "Return electricity to us" and "Prison is more comfortable than our homes."

Police said they tried to control the crowd but protesters started throwing stones at the council building and set fire to a guard's cabin, prompting the troops to open fire. They said the first shots were in the air to disperse the crowd, but that failed to quell the unruly crowd.

In a statement on Saturday, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki asked the people of Basra to remain calm and said he was sending a delegation of officials to Basra to address the city's electricity problems.

Iraqis are increasingly angry over the government's failure to provide adequate public services more than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion.

There have been severe electricity outages as summer temperatures soar above 120 degrees Fahrenheit (50 degrees Celsius).

Iraqis have also been suffering from water shortages and poor water quality due to an ongoing drought.

On Friday, gunmen killed an employee of the local irrigation department and three of his family members in an apparent tribal dispute over water distribution west of Baghdad.

Irrigation department employees have increasingly been targeted in the area as rival tribal factions battle over the dwindling water resources.

Also on Saturday, officials said gunmen killed three anti-al-Qaida fighters after opening fire at a checkpoint south of Baghdad manned by a local government-backed group known as an Awakening Council.

The Council is part of a movement that has been key to a sharp drop in violence in recent years.Nobody claimed responsibility for Saturday's attack in Jibala, 40 miles (65 kilometers) south of Baghdad, but al-Qaida and other insurgents frequently target Awakening Council members as revenge or to discourage others from joining.

Police and hospital officials also raised the death toll to 12 in Friday's car bombing targeting an ethnic Turkomen provincial council member in the northern city of Tuz Khormatu.

More than 30 people were killed Friday in a wave of violence targeting government officials, Iraqi security forces and those seen as allied with them.

The violence highlights fears of growing unrest as the country remains deadlocked months after March's inconclusive parliamentary elections have failed to produce a new government.

The putative winner of the contests, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, announced Saturday that "international intelligence" services had told him that he was the target of an assassination plot.

He can no longer use a special airport for VIPs in central Baghdad because he was told snipers are on a lookout to kill him.

While Allawi acknowledged that there has yet to be an actual attempt on his life, he was taking the latest warnings seriously.

Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said that his government was ready to offer Allawi the necessary security to protect him from any assassination attempt, but criticized the former prime minister for going to the media with the news first."The Iraqi government is ready to hear from Ayad Allawi about the threats against him and will provide him with the necessary protection," al-Dabbagh told an Arabic satellite channel on Saturday.

Allawi's Sunni-backed Iraqi bloc won slim victory in the elections, but his main conservative Shiite opponents have united into a larger coalition that has good chance of heading the new government.

Associated Press Writers Hadeel al-Shalchi and Bushra Juhi contributed to this report.

www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSpBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9GEFKHG0

Tuzkhurmatu - Türkmenlere bombalı saldırı

Irak`ın kuzeyinde Türkmenlerin yoğun bulunduğu Tuzhurmatu`daki bombalı saldırılarda en az 10 kişinin hayatını kaybettiği bildirildi. Kerkük polisi, 20 kadar evin yıkıldığını belirttiği saldırıda enkaz kaldırma çalışmalarının sürdüğünü, bu yüzden de ölü sayısının artabileceğini açıkladı. Yaklaşık 60 kişinin yaralandığı saldırının bomba yüklü 3 araçla düzenlendiğini belirten polis, iki aracın infilak etmeden etkisiz hale getirildiğini aktardı.

KYRGYZSTAN: Delicate ethnic balance

Photo: UN Photo/AFP
An ethnic Uzbek holds his hands to his head as he stands beside the ruins of his home in Osh

DUBAI, 17 June 2010 (IRIN) - Kyrgyzstan’s population of 5.3 million comprises three main ethnic groups: Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Russians. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of ethnic Russians has declined, particularly in the south, where internal migration has also altered the balance between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks.

In common with its neighbours in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has a mixed population dating back to the drawing of the region’s borders by Stalin in the 1920s. Most of the 766,691 ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan live in the south, in the Kyrgyz part of Fergana Valley, the most densely populated area in the region where land is scarce.

Tensions over resources, mainly land, became apparent in June 1990 when young ethnic Kyrgyz demanded land that belonged to a collective farm of mainly ethnic Uzbek. The 1990 conflict was quickly suppressed by Soviet troops. The epicentre of recent clashes has been the two southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad.

The provisional government that came to power after former president Kurmanbek Bakiev was ousted following mass protests this April has been unable to assert its authority and as of 17 June, 191 people have been killed, hundreds more injured and an estimated 300,000 have fled their homes, including 100,000 who found refuge in neighbouring Uzbekistan.

Above, Photo: ReliefWeb
A map of Kyrgyzstan and surrounding countries

Population make-up Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kyrgyz were a minority in Osh, the main urban centre in the south. Historically they were mainly nomads living in rural areas, while Uzbeks were farmers and town-based artisans and traders. The borders drawn by Stalin that divided nationalities in the Fergana Valley were largely administrative, and did not mean much in practical terms.

After independence in 1991, the ethnic make-up changed dramatically. Many Russians left and more Kyrgyz started to migrate to Osh, looking for schooling and work opportunities following the end of agricultural subsidies and the disintegration of collective farms. Tensions rose as Kyrgyz started to penetrate traditional Uzbek economic strongholds, including trade and commerce.

As of 1 January 2009, 69.6 percent of the population were Kyrgyz, 14.5 percent Uzbeks and Russians constituted 8.4 percent. Among other ethnic groups, there were about 60,000 Dungans (called Hui in northwest China where they came from in the 19th century and are predominantly in the north of the country), about 52,000 Uygurs, 48,500 Tajiks largely in the south and 38,600 Kazakhs mainly in the north, making up the balance of Kyrgyzstan’s 5.3 million population, according to the National Statistics Committee.

The population of southern Kyrgyzstan was about 2,762,700 people in 2009, according to the National Statistics Committee and the Uzbek population in that area accounts for about 30 percent, while in some districts, such as Aravan district in Osh province or villages, they constitute the majority.

Politics Under first President Askar Akaev, the approach to minorities was more “flexible”, according to some analysts. Ethnic Uzbeks enjoyed economic freedom and some of their leaders were represented politically. However, they tended to be wealthy entrepreneurs, seen by many as out to further their own personal interests rather than building strategic links between the Kyrgyz establishment and the Uzbek community.

Kurmanbek Bakiev came to power in 2005 after Akaev was ousted in mass protests. He was from Jalal-Abad in the south, and began to sideline some of the Uzbek leaders who had benefited under Akaev - in certain cases that meant the redistribution of assets and property to his Bakiev clan.

After Bakiev was overthrown in April some Uzbek leaders, particularly in Jalal-Abad, openly supported the provisional government. Since independence, ethnic Uzbeks had shied away from politics, so such statements were seen as a cause for concern among the Kyrgyz political elite, according to one Kyrgyzstan-based analyst who spoke to IRIN on condition of anonymity.

at/mw/oa

Report can be found online at:http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=89526

Israeli Official Threatens to Kill Turkish PM

By Kurt Nimmo

Global Research, June 11, 2010
Infowars - 2010-06-06

Uzi Dayan, former deputy Chief of General Staff in Israel, says the Jewish state should consider a possible Turkish military escort of Gaza aid ships an act of war. “If the Turkish prime minister joins such a flotilla,” Dayan told Israeli army radio, according to the Jerusalem Post, “we should make clear beforehand this would be an act of war, and we would not try to take over the ship he was on, but would sink it.”

It is unprecedented for a top level state official to threaten a head of another state with murder.
Israel has refused to cooperate with an independent investigation of the incident that resulted in the death of between nine and nineteen activists. The Turkish government remains unequivocal in its condemnation of the action taken by the Israeli Navy. Most of the victims were Turkish citizens.

On June 5, the Turkish PM, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said he is not only planning to dispatch the Navy on the next flotilla, but that he is considering accompanying them personally. Erdogan reportedly raised the idea in conversations with close associates and even informed the United States of his intention to ask the Turkish Navy to accompany another aid flotilla to Gaza. The Americans asked Erdogan to delay his plans because of tensions on the region, the Lebanese newspaper al-Mustaqbal reported on Saturday.

Uzi Dayan is the nephew of Moshe Dayan, the fourth Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Defense Minister and later Foreign Minister of Israel.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=NIM20100610&articleId=19661