mardi 16 octobre 2012

ANALYSIS: The Route of Syria and Turkmens, Emre Kartal


Emre Kartal, Yıldırım Beyazıt University - October 14, 2012

Emre Kartal, postgraduate student at the Department of International Relations at Yıldırım Beyazıt University

Publication: Kartal, Emre (October, 2012), “The Route of Syria and Turkmens”, Vol. I, Issue 8, pp.18-19, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey.(http://researchturkey.org/?p=1990)


Indicative Abstract : The recent events in Syria are a revolt, which is comprised of the broad historical background and a social structure that emerged out of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. In order to understand the full extent of these events, the process of establishment of the Syrian Government, ethnic diversity and the structure of the state have to be examined.



Turkey is interested in the Syrian territory, both in terms of the border neighborhood and of the ethnic groups. Syria is a country that had been ruled for centuries by the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks. Today, it is also a border country of the Turkish Republic, with which it shares its longest border. In addition, the Kurdish problem is also of interest to Turkey, which is one of the country’s current problems, especially in terms of the Turkmen[1] population. In Syria, there are the Arab Alevis, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Armenians and Turkmens, which can be considered as a relic inherited from the Ottoman Empire, which have had a plurality under Assad’s regime.

Seen in the light of history of Imperialism, the uncertain route of Syria for the moment is an indicator of a new ethnic based structure. However, if the massacres are taken into account, it is obvious that this process will be really bloody. In order to understand Syria’s current path, the political structure and the contemporary history of Syria have to be analyzed. The foundation of the current Syrian structure is based on the French mandate after the First World War. During the French Mandate period, for administrative purposes, France divided the country into ethnically based regions and granted them autonomy. When France desisted, it constituted an army based on these ethnic grounds. The Baath Party cadres, which rule Syria today, emerged based on the organizational principals of this army. During the independence struggle of Syria, the Arab Alevis were in power, which sowed the seeds of what is called as Ba’athism. The ‘Levant Special Force’ founded by the French in Syria was created by the Arab Alevis, the Druze, and a small group of the Sunni population living in rural areas. Searching for a common identity in this army had been the common denominator of Ba’athism.

Against this background, today, it could be claimed that the current revolt is organized and under the promotion of the Barzani Kurdish population and it has an active political aim. In the northern regions there is even a possibility of an autonomous structure. This is a process reminiscent of the Kurdish administration gaining autonomy in Iraq after the U.S. operation. The Assad regime is a matter of life and death for the Arab Alevis because the destruction of the regime would mean great difficulties for them. The Turkmens in the country are facing great difficulties as well as they had under the Assad regime. So to speak, the Turkmens, touted as ‘the descendants of the Ottoman invaders’ by the Baathist Arab nationalism, are either facing great difficulties, or they are partially assimilated. They are the target of both Assad’s attacks, and of the opponents such as the Kurdish Defense Forces (HPK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

An analysis of the latest developments in Syria shows that the sides to this struggle in the country are the following: the Kurdish movement supported by Mesut Barzani, ex-political power holders who are no longer supportive of the Assad regime and who became opponents and, finally, the Sunni Arab uprising in the central region. The Arab Alevis, previously identified by the regime, may have to share their absolute power with the citizens of other ethnic origins. This may partly be due to the Arab Alevis who no longer support Assad. The most striking example for the Kurdish groups that have political demands in Syria is the Kurdish structuring in Iraq. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the then U.S. president George W. Bush, during a meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had guaranteed ‘Iraq’s territorial integrity’. Along the same lines, Mesut Barzani, the leader of the autonomous administration in Northern Iraq, declared themselves in the favor of territorial integrity of Iraq. However, a closer inspection of today’s situation might show that the aforementioned administration is currently a step closer to independence.

Syria’s path is still uncertain. However, out of two possible scenarios, Assad’s overthrow is more likely. It is not possible to sustain the Assad’s regime which is massacring people and has lost its legitimacy in the world public opinion. The possible establishment of a new system will face these ethnic disparities and imperial ambitions. The imperialist experience of the French Mandate in the region and ethnic based system of the latter regime show us that the United States and some Western states are trying to apply the divide-and-conquer logic to this region. The statement by the former U.S. minister of foreign affairs on 7 August 2003 in the Washington Post that ‘the borders of the 22 countries from Morocco to China would change’ supports this claim.

To sum up, the new regime that will be established after the Assad regime’s overthrow will be based on ethnicity due to the historical experiences. Moreover, while the Turkmens will be disenfranchised, there will be a strong Kurdish structure in line with Western and international support. This will cause problems both for Turkey (in terms her struggle with the PKK) and for the Barzani administration. The assimilation of Turkmens in the region will be inevitable. The armed attacks against Turkmens in Kirkuk and other Turkmen cities will continue and massacres against the Turkmen are likely to increase. It is possible to have a structure that is dominated by Sunnis at the center. In my opinion, the activities of the Arab Alevis in the bureaucracy will continue for a while but their liquidation will take place soon.



[1] The Syrian Turkmen are an ethnic minority of Oghuz Turkish descent living in Syria (e.n.)

dimanche 14 octobre 2012

Why does Barzani oppose modern banking for Kurdistan?


By Michael Rubin: Kurdistan Tribune – 12.10.2012-

With the specter of Saddam removed, Iraqi Kurdistan has boomed. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has worked hard to attract foreign investment in the oil industry, hotel, and construction sectors. Erbil and Sulaymani are becoming the first cities in Iraq with real skylines. Scratch the surface, though, and the patina of progress is thin. Erbil is no Dubai, and Sulaymani is not Abu Dhabi: As one recent Kurdish visitor observed, Kurdistan is a region with European cars, discos, hotels and restaurants, but the hospitals and schools of Africa.



Corruption is endemic throughout the Middle East, but in Kurdistan it is particularly rife: party leaders’ demands that foreign firms partner with their relatives and hire only party members have led some Western firms to walk away from the region. Bureaucracy is suffocating; even Kurdish officials acknowledge that most ministries could operate as effectively with one-third the staff. Less visible but just as endemic is the inflation of government ledgers with ghost employees. Simply put, the government claims extra employees whose salaries officials pocket. There are many variations on this scheme. Some employees might be fictional, but that is dangerous and could lead to exposure. In most cases, ministers, commanders, and directors-general inflate their employee rolls with friends and family. The government disburses the full salary, but the director might give only half to the fake employee, keeping a healthy cut for himself. As Kurdish salaries grow, it must be nice to collect several of them. After all, the cost-of-living has increased not only in Sulaymani and Erbil, but also on Sar-e Rash.

Banking in Kurdistan is old-fashioned. Kurdistan is a cash society; credit cards are rarely accepted and cash machines a rarity. To collect salaries, Kurds must queue in their offices, peshmerga must go to force headquarters, and police must visit their directorate. Very few head to the bank, and even then the process is retrograde. It is only because Kurdistan remains a cash society that the ghost employee scheme remains viable. Enabling this scheme has become more important for the Kurdistan Regional Government’s leaders than modernizing the region.

It need not be this way. A representative from one of the United Kingdom’s top companies offered to install a network of ATMs and electronic banking centers—more than 1,500 in all—across Kurdistan. The company would have provided the machines for free, and sought only a miniscule commission on transactions at less than one-percent, far less than the going international rate.

Such a network would have revolutionized banking and transactions in Kurdistan. Salaries could be disbursed directly to private bank account, and be accessible on demand. There would be no need for wasted afternoons and long queues to collect cash. The electronic banking network would also ease real estate transactions. Purchasing a property in Kurdistan can involve gathering several hundred thousand dollars in cash. Property crime might be rare, but this is still a risky proposition. With electronic banking, the cash transfer can occur with the press of a button. Nor is electronic banking revolutionary: Every advanced economy uses it: Not only the United States and Europe, but also China, Japan, and Korea. In the Middle East, not only Emiratis and Saudis, but also Egyptians and Moroccans use cash machines. Why then did the KRG refuse to grant the company permission to establish an electronic banking and cash machine network? Electronic transactions undercut corruption. Because employers would pay salaries directly to the employee’s account, there would be no opportunity for ministers, supervisors, or party leaders to syphon off cash or deduct kickbacks for themselves. If, on paper, a clerk earned $1,000 per month, he would receive $1,000 per month into his account, not $700 per month, with the extra $300 going to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appointee heading his organization.

Electronic banking would also make other corruption schemes more difficult. Even though illegal, party officials often win and flip contracts: They may bid under the guise of their own one-man front company for a $10 million contract and, because of their connections to Masud Barzani or Jalal Talabani, they may win it. Immediately, however, they will then turn around and sell the contract to another company for $11 million, netting an instant $1 million profit. Electronic banking makes such transactions easier to trace. Likewise, it hampers bribery: Banking watchdogs may question how it is a mid-level government employee suddenly deposits $100,000 into his account.

After years of denial, threats, and even the murder of critical journalists, KDP leader Masud Barzani has at long last acknowledged corruption is a problem. He, his nephew and current Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, and former Prime Minister Barham Salih have all promised to tackle corruption. Rhetoric alone does not defeat graft. Promises can be empty. More important is action.

Given a clear choice between regional development and ease of life for ordinary Kurds on one hand, and protecting a system which enables corruption and embezzlement on the other, the Kurdish leadership chose the latter. Kurdish leaders describe their region as a democracy and haven for investment; they say that they seek progress. Perhaps one day their actions may show sincerity; alas, that day is not now.

samedi 13 octobre 2012

Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition


INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition

Damascus/Brussels, 12 October 2012: The presence of Salafi groups among Syria’s armed opposition is an irrefutable, damaging yet not necessarily irreversible trend. Breaking this cycle will require the opposition to curb their influence, members of the international community to coordinate their policies and a perilous military stalemate to transition to a political solution.








Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines reasons behind the emergence of a strong Salafi strand within the opposition. Drawing extensively on interviews and on the armed groups’ own public discourse, the report explores the place of Salafism within the militant spectrum and distinguishes the most extreme Salafi-jihadi elements from their mainstream counterparts. Given a fragile and ailing society, an increasingly vicious and destructive stalemate and a delicate strategic environment, a more nuanced understanding of the armed opposition is critical.

There is no denying the inroads made by Salafism since the onset of the protest movement. Conditions were favourable. The uprising was rooted in a social category readymade for Salafi preachers: the poor rural underclass that migrated to impersonal urban settings far removed from traditional support networks. As violence mounted, hopes for a quick resolution faded and alternatives on offer – peaceful demonstration, the exiled leadership, moderate Islamists, Western intervention – proved ineffective or illusory, many naturally flocked to Salafism.

“Salafism offered critical assets: a compelling narrative and sense of purpose, funds and ammunition from sympathetic Gulf Arabs, fighters and the know-how of jihadis who fought on other battlegrounds”, says Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Project Director for Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. “But if Salafism grew out of one impasse, it has led into another. It gained prominence at a time when the rest of the armed opposition was stuck in a military stalemate, yet it has further polarised society and, by heightening the sectarian character of the conflict, reinforced arguments of those it purports to fight”.
But Salafi dominance of the opposition field is not pre-ordained. The country has a history of moderate Islamic practice and long prided itself on peaceful, cross-confessional coexistence. Its citizens have seen, first-hand, the calamitous repercussions of sectarian strife as civil war ravaged two of its neighbours, first Lebanon, later Iraq. Finally, many in the opposition realise that Salafism undercuts its appeal, frightens Syria’s minority groups and worries actual and potential foreign backers.

The opposition has a responsibility: stem the slide toward evermore radical and confessional discourse and halt brutal tactics. So too do members of the international community, quick to fault the opposition for fragmentation and radical drift that their own divisions and powerlessness have done much to foster. As long as different countries sponsor distinct armed groups, a bidding war will ensue, and any hope of coordinating the rebels and restraining their most extremist members will be in vain.

“Much of the debate has focused on whether to arm the opposition – and, if so, by whom and with what, but that’s not the main issue”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “It is, rather, to rationalise and coordinate support to the opposition and help the emergence of a more structured, representative and effective interlocutor in what, sooner or later, must be a negotiated outcome. Even those who side with the regime stand to benefit, if they wish to see today’s devastating military stalemate evolve toward a political solution”.

Executive Summary | Full PDF Briefing
البيان الإعلامي بالعربية

vendredi 12 octobre 2012

Iraq al-Qaeda says it masterminded escape



12 October 2012 / REUTERS, BAGHDAD


Iraq's branch of al-Qaeda said it masterminded a jailbreak
in the northern city of Tikrit last month and smuggled 
weapons to inmates, according to a statement posted
on militant websites.




Dozens of prisoners, many of them convicted members
of al-Qaeda on death row, fought their way out of the 
jail, killing 16 members of the security forces in ensuing
clashes. Al-Qaeda issued a statement saying
it planned the mass escape with prisoners, sent them
arms and detonated a car bomb outside the prison gate
to give them a chance to flee, according to SITE, a group
which monitors extremist websites. Iraq's Interior 
Ministry has accused prison officials of complicity in
the jailbreak.




The country is home to a number of Sunni insurgent groups,
including a local branch of al-Qaeda called the Islamic State
of Iraq, which continue to launch attacks to undermine the
Shiite-led government. Security at prisons was beefed up
following the jailbreak and some inmates were transferred
to fortified jails.

Last September, 35 prisoners facing terrorism charges
escaped via a sewage pipe from a temporary jail in the
northern city of Mosul, an al-Qaeda stronghold.
 

The European Union awarded 2012 Nobel Peace Prize




“The stabilizing part played by the European Union has helped to transform a once-torn Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace” — Nobel committee chairman Thorbjoern Jagland.
———
“We must never forget that, at its origins, the European Union brought together nations emerging from the ruins of the devastating Second World War and united them in a project for peace … The Nobel peace prize council, and in fact the international community, are now sending a very important message to Europe — that the European Union is something very precious, that we should cherish it.” — European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso

Video of Jalal Talabani’s presidential car passing along a street in Baghdad


While thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians continue to be killed all over Iraq: 


60 cars with fully armed security guards are protecting Jalal Talabani's Presidential car passing along a street in Baghdad, you can also hear a helicopter’s engine.



mardi 9 octobre 2012

Six Terrorists arrested in Kirkuk


6 arrested in Kirkuk
08/10/2012
Police sources said here today that a joint force arrested 6 armed men from Diala province.

The arrested belong to the so-called Iraqi Islamic State, who exploded a number of Shiite mosques and killing elders in the province.

The source told Aswat al-Iraq that a joint force with the Kurdish security forces, Asayish, managed to arrest them.

The arrested persons acknowledged exploding vehicles near Shiite mosques in Kirkuk, assassination of elders and armed thefts.

See:

dimanche 7 octobre 2012

Fourth European Parliament - Iraq Interparliamentary Meeting in Brussels




ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli attended the 4th European Parliament – Iraq Interparliamentary Meeting in Brussels



On 25th September 2012 an Iraqi Delegation was received at the European Parliament in Brussels.

The Iraqi Delegation was composed of the following Iraqi MPs:                                            
Mr. Sadiq Humadi AL-RIKABI, Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Ms. Safiya Talib AL-SUHAIL
Mr. Hasan Khudhair Abbas HAMADANI (did not attend)
Ms. Wisal SALEEM ALI
Ms. Ashwaq Najem Al  Deen AL-JAF
Ms. Iman HASAN NEAMAH
And 2 coordinator – staffs: Ms. Amal Hazim AL ZUBAIDI and Ms. Rafeef BASIM MOHAMMED.

Other Attendees (Iraqi side from Brussels):
Ms. Jwan KHIOKA, of the Iraqi Embassy, representing the Iraqi Ambassador to Brussels who was in New York  attending the UN General Assembly
Dr Hassan AYDINLI, Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) EU representative
Mrs. Merry FITZGERALD,  Europe-Turkmen Friendships
Mr. Zana KURDA, KRG Mission to the European Union

Members of the EU Parliament:
Mr. Struan STEVENSON, Chair of the Delegation for relations with Iraq
Mr. Elmar BROK, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Ms. Tarja CRONBERG, Chair of the Delegation for Relations with Iran
Ms. Ana GOMEZ
Mr. Tunne KELAM
Ms. Alexandra THEIN
Mr. Alejo VIDAL-QUADRAS
Ambassador Hansjorg HABER, Director and Civilian Operations Commander of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
Ms. Patricia LLOMBART-CUSSAC, Head of Division Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq at the European External Action Service (EEAS)
Mr. Mario MAURO, Rapporteur Partnership and Cooperation Agreement EU-IRAQ,
Ms. Amalia SARTORI, Chair of ITRE Committee (Industry, Research and Energy)
Ms. Paula ABREU-MARQUES, Head of Unit, DG Energy, European Commission
Mr. Olivier De LAROUSSILHE, Head of Unit South Mediterranean and Middle East, DG Trade, European Commission.
Mr. Jean Barbé, AidCo representative
Mr. Dirk Fokke Toornstra, Director of OPPD
Mrs. Eleonora Catella, Business Association representative,


Before the start of the morning session,  ITF EU Representative, Dr Hassan AYDINLI, welcomed the Iraqi Parliamentarians to the European Capital, wishing them a successful Meeting with the European participants and a fruitful exchange of views with the EU representatives and policy makers.

Having noticed, once more, the absence of a Turkmen parliamentarian in the Iraqi Delegation to the EU Parliament, he deplored this anomaly and complained about it to the head of the Iraqi Delegation Mr. Sadiq AL-RIKABI, telling him that he felt that the Delegation had once more been composed on a wrong basis as it did not represent the Iraqi people entirely, given the absence of a Turkmen representative in the Delegation. Dr Hassan AYDINLI added that unfortunately, this is not the first time that such anomaly has occurred as it seems that it has become a rule in the Iraqi Parliament to marginalize the Turkmens when composing Delegations to visit important foreign countries and institutions like the European Parliament, despite the fact that the same Iraqi Parliament has recognized that the Turkmens represent the Iraqi people’s  third main component.

ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli asked Mr. Sadiq AL-RIKABI to transmit his remarks and his complaint about the absence of a Turkmen representative in the Delegation to whom the matter may concern in Iraq and especially to the President of the Iraqi Parliament Mr. Usama AL-NUJEYFI, hoping that the above mentioned anomaly will cease soon and that a Turkmen representative will be part of all future Iraqi Delegations visiting important foreign capitals and/or institutions.

For resumé of the Meeting please see: