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Iraq’s Insurgents Picking Up Attacks During Ramadan

Monday, July 22, 2013


Ramadan began at the start of July 2013, and so has a new wave of attacks by Iraq’s insurgency. June saw a decline in deaths, but that was apparently because militants were preparing for the holy month to begin. In the first half of July there has almost been twice as many killed as the same time period in June. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) knew that such an offensive was coming, but have proven hapless at stopping it, because of their institutional deficiencies. July is looking to be one of the deadliest of the year highlighting the rebirth of the insurgency, and the weakness of the government to prevent it.



Site of a car bomb in Nasiriyah July 15. This is part of Al Qaeda’s on going bombing campaign in the south (AFP)


Iraq Body Count has recorded a decided increase in violence in July. For the first seventeen days of the month it has reported 480 deaths, compared to 280 in June for that same number of days. As usual, Baghdad has seen the most carnage with 108 deaths, followed by 83 in Diyala, 70 in Salahaddin, 66 in Ninewa, and 48 in Tamim. There has also been a wave of bombings in the south. That led to 14 killed in Basra, 9 in Karbala, 5 in Dhi Qar, and 2 in Maysan. Car bombs and suicide bombers have accounted for the most fatalities, 176 and 123 respectively. After that have been Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 86, and small arms fire 72. A final sign of how bad July has been is the number of days where 30 or more people were killed. So far that has happened six times, with the deadliest day being July 14 when 66 people were killed. For all of June and April there were 7 such days, and July has already surpassed January, February, and March. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was responsible for the vast majority of this violence. Car and suicide bombings are a trademark of their operations. They have also been carrying out attacks in southern Iraq since December 2012. IEDs and small arms are more likely the work of other groups such as the Baathist Naqshibandi, the Islamic Army, Ansar al-Sunna or tribes, all of which have become more active this year. That followed the government raid upon the Hawija protest site in April, which was exploited by militant organizations to try to turn people away from peaceful demonstrations and towards violence.


Deaths By Province, July 2013 – Iraq Body Count
Baghdad – 108 killed
Diyala – 83 killed
Salahaddin – 70 killed
Ninewa – 66 killed
Tamim – 48 killed
Anbar – 29 killed
Babil – 24 killed
Basra – 14 killed
Wasit – 12 killed
Karbala – 9 killed
Dhi Qar – 5 killed
Maysan – 2 killed
Unknown – 10 killed


Forms of Attack, July 2013 – Iraq Body Count
Car bomb – 176 killed
Suicide Bomber - 123 killed
IED - 86 killed
Small arms – 72 killed
Bodies found - 16 killed
Mortar – 7 killed


Deadliest Days, July 2013
7/1/13 43 killed
7/2/13 59 killed
7/11/13 59 killed
7/12/13 49 killed
7/13/13 37 killed
7/14/13 66 killed


For the last several years insurgents have picked up their activities during the summer, so the government knew what was coming, but it has not been able to stop it. On July 1, the Anbar Operations Command said it had a new security plan for Ramadan for example. Two intelligence officials warned the press that Al Qaeda was preparing for a “Battle of Baghdad,” the police in Salahaddin stated that there was going to be a“Battle of Ramadan,” while a member of the Human Rights Commission told the press that there was a plan to increase attacks during the holy month. The government has tried to portray itself as being successful in countering this threat with claims that it killed four top AQI leaders in Anbar at the beginning of July. The reality of the situation is much different. The tactics of the army and police are predictable such as setting up checkpoints or carrying out raids. When the ISF launches an operation it only lasts a few days, and then they leave, allowing militants to move right back in. The intelligence agencies don’t provide actionable reports, and have few sources along the border with Syria, where fighters are now travelling back and forth at will. Finally, the border guard and ISF do not have control of the border area either. Baghdad finds itself in a hopeless situation right now. Just as the insurgency is re-emerging, the government is incapable of countering them. The ISF has become a reactionary force, responding to threats rather than attempting to prevent them as it once did. The failure of these tactics is apparent in July as the police and army prepared for Ramadan, but has not been able to secure the country.


The Iraqi insurgency is making a comeback. It has been able to carry out operations far longer than it has for several years now. This was partly of the government’s own making as it used excessive force against demonstrators, which made many of them and their supporters to give up on peaceful means to influence Baghdad, and have now turned to the use of force. That along with the security forces no longer carrying out counterinsurgency tactics have all contributed to the current rising violence in the country. July is just one of many deadly months that are going to occur in the foreseeable future.

TÜRKALAN KÖYÜ

What Remains after 14th July 1959 of the Massacre of Turkmens? Bilgay Duman

What Remains after 14th July 1959 of the Massacre of Turkmens?
Bilgay Duman, ORSAM Middle-East Specialist

To read the original article in Turkish please click on:
http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=4591

Below is the English translation

Anaların gözyaşlarına hepimiz sebebiz.

Anaların gözyaşlarına hepimiz sebebiz.


Bir anne



Ey Türkmenler! Bir dahaki bombalı saldırıyı mı bekliyorsunuz saha kalkmak için? Bu ne suskunluk, bu ne soğukkanlılık bizdeki. Az sayıdaki Türkmen medyasına bakıyoruz, Tuzhurmatu faciası hakkında kısa kısa haberler, yorumlar 2-3 gün surdu, mevlitler okundu cenaze namazları kılındı görev tamamlandı. Kaldığımız yerden devam. Derken Kerkük teki patlama, ve muhtemelen yine ayni rutin, belki biraz daha sakin, malum mevki sahibi kişiler yoktu içlerinde, ayrıca birde ramazan. 

Burada amacımız eksiklikleri ve sorunları sıralayıp birilerinin bir şeyler yapmasını talep etmek değil. Biz sıradan bir birey olarak gözlemlerimiz doğrultusunda naçizane görüşlerimizi paylaşıp, mümkünse bir kaç kişiyi tekrar düşünmeye ve özeleştiri yapmaya teşvik etmek istiyoruz.

Son olaylar bir dönüm noktasıydı. Durumun vahametinin farkında mıyız gerçekten? Kaç kişinin daha ölmesi gerek, bir 59 katliamı daha mı gerek silkinip kendimize gelmek için? Ya şimdi bir şeyler yapmalıyız yada artık susmalıyız. 

Herkes iyi Türkmen, herkes milliyetçi, herkes dava adamı, herkes birlik beraberlikten dem vurur, Kerkük trüktür trük kalacak, şehitler ölmez vs. vs. vs. İcraat?

Çok basit bir soru: Şimdiye kadar hiç bir Türkmen yetkili gördünüz mü ki desin ben yanlış yaptım, ya da ben bu görevi tam yapamadın, yada milletin yararınaysa ben çekileyim? Burada herhangi birisinden bahsetmiyoruz, sadece zihniyetin bu olduğunu söylüyoruz. Zihniyet bu oldukça nasıl bir araya geleceğiz biz. Biz hala Türkmen’in iyiliği için çalışan insanlara falanın oğlu, filanın kardeşi, falan mahalleden, filan şehirden diye bakarsak ağam sen paşam sen, benim yoldaşım, benim akrabam ne derse ne yapsa doğrudur dersek olduğumuz yerden bir adim ileri gidemeyiz.

Türkmenlere iki parti bile çokken birde Türkmen olmayan partilere destek veriyoruz. Ey millet biz daha oraya gelmedik ki. Biz daha var olmadık ki. İçinde bulunduğumuz dönem Türkmen’in var olma savaşı vermesi gereken dönemdir. Biz sanki kimliğimizi garanti altına alıp "Türkmeneli" kavramını sağlama almışız da çok demokratik bir ülkede yaşıyormuş gibi bin bir parçaya bölünüp, her birimiz değişik partilere gruplara bölünmüşüz. ? Her secimde fiyasko oluyorsa kimse bizi ciddiye almamakta haklı. Sorarlar tabi sen kaç kişiyi temsil ediyorsun diye. Türkiye acaba hangi gruba destek verse? İktidar değişince hangi gruba destek verir acaba? Biz bir tek vücut olmadıkça bir tek ses olmadıkça hiç bir şey elde edemeyiz.
Bu kadar sorun, peki çözüm ne?

Çözümün bir parçası ya da çözüme giden yol, herkesin harekete geçmesi. Birilerinden bir şeyler beklemek değil. Düşünce tarzımızı değiştirmeliyiz, yeni fikirlere açılmalıyız. Irak in dışında yaşayan kaç bin Türkmen var? Bunlar bir kazanç olmalı kayıp değil. Yeni bir örgütlenme oluşturulmalı. Yıllardır ağır aksak kör topal isleyen tabela derneklerinden artık vazgeçilmeli. Siyasallaşmak için adim atılmalı. Mesela bütün Avrupa bir merkeze bağlanmalı, denetleme mekanizması oluşturulmalı. Ama önce cesaret edip yanlışa yanlış diyebilmeli.
Buradan Avrupa’daki bütün dernek veya kuruluş temsilcilerine sesleniyorum, her biriniz inisiyatif alıp diğerleriyle temasa geçin bir kurultay, bir panel, bir toplantı tertibi için acilen harekete geçin. Büyük bir miting veya kampanya veya toplu herhangi bir eylem planlayın. Bulunduğumuz ülke siyasetçilerine toplu olarak seslenin. Türkmenelinde yaşananları hafife almayın. Bu tarihi ve son fırsat. Ya şimdi sesini çıkar yada ben varım deme! Bu geçiş döneminde herkes Şia yada Sünni olduğunu, Kerkük’ten yada Erbil’den olduğunu, hasmını veya dostunu, hepsini bir kenara bıraksın, sadece Türkmen olarak duşunsun. Hepimiz önce kendimizi kendi şehrimizdeki Türkmenleri bir araya getirmek için adim atalım, diğerinden beklemeden önce, SEN adim at, hepimiz adim atalım.

Her fırsatta 3 milyonuz diye övünüyorsak Türkmen olduğumuzdan övünüyorsak ona yakışır davranmalıyız. O topraklarda kahramanca savaşmış devletler kurmuş, hüküm etmiş, hak etmiş ecdadımızın sonu bu mu? Katillerin kurduğu düzene boyun eğmek bize yakışırımı? Biz gerçek mücadeleyi, korkusuzca başkaldırmayı hakkimizi almayı ne zaman unuttuk. Biz en az diğer bütün etnik gruplar kadar Irak in sahibiyiz Türkmenelinin sahibiyiz biz. Ona göre davranalım. 

Bugün herkes sorumludur, bugün susan herkes gelecekte suçludur...
Susma! Sustukça sıra sana gelecek.
Saygılar

Tapu Senedi 90.yilinda LOZAN

KAZANCI EXPLAINED THE RECENT SITUATION IN IRAQ TO TRT TÜRK

KAZANCI EXPLAINED THE RECENT SITUATION IN IRAQ TO TRT TÜRK

Iraqi Turkmen Front Representative Dr. Hicran Kazancı participated in Detay Haber program which is broadcast on TRT Türk and explained how the situation in Iraq became what it is.

Kazancı indicated that after occupying Iraq, the United States was unable to resolve the problems particularly regarding Kirkuk and other controversial areas and said, “The army and security forces were established on ethnic sect separation”. Kazancı emphasized that the Iraqi Constitutional Law used vague phrases regarding Kirkuk and controversial areas, other important issues as well as those dealing with returning lands seized from Turkmen and Kurds in the previous era and said:

“The problems continued. The US deferred them, postponed them but did not resolve or could not resolve them. In 2006-2007 the ethnic sect conflict peaked. But at that time it did not make great waves because 180 US troops were there. They tried to prevent it and did so.”

THE POLITICIANS ARE FAR REMOVED FROM A CULTURE OF COMPROMISE

Kazancı reminded that after the US troops withdrew the problems started to emerge once again and that the problems in Iraq were political and could only be resolved by politicians who were familiar with a culture of compromise. Kazancı underlined that the Iraqi politicians were far from the culture of compromise, that instead of culture of compromise a culture of dissolution had emerged in Iraq, that immediately after the US withdrew first a warrant for arrest was issued for the Vice President who represented the Sunni after which he was given a death sentence and that mosques were attacked during the protests organized on Fridays.

Kazancı also indicated that failure to implement the Arbil agreement was one of the reasons which started the crisis and said, “The crisis blew up when this failure was followed by the budget and energy issue between the central Government and Arbil”.

POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE SHARED IN KIRKUK

Kazanci indicated that Kirkuk was not only significant in terms of economy but also possessed a very important strategic position and because it was not indicated in the constitutional law the status of Kirkuk is a matter for debate. Kazancı said that the Kirkuk issue was not an issue between Baghdad and Arbil, it was also an international issue and as such the resolution was also political and underlined that political and administrative sharing should be carried out.

OUR DEMANDS FOR AN ARMED FORCE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN REJECTED

Kazancı said that after 2003 all the political groups in Iraq acquired an armed forces and commented that, “However, our requests to establish such a security after 2003 have been continuously rejected. If you not possess special forces to protect you in a region where terror is rampant then you become the number one target of terror. That is the case in Turkmen regions”. Kazancı continued to say that: “Our lack of armed forces put us face to face with terror. Time after time we have requested from the Iraqi central government that we ensure our security. These requests were always rejected. For this reason the negligence of the central government has a significant contribution in the targeting of Turkmen.

WE REJECT A REVIVAL COUNCIL BASED ON SECT

Regarding the establishment of a 750 person unit for the Turkmen for security Kazancı commented that, “It is very offensive that political issues get involved with security issues in Iraq”. Kazancı continued by saying: “Any kind of armed formation based on sect is a disaster both for the region as well as for Turkmen. If a Turkmen force is established under the title Revival Council it must be established for all regions. It must be commanded by the Iraqi Turkmen Front. The establishment of an armed unit based on sect will endeavor to deepen the rift between sects even further. That is the intention of those behind this.”

Kazancı drew attention to the fact that so far there had been no ethnic-sect conflict between the Turkmen in Iraq, however as a result of the recent attacks there had been efforts to create discrimination. Kazancı said, “The establishment of such a security force will serve the targets of those trying to create discrimination”. 

THE COMMISSIONS DO NOTHING

Kazancı commented on commissions saying, “The same investigation commission was established after previously committed attacks. However, none of their investigations presented any results”. Kazancı indicated that the commission established after the Tuzhurmatu attack had done nothing and said, “We saw that the full picture displayed a commercial targeting the press”. Kazancı pointed out that those who had incurred damage from terror would be indemnified from the investment budget put aside for Turkmen regions and that the expectations of the Turkmen people were most definitely far from fulfilled.

THE SUPPORT OF TURKEY IS ALWAYS RIGHT BEHIND US

Kazancı indicated that as always the moral support of Turkey for the Turkmen continued and said, “Turkey did what had to be done up to now”. Kazancı said that it was the support of Turkey which enabled the Turkmen to have 3 ministers and 6 members of parliament represent them in the central government and continued to say, “If the  referendum in Kirkuk has been delayed from 2005 to date that is on account of Turkey.  For this reason whatever positive things have happened to the Iraqi Turkmen have incurred with the significant moral support of Turkey”.

Kazancı repeated what Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu had said at the reception of martyr Ali Haşim Muhtaroğlu, “Turkey is always behind you. This is your second home. 76 million are behind you” and emphasized that this was a clear indication of the support Turkey gave to the Turkmen.

The Breakdown Of The Iraqi Army’s Logistics

Posted by Joel Wing


Given the dire security situation that Iraq faced from 2003-2008 it was no surprise that the United States gave little attention to the Iraqi Army’s logistics. It wasn’t until several years after the U.S. invasion that the Americans finally began planning and contracting to develop Iraq’s support network, so that it could maintain its forces and equipment. This went through huge problems including the complete un-interest amongst the Iraqi military leadership for this task. By the time the U.S. withdrew its forces in 2011, several supply depots had been established and a computerized management system was in place. The problem was that the Americans oversaw this network, and when they left the Iraqis weren’t capable of keeping it up and running. The result is that most of the logistics for the Iraqi army has broken down since then.



Iraqis are finding it harder to maintain their equipment like this Humvee because their logistic network is falling apart (U.S. Department of Defense)


In early 2013 General Robert Caslen, the head of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that Iraq’s logistic system had collapsed after the U.S. withdrawal. General Caslen told SIGIR that when the U.S. military pulled out of Iraq it took the structures with it that made sure the Iraqi military could supply and maintain itself. Around December 2012, General Caslen travelled to the spare parts warehouse at the Taji facility, which is the top maintenance base for the Iraqi army. There the general saw shelves packed with parts and the computers for the country’s automated inventory management system. The problem was that the parts were covered with dust, because they were never sent to any Iraqi units to repair anything. As a result, the Taji base had not ordered a single spare part during 2012. The computers Caslen found were not turned on, and had not worked for months. That was because the generators that ran the computers were out of commission. When the U.S. left the base had no contract or budget to provide fuel. That forced Iraqi soldiers to buy it themselves, which turned out to be of low quality, which eventually broke the generators. This was symbolic of the entire supply system for the Iraqi army. After the Americans departed, the Iraqis lacked the care, concern, know how, and interest to keep up the facility, and the entire network running. In turn, it fell apart leaving Iraqi units to fend for themselves. These problems were repeatedly brought up in audits and investigations in the lead-up to the withdrawal.


The Special Inspector General and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense from 2009-2010 issued several reports warning that the Iraqis were incapable of maintaining their supply system for the Iraqi forces. The problems actually started with the Americans. For the first several years after the invasion, the U.S. was only concerned with pumping out as many soldiers as possible. The Americans would do all the training, equipping, and supplying, so nothing was really done about the Iraqis doing that work themselves. Eventually, the U.S. decided to tackle the issue, and the Taji maintenance facility was to be at the forefront of that effort. The company that was contracted to develop the base was originally given a deal for $350 million, but that ballooned to $628.2 million by the time it was done. That was because the job was badly designed, and the orders for it were changed 161 times. The Iraqi Defense Ministry showed no interest in the facility, and the supply network overall, which meant the U.S. had to work on the base longer than expected adding more costs. When Taji was completed there were no Iraqi soldiers trained to use its equipment. The U.S. military stepped in, but the Iraqi army and Defense Ministry again showed little concern, and never sent enough soldiers to fully man the base or go for training. Not only that, but those that were detailed for the task were often pulled out. A July 2009 report by SIGIR for example, found that around 50% of students at Taji were absent at any given time. Of those permanently stationed at the base, 75% had finished their required courses, but they were ranked as marginally skilled. On top of that, only 33% of required troops were ever at the facility. Taji was only one example of how the entire system was flawed. Other issues included the fact that the Iraqi generals valued parts on the shelvesover them being sent to units. That meant the leadership did not want bases like Taji to actually do their job, but simply store parts. Second, the system set up required Iraqi units to go to Taji to get parts rather than having them shipped to them. That would require huge trips, often ones that commanders would not allow. Requests for parts had to go all the way to the division’s general staff, and officers felt if they constantly asked for repairs they would lose standing, so most of them did not make the effort. There was also no guarantee that equipment sent to be fixed would be sent back to their units. Instead, Iraqi soldiers were forced to buy spare parts on the open market, sometimes of spotty quality or scavenge them from other vehicles to maintain their forces. Another factor was that Iraqi divisions were only given fuel for the number of vehicles they had on hand whether they worked or not. That created an incentive for officers to keep as many vehicles on hand as possible, even broke ones, so that they would get their fuel quota. At the top, because the Defense Ministry did not value logistics, and didn’t understand how it worked, it didn’t adequately budget, plan, or maintain it. The only thing that kept the system working was American oversight and advisers. Now that they are gone, the whole thing is collapsing. That has left each Iraqi division to take care of itself, while millions of dollars of parts sit idle in places like Taji.


Rebuilding the Iraqi security forces is considered the only success of the U.S. effort to reconstruct Iraq. A number of divisions were put together. After some huge setbacks, those units eventually took the lead in fighting militants, and performed admirably. Behind the scenes however, American and Iraqi neglect meant that the Iraqi army was only able to field a force, because of the U.S. military was there to ensure that adequate supplies and parts were made available. Once they withdrew the logistics system immediately began deteriorating. Taji Maintenance Depot is a perfect example with parts collecting dust that could be used to keep Humvees and other vehicles running. The Iraqi military leadership is making the situation worse, because they value how many resources are on hand rather than whether they are being used or operating properly. It has never understood the need for maintenance, and until it does the general staff will maintain incentives that will eventually lead to the breakdown of most of its heavy equipment.