INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle

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البيان الإعلامي بالعربية 

Erbil/Damascus/Brussels, 22 January 2013: Syria’s conflict gives its Kurdish population an opening to rectify historic wrongs and push for more autonomy, but facing internal divisions, poor ties with the non-Kurdish opposition and regional rivalries, its challenge is to articulate clear, unified and achievable demands.

Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, the latest International Crisis Group report, examines the growing influence of Kurdish factions in Syria while warning against entanglement in the broader regional battle over Kurdish independence.

“For the foreseeable future, the fate of Syria’s Kurds lies in Syria and rests on their ability to manage relations with the surrounding society and an emerging, pluralistic political scene”, says Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Syria, Egypt and Lebanon Project Director. “They express specific fears and general demands, but need to engage broader society and define a platform to serve as a basis for negotiations”.

Syria’s conflict has given its Kurds an opportunity to escape from a long period of systemic discrimination. Hoping to avoid a new battlefront and banking on Arab-Kurdish divisions to further muddy the picture, the regime largely left Kurds alone. In turn, Syrian Kurdish factions, many with ties to Kurdish groups based in Turkey or northern Iraq, took advantage of the regime’s preoccupation. This is the case in particular of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD), the Syrian offshoot of Turkey’s PKK insurgency, whose military wing has ousted government officials and security forces from many majority-Kurd areas.

Yet, several factors should give Kurdish leaders pause. Kurdish factions are deeply divided over goals and tactics, as well as more petty rivalries. Some accuse the PYD, the largest and most influential group, of being overly dependent on the PKK. Other Kurdish groups are a motley collection of smaller parties that, unlike the PYD, lack an effective military presence within Syria.

Kurdish factions compete not only with each other but also with the non-Kurdish opposition, whose predominantly Arab nationalist and Islamist narratives alienate many Kurds. In turn, Kurds have raised suspicions about their ultimate goals and notably their willingness to remain part of Syria. The more the conflict drags on, the more ethnic tensions build. Already, there are turf battles between PYD fighters and opposition armed groups. Worse clashes may come.

Finally, the Syrian conflict has exacerbated the undeclared fight for the heart and soul of the Kurdish national movement in the four countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran) across which it is divided. Syrian Kurdish parties, like their regional patrons, have different views on tactics: whether to extract concessions by force or engagement and compromise.

“By and large, Syria’s Kurds already have made strides in their quest for greater rights by being masters of their own areas for the first time in the history of modern Syria”, says Maria Fantappie, Crisis Group’s Middle East Analyst. “They plan to parlay new freedoms into constitutional guarantees in the new order that eventually will emerge. But that will only be possible if their parties and youth groups coordinate, reach out to broader Syrian society and make their struggle for Kurdish national rights part of the larger struggle for citizenship in Syria”.

Crisis Group Warns Kirkuk Might Cause Break-up of Iraq

29/03/2011

By MOHAMMED A. SALIH

ERBIL, Iraqi Kurdistan: As the United States prepare for their scheduled complete withdrawal from Iraq by the end of the year, the continuation of tensions over land and resources among Iraq’s various ethnic groups could trigger a serious conflict that might pull Iraq into a state of “political paralysis” or “break-up,” warns the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) in a report on the current state of the disputed territories in northern Iraq.

The 40-page report, published on Monday, cautions against the stand-off between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmarga forces in areas such as Kirkuk, which could “augur trouble for the period after US withdrawal.” In late February, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) dispatched thousands of peshmarga troops to Kirkuk and some other disputed areas in the north of Iraq, with the stated aim of trying to ward off any potential threats caused by a scheduled mass Arab protest across Kirkuk province and other areas. Kurdish officials had accused “terrorists” and elements loyal to the former regime of Saddam Hussein of attempting to use the protests as a pretext to bring down the Kurdish-controlled administrations in Kirkuk and districts in northern Diyala province.

But, the deployment of Kurdish forces created anxiety among some sections of Kirkuk’s population, according to the ICG’s report. “The Kurds are blocking Iraqi forces from entering Kurdistan without their permission, while Kurdish forces can leave their jurisdiction [at will] and come to Kirkuk,” Jamal Shan, head of the Iraqi National Turcoman Party, told the ICG. “We are concerned about the American policy, which is always right behind the Kurds. We are all aware of this American-Kurdish alliance.” The tensions in Kirkuk escalated considerably after the deployment of the peshmarga forces to the city and remarks by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, that described Kirkuk as “Kurdistan’s Jerusalem,” implying that Kurds would not let the city go.

In a statement, Iraqi Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni Arab, called on all parties to “deal with Kirkuk in a way that suits its social and cultural make-up and protects peaceful coexistence among its components,” adding that the key to a solution to the Kirkuk issue was “coexistence and true partnership.” The oil-rich, multi-ethnic province of Kirkuk has been at the heart of decades-long tensions between Kurds on the one side, and other ethnic groups, particularly Arabs and the Iraqi government, on the other. Joost Hiltermann, deputy director of the ICG’s Middle East program, told Rudaw that “unless either a political deal is reached…or a workable alternative arrangement to the combined security mechanism is created without a direct US troop presence,” the chances of conflict in the ethnically-mixed areas of northern Iraq will increase.

Since August 2009, Iraq, Kurdish and US forces have formed joint patrols in the disputed areas as a confidence-building measure to pave the way for joint work between Iraqi and Kurdish troops after the pull-out of US military forces from Iraq. Hiltermann said that, despite early US “acquiescence to the Kurds' control of Kirkuk,” the US was now “increasingly impatient with Kurdish unilateral moves that could cause instability once US troops withdraw.” However, Kurdish officials say the presence of their forces in the disputed areas is meant to establish stability in these volatile regions.

Jabar Yawar, spokesman for the Kurdish Ministry of Peshmarga, said all the extra troops deployed to Kirkuk and other disputed areas had now returned to their bases in the Kurdistan region as the threats in those areas had “for the time being vanished.” But, he said there were currently four battalions of peshmarga forces in the disputed areas, in line with an agreement between the Iraqi government and the KRG. “We will have regular meetings with the Iraqi and US sides in the next eight months in order to agree on a mechanism of cooperation to ensure stability in Kirkuk and other areas,” Yawar told Rudaw. As part of a “status of forces agreement” between the US and Iraqi governments in 2008, the US has to withdraw all its forces from Iraq by the end of 2011.

But, there have been unverified media reports that the US might leave behind a residual force to train and advise the Iraqi military beyond that date. Some observers have suggested that the US should keep some troops in the disputed regions in order to avert any possibility of conflict in those areas. Yawar said that, as Kurds, they wanted the US forces to stay in Kirkuk after 2011, but “it is up to the Iraqi and US governments to make a deal on whether the US troops should stay in Iraq or not.”

In order to facilitate an agreement on the disputed areas, the ICG advises the Iraqi and Kurdish governments to “resume negotiations on the full range of pertinent issues, including the status of disputed territories, a hydrocarbons law, a revenue-sharing law, provincial elections in Kirkuk and a national census.” It also calls for Kirkuk to be granted a “special status as a stand-alone governorate, under neither Baghdad’s nor Erbil’s direct control, for an interim period,” and for the devising of a “mechanism for ultimately resolving its status with a power-sharing arrangement in which political representatives of the main ethnic and religious groups are represented fairly.” While concerns about the fate of Kirkuk persist, there are signs that a possible deal among the province’s various ethnic groups might be possible.

In what appeared to be a deal between the Kurds and Kirkuk’s main Turcoman party, the province’s top administrators were replaced Tuesday. Najmaddin Karim, a member of Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Hassan Turhan, a senior official of the Iraqi Turcoman Front (ITF), now occupy the posts of governor and head of Kirkuk’s Provincial Council respectively. The two posts were, until now, occupied by two Kurdish officials.

The change could represent a deal between the Kurdish and Turcoman parties to divide power, perhaps reflecting the improving ties between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. Several past agreements between the Kurds and successive Iraqi governments have collapsed because of disagreements over the fate of Kirkuk, resulting in renewed conflict. Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kurds managed to assert control over the local administrations in Kirkuk and Kurdish-dominated parts of Diyala and Nineveh provinces.

But, their domination of those areas has met with stiff resistance from many ethnic Arabs and Turcomans, who fear the Kurds are planning a change of demography in their own favor in the disputed areas. Iraq’s constitution, drafted in 2005, has set up a roadmap for the peaceful settlement of the fate of the disputed areas. The roadmap calls for the allowing of families expelled from these areas – mostly Kurds and Turcomans – to return to their homes, while demanding Arab families brought to Kirkuk and other disputed territories by Hussein’s government to be compensated so that they can go back to their original areas in the southern and central parts of the country.

It also mandates a population census in the disputed areas, to be followed by a referendum where the areas’ residents will decide whether they want to join the Kurdistan region or be governed by the federal government in Baghdad. Although the roadmap was to be implemented by the end of 2007, the process is still in its early stages, with no clear date in sight as to when the referendum will take place.

With a comprehensive deal concerning Kirkuk yet to emerge, Hiltermann called on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to publicly release a report it had drafted in 2009 that contains recommendations for possible solutions to the disputed areas. “[UNAMI] should now release [the report] and facilitate the start of direct talks between Baghdad and Erbil. If it has been quiet, it has been because Iraqis were immersed in electoral politics, the elections, and then forming a government, but it now no longer has this excuse.

It's time for UNAMI to step up to the plate. It is not visibly doing so yet,” said Hiltermann.

http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3525.html

Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW MEDIA RELEASE
Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle: New Crisis Group webpage

Istanbul/Brussels, 23 February 2009: The International Crisis is pleased to announce the launch of a new frequently updated webpage covering the nexus of issues surrounding Cyprus, Turkey and the European Union: “Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle”.

This is a critical year for Cyprus as efforts to resolve the long conflict gather steam, and for Turkey as frustration with EU enlargement fatigue weighs heavy on its chances of approaching membership. With Cyprus a member state of the EU and troops from NATO-member Turkey still in the northern half of the island, the inter-relationships are many.

Will Turkey’s efforts to join the Union be formally blocked if it does not normalise its relations with Cyprus by autumn? Will other EU member states that have a negative stance towards Turkey’s membership continue to argue that Turkey has no place in the Union? Will such moves turn Turkey away from the EU, stifle ongoing reform and push Ankara towards other allies? Will the EU’s need to diversify energy sources and the Nabucco pipeline plans affect thinking in Brussels and member state capitals? And how will all these factors affect the search for a final peaceful settlement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, elusive for so many decades?

“Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle”, the new Crisis Group webpage, is an effort to continually revisit these questions and others with frequently updated analysis and commentary following the situation as it unfolds. The point is not to respond to every new diplomatic twist and turn, but to make a reasoned and considered assessment of events and offer recommendations to the key actors with greater immediacy than can be done with a longer report.

Part of the reasoning behind this new webpage comes from the results of the online survey Crisis Group conducted a few weeks ago. Through that poll, we learned that 74% of our subscribers find our themed pages on specific conflicts useful -- our most popular website feature. More than half of the over 11,500 survey respondents said they would like Crisis Group to produce more frequently updated analysis and commentary on our website. Almost as many said they wanted more information from the field.

This new webpage will meet these expectations, with updates and new material once or twice a week from Crisis Group Europe Program Director Sabine Freizer in Brussels and Turkey/Cyprus Project Director Hugh Pope in Istanbul. With these frequent inputs into the public debate, we intend to play our part in the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict in a way that can draw Turkey and the EU closer together.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here

Iraq's Provincial Elections: The Stakes

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes

Baghdad/Brussels, 27 January 2009: Elections on Saturday have a potential to make still fragile Iraq more stable by reversing severe imbalances in provincial governance created four years ago, which generated deep grievances and widespread violence.

Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,* the latest International Crisis Group report, examines how these elections could refresh local governance, test the strength of various parties and serve as a bellwether for nationwide political trends ahead of parliamentary elections later this year. On 31 January, Iraqis will vote in fourteen of eighteen governorates to elect new councils. Participation by parties that boycotted the 2005 elections is expected to reduce the dominance of governing parties whose rule has been marred by mismanagement and corruption. Even if they have taken a hit in public perceptions, however, they remain strong and well-funded, able to mobilise voters around religious symbols and use their institutional power to direct them to candidates of their choice.

“Ruling parties enjoy built-in advantages that will make it hard to translate severe popular disappointment into clear repudiation at the polls”, says Joost Hiltermann, Crisis Group’s Middle East Deputy Program Director. “They will make use of their superior access to wealth and patronage to influence the vote. Fraud is feared in the absence of international observers. And the opposition is hopelessly divided”.

The result of the 2005 electoral boycott was imbalanced provincial bodies often unreflective of popular needs, as well as an accumulation of local grievances. The councils’ failure to deliver basic services has made voters disenchanted with both the religious parties and the clerics that sponsored them.

This explains the rise of a new generation of politicians untainted by corruption, more technocratic in background, less religious in outlook and more nationalist in ideology. They will come to the job with less baggage and better credentials than the current leadership and might be both better equipped and more willing to make the compromises needed to put Iraq on a more stable footing.

“Whereas the January 2005 elections helped put Iraq on the path to all-out civil war, these polls could represent another, far more peaceful turning point”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director. “Despite likely shortcomings, they may begin to redress some of the most severe problems associated with the 2005 vote, assuring fairer representation of all segments of the population”.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601To contact Crisis Group media please click here

*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org

Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/81_turkey_and_iraqi_kurds___conflict_or_cooperation.pdf


INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?

Istanbul/Brussels, 13 November 2008:

Turkey’s newly adroit management of its relationship with Iraqi Kurds has resulted in a tentative victory for pragmatism over ultra-nationalism, but many obstacles remain before relations can be normalised.

Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?,* the latest background report from the International Crisis Group, examines the study in contrasts that has been Ankara’s policy:

Turkey periodically sends jets to bomb suspected hide-outs of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and expresses alarm at the prospect of Kurdish independence, yet it has now significantly deepened its ties to the Iraqi Kurdish region.

“Both Turkey and Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have made a breakthrough in challenging ultra-nationalism”, says Oytun Çelik, Crisis Group’s Istanbul-based analyst. “They should continue to invest in a relationship that, though fragile and beset by uncertainties over Iraq’s future, has become more pragmatic and potentially very fruitful”.

Ankara’s policy toward Iraq is based on two core national interests: preserving that country’s territorial integrity and fighting the PKK, whose rebels use remote northern Iraqi border areas as staging ground for attacks inside Turkey. From Turkey’s perspective, Iraq’s disintegration would remove a critical counterweight to Iranian influence and, more ominously, herald the birth of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that could inspire Kurdish nationalist passions inside Turkey. As a result, it has sought to prevent the sectarian conflict in Iraq’s centre from escalating, Iraqi Kurds from seceding and the PKK from prospering.

Political divisions as to how this should be achieved have yielded a measure of confusion, but the result has been a largely effective compromise, combining military pressure, politics, diplomacy and economic incentives. While it has mounted limited cross-border operations against the PKK, Turkey has begun meeting with Iraqi Kurdish leaders and deepened economic ties with their federal region.

There have been real benefits for the KRG as well. The warming relationship is based on its realisation that U.S. forces may draw down significantly in the next two years, leaving the Kurds increasingly dependent on the federal government and neighbouring states. Turkey can be a useful partner as a bridge to Europe, its suitability as a trans-shipment country for Kurdish oil and gas, its investment capabilities and the relatively better quality of the goods it has to sell.

“More is required to lay the foundations of a lasting, stable relationship, including a peaceful, consensus-based solution to the Kirkuk question”, states Joost Hiltermann, Crisis Group’s Middle East Deputy Program Director. “But, amid the many uncertain prospects facing Iraq, this at least is one development to be welcomed and nurtured”.