Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Sectarian tensions. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Sectarian tensions. Afficher tous les articles

mardi 31 décembre 2013

Sunni monarchs back YouTube hate preachers: Anti-Shia propaganda threatens a sectarian civil war which will engulf the entire Muslim world

PATRICK COCKBURN



Sunday 29 December 2013

Sunni monarchs back YouTube hate preachers: Anti-Shia propaganda threatens a sectarian civil war which will engulf the entire Muslim world



World View: There is now a pool of jihadis willing to fight and die anywhere





Anti-Shia hate propaganda spread by Sunni religious figures sponsored by, or based in, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, is creating the ingredients for a sectarian civil war engulfing the entire Muslim world. Iraq and Syria have seen the most violence, with the majority of the 766 civilian fatalities in Iraq this month being Shia pilgrims killed by suicide bombers from the al-Qa'ida umbrella group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis). The anti-Shia hostility of this organisation, now operating from Baghdad to Beirut, is so extreme that last month it had to apologise for beheading one of its own wounded fighters in Aleppo – because he was mistakenly believed to have muttered the name of Shia saints as he lay on a stretcher.


At the beginning of December, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula killed 53 doctors and nurses and wounded 162 in an attack on a hospital in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, which had been threatened for not taking care of wounded militants by a commentator on an extreme Sunni satellite TV station. Days before the attack, he announced that armies and tribes would assault the hospital "to take revenge for our brothers. We say this and, by the grace of Allah, we will do it".

Skilled use of the internet and access to satellite television funded by or based in Sunni states has been central to the resurgence of al-Qa'ida across the Middle East, to a degree that Western politicians have so far failed to grasp. In the last year, Isis has become the most powerful single rebel military force in Iraq and Syria, partly because of its ability to recruit suicide bombers and fanatical fighters through the social media. Western intelligence agencies, such as the NSA in the US, much criticised for spying on the internet communications of their own citizens, have paid much less attention to open and instantly accessible calls for sectarian murder that are in plain view. Critics say that this is in keeping with a tradition since 9/11 of Western governments not wishing to hold Saudi Arabia or the Gulf monarchies responsible for funding extreme Sunni jihadi groups and propagandists supporting them through private donations.

Satellite television, internet, YouTube and Twitter content, frequently emanating from or financed by oil states in the Arabian peninsula, are at the centre of a campaign to spread sectarian hatred to every corner of the Muslim world, including places where Shia are a vulnerable minority, such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Malaysia. In Benghazi, in effect the capital of eastern Libya, a jihadi group uploaded a video of the execution of an Iraqi professor who admitted to being a Shia, saying they had shot him in revenge for the execution of Sunni militants by the Iraqi government.

YouTube-inspired divisions are not confined to the Middle East: in London's Edgware Road there was a fracas this summer when a Salafi (Sunni fundamentalist) cleric held a rally in the face of objections from local Shia shopkeepers. Impelled by television preachers and the social media, sectarian animosities are deepening among hitherto moderate Sunni and Shia, with one Shia figure in the UK saying that "Even in London you could open the address books of most Sunni without finding any Shia names, and vice versa."

The hate propaganda is often gory and calls openly for religious war. One anti-Shia satellite television station shows a grouping of Shia clerical leaders, mostly from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, labelled as "Satan's assistants". Another asks "Oh Sunni Muslims, how long will you wait when your sons are led to be hanged in Iraq? Is it now time to break the shackles?" A picture of a woman in black walking between what appear to be two militiamen is entitled "Shia men in Syria rape Sunni sisters", and another shows the back of a pick-up truck heaped with dead bodies in uniform, titled "The destiny of Syrian Army and Shia soldiers". Some pictures are intended to intimidate, such as one showing an armed convoy on a road in Yemen, with a message addressed to the Shia saying: "Sunni tribes are on the way".

Sectarian animosities between Sunni and Shia have existed down the centuries, but have greatly intensified since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that followed it. Hatreds increased after the US invasion of Iraq and the takeover of what had been a Sunni-run state under Saddam Hussein by the majority Shia community, which generated a ferocious sectarian civil war that peaked in 2006-07 and ended with a Shia victory. Opposition to Iran and the new Shia-run state of Iraq led to Sunni rulers emphasising the Shia threat. Shia activists point in particular to the establishment in 2009 of two satellite channels, Safa TV and Wesal TV, which they accuse of having strong anti-Shia bias. They say that Saudi clerics have shown great skill in communicating extreme sectarian views through modern communications technology such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, giving them a much wider audience than they had previously enjoyed.

An example of the inflammatory views being pumped out over YouTube is a sermon by Nabil al-Awadi, a cleric in Kuwait, who has 3.4 million followers on Twitter. His speech is devoted to "exposing the biggest conspiracy the Muslim world faces", which turns out to be a plot "conceived in Qom [the Shia holy city in Iran], and handled by sayyids and chiefs in Tehran, to get rid of the nation of Islam, aiming to desecrate the Kaaba [the building in Mecca that is Islam's most sacred site] brick by brick".

Mr Awadi relates that Iraq fell to an enemy whom he does not name, but he clearly means the Shia, often referred to as Safavids after the Iranian dynasty of that name. He says that in Iraq "they were killing the imams with drills in their heads until they are dead and they put the bodies in acid to burn until they died". But the speaker looks forward to a holy war or jihad in Syria, where a great battle for the future of Islam will be fought and won. He warns that "they did not know that jihad is staying and will put fear in their hearts even if they are in Washington, even if they are in London, even if they are in Moscow".

In Egypt, the Shia are only a small minority, but a cleric named Mohamed Zoghbi reacted furiously to the suggestion that they appear on satellite television to debate religious differences. "We would cut off their fingers and cut off their tongues," he said. "I must cut off the Shia breath in Egypt." Bloodthirsty threats like this have great influence on ordinary viewers, since many Egyptians watch religious channels continuously and believe the opinions expressed on them. An example of what this kind of incitement can mean for Shia living in communities where Sunni are the overwhelming majority was demonstrated in June in the small village of Zawyat Abu Musalam, in Giza governorate in Egypt. Some 40 Shia families had previously lived in the village until an enraged mob, led by Salafist sheikhs, burned five houses and lynched four Shia, including a prominent local figure.

Video films of the lynching, which took place in daylight, show the savage and merciless attacks to which Shia minorities in many countries are now being subjected.

Hazem Barakat, an eyewitness and photojournalist, minutely recorded what happened and recorded it on Twitter in real time. "For three weeks, the Salafist sheikhs in the village have been attacking the Shias and accusing them of being infidels and spreading debauchery," he told Ahram Online. Film of the incident shows a man, who looks as if he may already be dead, being dragged through a narrow street in the village by a mob. Among the four dead was 66-year-old Hassan Shehata, a well-known Shia leader who had been twice jailed under Hosni Mubarak for "contempt for religion". Police came to the village but arrived late. "They were just watching the public lynching like everyone else and did not stop anything," said Mr Barakat.

A significant sign of the mood in Egypt is that immediately after the lynchings, a TV host said that Mr Shehata had been killed because he had insulted the Prophet Mohamed's relatives. Several Salafist and conservative Facebook pages are cited by Ahram Online as having lauded the murders, saying that this was the beginning of eliminating all the three million Shia in Egypt.

Given that Shia make up between 150 and 200 million of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, they are a small and usually vulnerable minority in all countries aside from Iran and Iraq, though they are numerous in Lebanon, Pakistan and India. In Tunisia last year, a pro-Palestinian march by Shia in the city of Gabes was attacked by Salafists chanting, "There is no god but Allah and the Shia are the enemies of God." Tunisian eyewitnesses cite the influence of Egyptian and Saudi religious channels, combined with the Salafists claiming to be the last defence against an exaggerated threat of a takeover by Iran and the Shia.

The propaganda war became more intense from 2006 on, when there were mass killings of Sunni in Baghdad which, having previously been a mixed city, is now dominated by the Shia, with Sunnis confined to enclaves mostly in the west of the city. The Sunni community in Iraq started a protest movement against persecution and denial of political, social and economic rights in December 2012. As the Iraqi government failed to conciliate the Sunni with concessions, a peaceful protest movement mutated into armed resistance.

The enhanced prestige and popularity of the Shia paramilitary movement Hezbollah, after its success against Israel's air and ground assault in 2006, may also be a reason why Sunni governments tolerated stepped-up sectarian attacks on the Shia. These often take the form of claims that Iran is seeking to take over the region. In Bahrain, the Sunni monarchy repeatedly asserted that it saw an Iranian hand behind the Arab Spring protests in early 2011, though its own international inquiry later found no evidence for this. When President Obama said in September that Bahrain, along with Iraq and Syria, suffered from sectarian tensions, the Bahraini government furiously denied that any such thing was true.

Social media, satellite television, Facebook and YouTube, which were praised at the start of the Arab Spring as the means for a progressive breakthrough for freedom of expression, have turned into channels for instilling hatred and fear. Fighters in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and other countries beset by violence often draw their knowledge of the world from a limited number of fanatical internet preachers and commentators calling for holy war by Sunni against Shia; often such people are crucial in sending young volunteers to fight and die in Syria and Iraq.

A recent study of dead rebel fighters in Syria by Aaron Y Zelin of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation indicates that jihadi death notices revealing country of origin show that 267 came from Saudi Arabia, 201 from Libya, 182 from Tunisia and 95 from Jordan. The great majority had joined Isis and the al-Nusra Front, both of which are highly sectarian organisations. A deeply dangerous development is that the foreign fighters, inspired by film of atrocities and appeals to religious faith, may sign up to go to Syria but often end up as suicide bombers in Iraq, where violence has increased spectacularly in the past 12 months.

There is now a fast-expanding pool of jihadis willing to fight and die anywhere. The Saudis and the Gulf monarchies may find, as happened in Afghanistan 30 years ago, that, by funding or tolerating the dissemination of Sunni-Shia hate, they have created a sectarian Frankenstein's monster of religious fanatics beyond their control.

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/sunni-monarchs-back-youtube-hate-preachers-antishia-propaganda-threatens-a-sectarian-civil-war-which-will-engulf-the-entire-muslim-world-9028538.html

jeudi 31 octobre 2013

Controversial new law proposes one court for shia, another for sunni

controversial new law proposes one court for shia, another for sunni

 
Last week Iraq’s Minister of Justice announced two new, potential laws that will impact on how ordinary Iraqis divorce, marry and inherit. Supporters of the laws say they should be free to choose whether they want to be judged in a religious court. But opponents of the laws say that by splitting the country in half in legal terms, already heated sectarian tensions will only be inflamed further. 

In the middle of last week Iraq's Minister of Justice, Hassan al-Shammari, announced that two controversial laws – one on personal status and another on judiciary proceedings – had been drafted and that they were being sent to the State Shura Council for review. The Shura Council is responsible for reviewing all draft legislation to ensure conformity with Iraqi law and the Iraqi Constitution.   

The two laws would work together to regulate matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, inheritance and the custody of minors. The first was about personal status  that is, whether one is single, divorced and so forth – and the second would deal with which court made those decisions and arbitrated on those kinds of statuses.

This is all despite the fact that Iraq already has a personal status law, formulated in 1959 and widely considered to be one of the most liberal of its kind in the Middle East.


It’s for this reason that the potential introduction of the two new pieces of legislation is controversial. And it’s even more controversial because, while the old law was seen as being more universal, and not discriminating between Iraq’s different sects and ethnicities, the new laws may well escalate sectarian tensions.

mercredi 13 février 2013

Briefing: A guide to defusing sectarian tensions in Iraq

IRIN Briefing


BAGHDAD, 13 February 2013 (IRIN) - Protests have rocked Sunni-dominated provinces of Iraq for almost two months, raising sectarian tensions in the country’s fragile post-war environment.

Subsequent actions and reactions have raised fears among Iraqis and in the UN of a resurgence of the kind of violence that killed tens of thousands of people during the civil strife of 2006-08.

Bombings on 8 and 11 February - the most recent in continued attacks since the withdrawal of US forces in late 2011 - have killed dozens of people and heightened those fears.

What is behind the recent escalation in tension?

The protests began in December, after Iraq’s Shia-led government arrested 10 bodyguards of a Sunni leader on terrorism charges in what was widely seen to be a political move. The guards of Rafie al-Essawi, minister of finance and a leader in the Iraqiya political Sunni alliance, were arrested just three months after another Sunni leader, Vice-President Tareq al-Hashemi, was sentenced to death in absentia for allegedly running a death squad.

Sunni protesters have expressed a rising sense of their sect’s neglect since Sunni President Saddam Hussein was deposed in 2003. Their demands include more influence on decision-making, the release of detainees (especially female detainees), cancellation of the de-Baathification law (which bans former members of Hussein’s Baath party – mostly Sunnis - from jobs in the civil service), and cancellation of a counter-terrorism law that Sunnis say is being used only against them. There are increasing calls to topple the government.

As the protests swelled, they spread to predominantly Shia provinces, where people showed their support for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shiite, and insisted that no Baath party members be returned to power.

Last week, tensions rose even higher when on 4 February, Wathiq al-Batat, the head of Shia militant group Hezbollah in Iraq, announced the formation of the al-Mukhtar (“The Chosen”) Army. Al-Batat threatened this militia would fight against the protesters if they became controlled by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

“Kurds have their militia to protect them; Sunnis have al-Qaeda; and Shiites have nothing,” he said at a press conference in Baghdad. “That is why we are forming this army - to protect Shiites and Iraqis in general from al-Qaeda and the Free Iraqi Army,” he said, referring to a newly branded Sunni militant group that says it is fighting to topple the government. “We will carry out attacks against them.”

A few days after his press conference, the government issued an arrest warrant against him, though he remains free. Sunnis have since threatened to bring the protests to the streets of Baghdad.

What are the root causes of this sectarianism?
Analysts and political figures point to a re-emergence of sectarian or ethnic identities decades ago.

Hussein’s exclusionary policies and 10 years of sanctions led to a weakening of state institutions, a decline of the secular middle class - especially doctors and engineers - and the re-emergence of communal identities as key elements governing Iraqi society.

"He chose the policy of a one party state. He eliminated all others… then he started to eliminate figures within his party… then he wanted to keep the power within his family only,” explained political analyst Ehsan al-Shimary.

Besides political affiliation to the Baath party, belonging to a certain sect or ethnic group often meant privileged channels to access employment or promotions.

After the fall of the Baath regime, and during the US occupation in the last decade, US policies further reinforced this trend by promoting the idea that Iraqi society was composed of three main communities - Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds - and creating a political system that partitioned political power among these groups.

In this new system, political affiliation and sectarian and ethnic identity had to overlap: most political parties now have a defined sectarian or ethnic nature.

The failure to rebuild an effective Iraqi state has given Iraqis little choice but to return to their sectarian identities to ensure their own security (for example, the civil conflict led to the creation of “Sunni” or “Shia” neighbourhoods within Baghdad) and affiliate themselves with sect-based political parties to access the job market, promotions or even basic service provision.

What is the way out?

Reform the political class

“We need technocrats to rule this country,” said Sheikh Ahmed al-Rahman of the Anbar tribe, who has helped lead demonstrations in Anbar Province, where protests began in December. “In this case, it would not matter to our people if the leader was a Sunni or a Shiite.”

Observers say Iraqi leaders are using sect to promote themselves, and a reversal in their behaviour would go a long way to resolving the problem.

Take Muqtada al-Sadr, a leading Shia politician, who led the Mahdi Army militia during the civil conflict but has since reached out to Sunnis. In a speech about the protests, he told them: “I am with you in your demands and will support you in them, but do not call for the return of the Baath and do not carry Baath flags and slogans.” Days after his speech, Sunni protesters stopped such acts and even carried Shiite flags of Imam Hussain and others, for the first time in Anbar’s history.

At the root of the problem is Iraq’s political crisis, which has left the Iraqi parliament in a stalemate since 2010, unable to move the country forward because of deep-rooted divisions among sectarian-inclined politicians competing for power.

“Politicians must be aware and speak with a calm tone to prevent the political crises from being reflected onto the streets,” said Ali al-Alaq, a Shiite sheikh and member of the parliament’s social affairs committee. “Sometimes a member of parliament gives a speech on TV and the next day we witness an explosion.”

“It is the duty of the Iraqi leaders to find a solution to the current political stalemate in the country,” the special representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq, Martin Kobler, said in a statement after the 8 February bombings. “It is their duty and responsibility to sit together to see what can be put in place to stop this heinous, horrible violence.”

“Sometimes a member of parliament gives a speech on TV and the next day we witness an explosion.”
The International Crisis Group (ICG) insists that the prime minister implement the power-sharing deal negotiated in 2010 and step down at the end of his term, instead of running for a third term in 2014. “In turn,” the ICG wrote in a July 2012report, “his rivals should call off efforts to unseat him and instead use their parliamentary strength to build strong state institutions, such as an independent electoral commission, and ensure free and fair elections.”

Reduce foreign interference
Another important step in diffusing tensions in Iraq is “to diffuse Iranian influence in Iraq, which tries to highlight sectarian differences,” said Walid Khadduri, an Iraq expert and former editor of the Middle East Economic Survey. This will likely prove even harder in the future as Iran loses its traditional foothold in the Middle East (Syria), and as a result looks to Iraq even more closely.

Others, like al-Alaq, point to Turkey as an instigator trying to encourage Sunnis in Iraq to rise up.


Continued...