vendredi 7 mars 2014
What Europe Should Know About US Mass Surveillance
By Edward Snowden
07 March, 2014
Whistleblower Edward Snowden delivers written testimony to European Parliament
What follows is a statement addressed to an investigative panel of the European Parliament looking into the nature and scope of U.S. surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency and its partner agencies in Europe. Subsequent to the statement are specific answers to written questions posed by the panel to Mr. Snowden. The original statement from which this was reproduced is available here as a pdf.
I would like to thank the European Parliament for the invitation to provide testimony for your inquiry into the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens. The suspicionless surveillance programs of the NSA, GCHQ, and so many others that we learned about over the last year endanger a number of basic rights which, in aggregate, constitute the foundation of liberal societies.
The first principle any inquiry must take into account is that despite extraordinary political pressure to do so, no western government has been able to present evidence showing that such programs are necessary. In the United States, the heads of our spying services once claimed that 54 terrorist attacks had been stopped by mass surveillance, but two independent White House reviews with access to the classified evidence on which this claim was founded concluded it was untrue, as did a Federal Court.
Looking at the US government's reports here is valuable. The most recent of these investigations, performed by the White House's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, determined that the mass surveillance program investigated was not only ineffective -- they found it had never stopped even a single imminent terrorist attack -- but that it had no basis in law. In less diplomatic language, they discovered the United States was operating an unlawful mass surveillance program, and the greatest success the program had ever produced was discovering a taxi driver in the United States transferring $8,500 dollars to Somalia in 2007.
After noting that even this unimpressive success – uncovering evidence of a single unlawful bank transfer -- would have been achieved without bulk collection, the Board recommended that the unlawful mass surveillance program be ended. Unfortunately, we know from press reports that this program is still operating today.
I believe that suspicionless surveillance not only fails to make us safe, but it actually makes us less safe. By squandering precious, limited resources on "collecting it all," we end up with more analysts trying to make sense of harmless political dissent and fewer investigators running down real leads. I believe investing in mass surveillance at the expense of traditional, proven methods can cost lives, and history has shown my concerns are justified.
Despite the extraordinary intrusions of the NSA and EU national governments into private communications world-wide, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the "Underwear Bomber," was allowed to board an airplane traveling from Europe to the United States in 2009. The 290 persons on board were not saved by mass surveillance, but by his own incompetence, when he failed to detonate the device. While even Mutallab's own father warned the US government he was dangerous in November 2009, our resources were tied up monitoring online games and tapping German ministers. That extraordinary tip-off didn't get Mutallab a dedicated US investigator. All we gave him was a US visa.
jeudi 6 mars 2014
PolicyWatch 2219 – March 4, 2014 – By Soner Cagaptay & James F. Jeffrey – Issues such as energy dependence, deep-rooted fears of the Russian military, and Black Sea navigation policy all offer clues to Prime Minister Erdogan’s vacillating response to Russian activities in Crimea.
Russian troop deployment in Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula is likely to trigger a reaction from Turkey. Crimea lies only 173 miles from the Anatolian coastline, across the Black Sea. It is home to a community of Turkic Tatars, who are ethnic and linguistic kin of Anatolian Turks and oppose potential Russian annexation of the peninsula. Turkey has established close ties with Ukraine, a useful buffer with the bear to the north, since that country’s independence and will take issue with violation of Kiev’s sovereignty.At the same time, Turkey’s dependence on Russia for around half of its natural gas imports and historic Turkish fears of the Russians will temper Ankara’s reaction to Moscow’s takeover of Crimea. In case of NATO action in the Black Sea, for instance, Turkey would balance its NATO affiliation with its treaty obligations, rooted in the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the access of nonlittoral powers into the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, including the Bosporus. Ankara could adopt a position in the Crimean conflict similar to its stance in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia, another of Ankara’s Black Sea neighbors, with Turkey playing a balancing game between NATO and Russia. In no case will Turkey ignore the treaty, essential to the country’s sense of Great Power status.
CRIMEAN GEOGRAPHY, THE TATAR ISSUE, AND RUSSIA
Covering ten thousand square miles and home to two million residents, the Crimean Peninsula is connected to the mainland through a narrow, swampy isthmus. It is, however, effectively an island, separated from mainland Ukraine and Russia by the Sea of Azov, a Black Sea gulf nearly as large as the peninsula itself. Crimea’s peculiar geography has allowed it to maintain an identity distinct from the Eurasian mainland to its north for much of its history. In the medieval period, Genoa maintained colonies in Crimea. And in the premodern period, Crimea’s population was almost entirely ethnically Turkic and Tatar speaking, making Crimea a khanate in commonwealth with the Ottoman Empire.
Nevertheless, the Russian Empire gradually established control over the territories of the Crimean khanate as it expanded into the Black Sea basin. In 1774, the Ottomans relinquished control of the Crimean khanate, which then became autonomous but was soon absorbed into the Russian Empire. Thereafter, Russia saw Crimea as a vital outlet to the warm seas, establishing its Black Sea fleet in the Crimean deepwater port of Sevastopol in 1783.
During the ensuing centuries, the czars settled many Russians in the peninsula to solidify their rule. Yet even as religious and political persecution of the Tatars led to their mass migration, Crimea’s population was still 39 percent Tatar at the onset of World War II. After the war, Joseph Stalin furthered Crimea’s Russification by deporting the Tatar population en masse to the Soviet interior, together with other targeted groups, alleging that they had collaborated with Nazi Germany.
In 1954, Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a “gift” to Ukraine. Even then, given Crimea’s strategic importance in Moscow’s eyes, the Tatars were not allowed to return to their homes, although other nationalities deported by Stalin were eventually repatriated to their homelands. In another sign of Crimea’s strategic importance to Moscow, Russia kept its military presence in Crimea. As recently as 2010, Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty leasing the Crimean port of Sevastopol to Moscow for use by the Russian navy until 2042.Since the collapse of communism, many Tatars have returned to Crimea. As of the most recent official Ukrainian census, in 2001, the Tatars constitute more than 11 percent of Crimea’s population. According to the same census, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians constitute 59 and 24 percent of Crimea’s population, respectively.
The Tatars vehemently oppose the return of Russian rule to Crimea. Following the ouster of Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovych on February 22, many Tatars took part in anti-Russia rallies in Crimea, otherwise a bastion of pro-Russia sentiment. On February 26, two Tatars were killed and thirty-five injured in these rallies.
CRIMEAN DIASPORA IN TURKEY
Turkey’s large Crimean Tatar diaspora, numbering in the millions, is concentrated in certain provinces, including Eskisehir, Ankara, and Konya, as well as elsewhere in central Turkey. No doubt, the killing of Tatars in Crimea will rile Turkey’s Tatars, resulting in pressure on the Ankara government to oppose Russian control of Crimea. At the same time, while many of Turkey’s Tatars have a secular outlook in politics and tend to support the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Ukraine issue could be a complicating factor for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government as the country prepares for the March 30 nationwide polls for local government.
TURKEY’S ENERGY DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA, AND TURKISH VIEWS OF RUSSIA
Turkey imports around 55 percent of its natural gas needs and 12 percent of its oil from Russia, and it curiously turned to Russia for its first nuclear plant as well. Dependence on these resources has shaped Ankara’s foreign policy toward Moscow, tempering Turkish frustration with Russian policy. For instance, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known for his mercurial style in foreign policy, often criticizing foreign heads of government in public. That tendency notwithstanding, Erdogan treads carefully around Russian president Vladimir Putin. A case in point is Turkish policy in Syria. Even though Russia has blocked international action against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus, effectively undermining Ankara’s policy of helping Assad’s opponents, Erdogan has shied away from picking a fight with Putin, knowing that his country’s economic growth and his political fortunes depend on his ability to maintain a steady supply of Russian gas and oil. Finally, Turkey does considerable nonenergy business with Russia, ranging from massive Russian tourist flows to Turkish investment, exports, and construction and other contract deals involving Russia.
Beyond the energy issue, Ankara suffers from a deep-rooted historic reluctance to confront the Russians. Between 1568, when the Ottomans and Russians first clashed, and the end of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Turks and Russians fought at least seventeen wars. In each encounter, Russia was the instigator and the victor. Having suffered at the hands of the Russians for centuries, the Turks have a deeply ingrained fear of the Russians. This is the reason Turkey opted for NATO membership and U.S. protection when Stalin demanded territory from Turkey and a base on the Bosporus in 1945. Fear of the Russians made Turkey one of the most committed Cold War allies to the United States. The same fear will now make Turkey reluctant to confront Moscow in Crimea.
TURKISH VIEWS ON THE BLACK SEA
A third factor that will dampen Turkish policy against Moscow in Crimea is Ankara’s static view of Black Sea navigation, which is embedded in the Montreux Convention of 1936. As already noted, this treaty limits the navigational rights of nonlittoral states’ navies on the sea. Unlike the post-World War I treaties, which limited Turkey’s control over the Turkish Straits, the 1936 treaty benefited Turkey, allowing it to militarize the straits and manage traffic coming in and out. The weight limitation for nonlittoral states to sail in the Black Sea can be as low as 15,000 tons, limiting a naval presence to two or three surface combatants. If the United States or NATO were to attempt to patrol actively and frequently in the Black Sea to deter Russian policies, Ankara’s vigorous application of the Montreux Convention would have an impact on operational flexibility.
TURKEY’S CRIMEA POLICY LIKELY TO FOLLOW ITS GEORGIA POLICY
In the 2008 Georgia crisis, all these factors came to bear. Ankara recognized that part of Russia’s motivation for its invasion was to limit competition from Azeri and other Caspian Sea states’ gas and oil shipments to Turkey and on to the outside world via Georgia. But concern about Russia’s retaliatory capabilities, particularly with gas sales, and what Turkey saw as the Georgian president’s reckless behavior tempered Turkish reactions. With some hesitation, Turkey facilitated U.S. naval and air movements into the Black Sea and Caucasus region, but it made clear it wanted full coordination in advance and did not want to be dragged into a confrontation with Moscow.
U.S. POLICY SUGGESTIONS
Putin’s gambit in Ukraine will hit a cultural-historical nerve focused on Crimea. But if he moves to neutralize or dominate all of Ukraine, then Turkey will be in an uncomfortable position. Ukraine has served as a buffer between Russia and Turkey — apart from minor Russian holdings on the Black Sea from Rostov to Sochi — since 1991. If Ukraine cannot maintain full independence, Turkey will be faced to its north with a Russia looking more and more like its czarist predecessor, with a record of successful Black Sea aggression, first against Georgia, then against Ukraine. All this comes at a time when the situation to Turkey’s south is extremely unstable. Normally, these factors would suggest closer Turkish consultations with, and reliance on, the United States. But with Prime Minister Erdogan, times are not normal. His view of democracy has a troubling resemblance to that of Putin, with whom Erdogan has a good relationship. Furthermore, and most dangerously, both share a sense of inferiority vis-a-vis a “West” that supposedly ignores their unique past glories and perceived global potential. In sum, while the United States should consult closely with Turkey, as an ally and as the “corridor” for power projection into the Black Sea, Washington must be aware of how erratic Erdogan is likely to be concerning Russia for ideological, historical, strategic, and energy reasons.
Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. His latest book is “The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power” (http://washin.st/RiseofTurkey), published by Potomac Books.
Read about his upcoming book-launch event with NATO commander Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, Ambassador James Jeffrey, and Ambassador Ross Wilson:
James F. Jeffrey is the Institute’s Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey.
mercredi 5 mars 2014
samedi 1 mars 2014
Iraqi Turkmen: MEP Kazak Warns European Parliament About Plight Of Iraqi Turkmen
On 26 February 2014, Metin Kazak, ALDE Coordinator and Vice-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, made a statement during the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, calling on the EU to pay attention to the deteriorating security and human rights situation for Iraqi Turkmen, and growing inter-ethnic tensions. According to Mr. Kazak, the European Commission and the European External Action Service should pressure the Iraqi Government to achieve a peaceful solution regarding the situation of the Turkmen in Iraq.
Below is an article published by the Official Website of Metin Kazak MEP
Metin Kazak, ALDE Coordinator and Vice-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights made a statement on the situation in Iraq during the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg (24 to 27 February, 2014). The Bulgarian MEP noted that 2013 will be remembered as "the bloodiest year" after the war on Iraq and the Iraqi people. He stressed that the European liberals are extremely concerned about the deteriorating security situation of the population, especially the Iraqi Turkmen.
The MEP underlined that the Resolution on "Iraq: the plight of minority groups, including the Iraqi Turkmen" adopted by the EP on March 14, 2013 is seen as a positive step forward, but not a sufficient measure taken by the EU given the current situation. He argued that cultural, religious and economic damages on the Turkmen population are highly visible and that it cannot be ignored by the Union.
Metin Kazak gave as an example the bloody incident in January 2014 in the cities of Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu, where two doctors were kidnapped and killed and 14 explosions killed a total of 20 and injured over 163 Turkmen. "This openly illustrates the existence of deep tensions between ethnic groups in Iraq, which increases the risk of a civil war involving the Iraqi people in bloody clashes," said Kazak.
According to the MEP, the EU should pay special attention to the deteriorating human rights situation of the Turkmen community in Iraq. He said that contractual relations between the two sides and the creation of a legal framework for relations covering political dialogue, trade relations, legal cooperation, human rights, development aid and others were established for the first time by the signing of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation in May 2012. Kazak pointed out that the purpose of the agreement is to significantly expand cooperation with Iraq on key foreign policy issues for the EU such as human rights, the rule of law, non-proliferation of weapons, the International Criminal Court, migration and others, because the situation in the country is directly linked to the overall stability in the Middle East region.
Finally, Metin Kazak called on the European Commission and the European External Action Service to exert additional pressure on the Iraqi government to achieve a peaceful solution on the situation of the Turkmen in Iraq in order to avoid irreversible consequences in the region.
- See more at: http://www.unpo.org/article/16903#sthash.38jETEwK.dpuf
28th February 2014
The suffering is far from over in Iraq, reports Felicity Arbuthnot. It's new dictator is being supported by massive shipments of horrific weapons, while the country remains poor and devastated country, and a covert US re-invasion is under way ...
The greatest crime since World War II has been US foreign policy - Former US Attorney General, Ramsey Clark.
In a Presentation at European Parliament in Brussels on 29th January the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, likened Iraq's justice system to"processing animals in a slaughterhouse".
She also accused Iraq's justice system of being "too deeply flawed to warrant even a limited use of the death penalty, let alone dozens of executions at a time." Torture, sexual abuse and the threat of rape and actual rape are frequently inflicted on detainees, regardless of their gender.
In January this year 38 people were hanged in two days. Last October 42 prisoners were executed in two days, acts Pillay called"obscene and inhuman". Iraq now has the third highest execution rate on earth, according to Amnesty International.
US, UK: selective condemnation of tyrants
However, the US and UK are seemingly remarkably selective when it comes to tyrants who "kill their own people".
Not only have they failed to censure their tyrannical Iraqi puppet, Nuri al-Maliki, but they are also arming him to the teeth with the same weapons which are linked to the horrific birth defects, and cancers throughout the country, which he is now using on "his own people".
Moreover, if allegations from very well informed sources that he holds an Iranian passport are correct, to say that US-UK's despot of choice appears in a whole new political light would be to massively understate.
To facilitate Al-Maliki's assault on Iraq's citizens, the US "rushed" 75 Hellfire missiles to Baghdad in December. On 23rd January Iraq requested a further 500 Hellfires, costing $82 million - small change compared to the $14 billion in weapons provided by America since 2005.
The AGM-114R Hellfire II, nauseatingly named 'Romeo', clocked in at: $94,000 each - in 2012. A shopping spree on weaponry in a country where electricity, clean water, education and health services have all but collapsed since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The re-invasion of Iraq
Two weeks ago an "American cargo jet loaded with weapons" including 2,400 rockets toarm Iraqi attack helicopters also arrived in Baghdad.
Subsequently a contract was agreed to sell a further 24 AH-64E attack helicopters to Iraq"along with spare parts and maintenance, in a massive $6.2 Billion deal."
With them comes the reinvasion of Iraq, with: "hundreds of Americans" to be shipped out"to oversee the training and fielding of equipment". Some are "US government employees" - read 'military' - plus a plethora of "contractors" - read mercenaries.
According to Jane's Defence Weekly, on 15th November 2013 Iraq also took delivery of"its first shipment of highly advanced Mi-35 attack helicopters as part of a $4.3 Billion arms purchase from Russia", out of an order of "about 40 Mi-35 and 40 Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters".
The all to "attack his own people" in the guise of defeating 'Al Qaida' in Anbar province and elsewhere where the people have been peacefully protesting a near one man regime of torture, sectarianism, kangaroo courts which sentence victims who have also had confessions extracted under torture.
vendredi 28 février 2014
A man mourns near the body of his brother, wrapped in a blanket, who was among those killed in a suicide bomb attack at a popular coffee shop in the town of Tuz Khormato in Iraq, July 17, 2006. (photo by REUTERS/Slahaldeen Rasheed)
Turkmen caught between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan
While Iraq’s April 30 general elections approach, the bets are slowly coming up for grabs. The polls matter not only for the Iraqis. The vote, the first since the end of the US occupation, is as crucial for regional actors Turkey and Iran as it is for the United States’ so-called “democracy project.”
Summary⎙ Print Iraqi Turkmen are getting pressure from the Turkish government to work more closely with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq.
Author Fehim TaştekinPosted February 27, 2014
Translator(s)Sibel Utku Bila
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s re-election is Turkey’s nightmare scenario. Turkey believes that bilateral ties stand no chance of improvement as long as Maliki stays in office, diplomatic sources in Baghdad told Al-Monitor. Maliki’s own feelings are no different. He thinks relations cannot be restored with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in charge in Ankara.
Turkey counts on a scenario where Maliki is sidelined by Shiite rivals of his State of Law Coalition, including Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform, Ammar al-Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadr movement. Yet, predictions are difficult to make in a political landscape where 270 parties and 70 coalitions contest the polls, and Maliki still has room to maneuver.
Moreover, the Iraqis I talked to point out that Shiite perceptions of Turkey have soured after the Justice and development Party (AKP) government granted asylum to Iraq’s former Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. Thus, even a Shiite-led government without Maliki does not guarantee a new chapter with Baghdad for Ankara.
There are other serious obstacles, too. Both Shiites and Sunnis have come increasingly to believe that Ankara’s strategic ties with Erbil are a major factor emboldening the Kurdistan Regional Government to drift away from Baghdad. Turkish officials, on the other hand, say privately that too much foot-dragging by Baghdad over a pipeline to carry Basra’s oil to Turkey compelled Ankara to “force certain things” and opt for an oil deal with Kurdistan, braving Maliki’s ire.
What is even more intriguing, Turkey — while courting Erbil to get what it lost in Baghdad — is also about to waste its Turkmen card, which it has already misused for years. Both Turkmen representatives and diplomatic sources say that Turkey, due to its pro-Sunni leaning, has already alienated the Shiite Turkmen.
A Turkmen academic in Baghdad told Al-Monitor, “Turkey’s sectarian policy has pushed the Shiite Turkmen under Iran’s influence.” According to the academic, “Sunni Turkmen are present in the ranks of al-Qaeda, which has been attacking Shiite Turkmen in recent years. Some al-Qaeda-linked people have used buildings of the Turkey-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). As a result, the Shiite Turkmen’s attitude toward Turkey has changed.”
Fevzi Ekrem, a former Shiite Turkmen parliament member from the Sadr movement, dismissed allegations that the ITF made its buildings available for al-Qaeda’s use. Yet, he, too, criticized Turkey for acting as if all Turkmen were Sunni. “The Shiite Turkmen feel they are treated as a stepchild,” he told Al-Monitor.
Ekrem, who identifies himself as “a patriot and nationalist above sects,” said the Turkmen had lost ground not only because of the Kurds, al-Qaeda and the Maliki government but also regional players such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Born to a Sunni-Shiite couple, Ekrem described the gloom in Tuz Khormato to illustrate the Turkmen resentment: “Over the past two years, we have lost 1,000 people in bomb attacks in Tuz Khormato. Another 4,000 have been wounded. Another 165 people have been kidnapped on their way home or to school, and remain unaccounted for. The attacks target the Turkmen neighborhoods in particular. Turkmen who fled the town have formed two whole neighborhoods in Karbala and Najaf. Some have fled to Baghdad as well. Christian Turkmen — the so-called 'fortress infidels' — have also fled the town. The truth is that no one really helped the Turkmen — neither neighboring countries nor the Sunni and Shiite political groups in Iraq. … The neighboring countries are playing a grave game; they want to make Iraq a second Syria. The Turkmen are the big losers, be they Sunni or Shiite. I’ll try to expose this tragedy at an exhibition I’m planning to open soon on al-Mutenebbi Avenue.”
Certainly, not all Turkmen are as pessimistic as Ekrem. A Turkmen employee at a construction company in Baghdad argued that all Iraqi communities were hit by violence and suffered. He underscored that the Turkmen were represented by seven lawmakers and three ministers, and that the government was taking steps for broadcasts and education in the Turkmen language. He was optimistic the community’s conditions would further improve.
Turkmen-Kurdish rapprochement suggested
For years, Turkey used the Turkmen card both against the central Iraqi government and the Kurds. Now the nature of the card appears to be changing. “Turkey is now advising us to get closer to theKurdistan administration. This has sparked serious reactions among the Turkmen,” a Turkmen official said.
A small Turkmen faction, including the Iraqi Turkmen Fraternity Party, favors cooperation with the Kurds. Yet, their favorable stance stems from skepticism toward both Iran, which uses the Shiite card, and Turkey, which counts on the Sunni card.
However, neither the ITF, which Turkey has not only backed but used as a tool, nor Shiite Turkmen groups such as the Iraqi Turkmen Islamic Union that aligns with Shiite Arab parties promoting Iraq’s integrity, are likely to engage with Kurdistan.
Even Turkmen currently in touch with the Kurdish region become agitated when it comes to Kurdish claims over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, the much-coveted “Kurdish Jerusalem.”
Ekrem was equally resentful: “We are being advised to take advantage of the Turkey-Kurdistan rapprochement, but the Kurdish administration has never reached out to us. They have had an eye on our lands, and nothing has changed since 2003. This is not an easy problem to solve. We’ve been through a lot. Those who usurped our lands are out there. The Turkmen population in Erbil has melted away. [Iraqi President] Jalal Talabani does not have a single Turkmen [on his team]. How are we supposed to engage in dialogue under these circumstances?”
Iran’s outstanding policies
While Turkey’s Kurdish and Turkmen cards are failing to yield the desired results, Iran’s maneuvering ability stands out on the Iraqi scene. Despite Turkey’s regional ambitions, it is Iran that has stepped in to settle the in-house rift at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) when it plunged into a leadership crisis after Talabani bowed out. When it comes to efforts to end the political impasse in Kurdistan — without a government for six months — it is again Iran out on the field. The most influential of the Turkmen card is similarly in Iran’s hands.
Having taken the Turkmen for granted, Turkey has only recently realized why they have entered the Iranian sphere of influence. According to a Turkish diplomat, lessons have been learned from past mistakes and a new approach is under way vis-a-vis the Shiite Turkmen. Yet, it seems hard for Ankara to make up, given the perceptions its regional policies have created in Iraq. Gestures like visits to religious shrines appear to just not be enough.
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/turkmen-iraq-kurdistan-turkey-reconciliation-krg.html#ixzz2uc5xR8w4
jeudi 27 février 2014
MEP Metin Kazak: The EU should pay special attention to the deteriorating human rights situation of the Turkmens in Iraq
Un grand merci à Monsieur Metin Kazak, le député qui a le plus oeuvré au sein du
parlement européen pour faire connaître la cause des Turkmènes irakiens.
La Représentation du Front Turkmène irakien auprès de l'Union européenne
For the the original version in BULGARIAN, please see:
MEP Metin Kazak mentioned the bloody incidents and explosions which took place in the cities of Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu, which killed a total of 20 and injured over 163 Turkmens.
Translated by Bing:
Metin Kazak, ALDE Coordinator and Vice-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights made a statement on the situation in Iraq during the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg (24 to 27 February, 2014). Bulgarian MEP noted that past 2013 will be remembered as "the bloodiest year" after the war on Iraq and the Iraqi people. He stressed that European liberals are extremely concerned about the deterioration of the security situation of the population, especially the Iraqi Turkmen.
The MEP stressed that the EP adoption on March 14, 2013 of "Resolution on Iraq: the plight of minority groups, including Iraqi Turkmen" is seen as a positive step forward, but not a sufficient measure taken by the EU, given the current situation. He argued that cultural, religious and economic damage on the Turkmen population are highly visible and can not be ignored by the Union.
This illustrates the existing open deep tensions between ethnic groups in Iraq, which increases the risk of civil war that will involve the Iraqi people in bloody clashes,"
According to MEP Metin Kazak, the EU should pay special attention to the deteriorating human rights situation of the Turkmen community in Iraq. He said that with the signing of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and Iraq in May 2012 for the first time establish contractual relations between the two countries and create a legal framework for relations covering political dialogue, trade relations, legal cooperation , human rights, development aid and others. Mr. Kazak pointed out that the purpose of the agreement is to significantly expand cooperation with Iraq on key foreign policy issues such as human rights, the rule of law, non-proliferation of weapons, the International Criminal Court, migration and others. Because the situation in the country is directly linked to overall stability in the Middle East region.
Finally Mr Metin Kazak called on the European Commission and the European External Action Service to exert additional pressure on the Iraqi government to achieve a peaceful resolution on the situation of Turkmen in Iraq to avoid irreversible consequences in the region.