vendredi 29 mai 2015


Les Turkmènes ont de quoi être inquiets, leur région TURKMENELI entre le marteau et l'enclume (les Arabes au sud et les Kurdes au nord de leur région TURKMENELI).

Les Turkmènes ont de quoi être inquiets, piégés entre le marteau et l'enclume (les Arabes au sud et les Kurdes au nord de leur région TURKMENELI).

Depuis des décennies les Arabes veulent arabiser la région turkmène et depuis l'invasion de l'Irak par les E.U. et la G.B. en 2003, les Kurdes occupent de facto la région turkmène, ils ont envahi Kirkouk, (la capitale culturelle des Turkmènes en Irak) avec le consentement des militaires américains.

Après avoir reçu ERBIL (autre ville turkmène) en 'cadeau' sous le régime de Saddam Hussein, les Kurdes veulent incorporer KIRKOUK dans leur région autonome dans le nord de l'Irak. L'occident doit cesser d'armer les milices kurdes, car tôt au tard les Kurdes utiliseront ces armes contre les Turkmènes.

Pour lire ce que le représentant des Turkmènes irakiens dans l'Union européenne écrivait en février 2007:

pour lire l'article paru dans TRT Net, prière de cliquer sur le lien ci-dessous


Europe-Turkmen Friendships mentioned in the Institute for International Law & Human Rights Report

Europe-Turkmen Friendships mentioned in the Institute for International Law & Human Rights Report
IRAQ's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups:
Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights
PAGE 146 - 
"Iraq's Turkmen community has strong support from Turkmen diaspora organizations such as the EUROPE TURKMEN FRIENDSHIPS organization and other groups. These organizations assist to monitor the human rights and security situation of Turkmen within Iraq and the plight of Turkmen refugees around the world."

Iraqi Turkmen Representatives at the D-IRQ meeting at the European Parliament in Strasbourg

Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative Dr. Hassan Aydinli, is pleased to inform you that the Turkmen cause is on the Agenda of the upcoming Delegation for Relations with Iraq Meeting which will take place at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France on Wednesday 10 June 2015, from 15.00-17.00.

Exchange of views with the Representatives of the Turkmen community in Iraq:

• Hassan Tawfiq Aydinli, Iraqi Turkmen Front EU Representative
• Niyazi Mimar Oglu, Iraqi Council of Representatives, Member

Exchange of views with the Temporal Self-Government of Sinjar, created for the fight against Daesh:

• Said Hassan, Chairman of the Temporal Self-Government of Sinjar (tbc)
• Nouri Mirza, Board Member of the Self-Government and representative of the Yazidi Self-Defence Force (tbc)

Exchange of views with the Representatives of the Assyrian people in Iraq:
• Sharbil Hanna Matty, General of the Assyrian Nineveh Plain Forces
• Youssif Yakoub Matti, President of the Bethnahrin Patriotic Union

jeudi 28 mai 2015

ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli was invited to the HRWF Conference 'In Prison for their Religion or Beliefs' at the EU Parliament in Brussels

Dr. Hassan Aydinli, ITF EU Representative and Ms. Merry Fitzgerald, Europe-Turkmen Friendships were invited by Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) and EPP Group at the EU Parliament to the Conference 'In Prison for their Religion or Beliefs'.

Brussels, 26th May 2015

Prof. Alan Murray, Chair of the European Network on Religion & Belief (ENORB)
Dr. Hassan Aydinli and Mrs. Merry Fitzgerald

The Conference was hosted by MEP Laslo TOKES,
the Moderator was his assistant Ms. Zsuzsa FERENCZY.

A report about 20 countries with religion or belief prisoners along with policy recommendations for the European Union specific to each country. 

In his speech Mr. Willy FAUTRE gave the Reasons for Imprisonment in these countries and he reminded the participants that FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF (FoRB) is a universal human right guaranteed by Article 18 of the UN International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

In 2013, the European Union adopted the EU Guidelines on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Human Rights Without Frontiers International was involved in the drafting process along with religious communities and other civil society organisations. The Guidelines are an important reference tool for EU institutions in third countries for identifying FoRB violations and assisting citizens who have been discriminated against on the basis of their religion or beliefs. The Guidelines also set out the actions and measures that the EU can take at multilateral-fora, regional and bi-lateral levels with regard to countries which fail to respect FoRB.

The purpose of this report is to highlight those states which imprison people for practices that are protected by Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The report also makes policy recommendations to the EU and other international institutions which are in a position to put pressure on the relevant countries to better respect and uphold FoRB.

Dr. Mark BARWICK of HRWF made a presentation about the Targeted Groups.

Mr. Alfiaz VAIYA Project Manager of HRWF and Mr. Jean-Bernard BOLVIN of European External Action Service made FoRB recommendations.

Four members of the EU parliament attended the conference.

The presentations were followed by Questions and Answers and by a Cocktail during which the participants had the opportunity to continue exchanging  views. Dr. Hassan AYDINLI, ITF EU Representative spoke with Mr. Jean-Bernard BOLVIN, Policy Officer, Human Rights and Multilateral Diplomacy - European External Action Service, with Prof. Alan MURRAY, Chair of the European Network on Religion & Belief (ENORB) and with several other participants belonging to human rights associations.

vendredi 22 mai 2015

Have the Kurds lied to Congress?

Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) under the auspices of President Masoud Barzani has been undertaking a full-court press of lobbying in Washington in order to get direct provision of weaponry. The KRG has hired at least four lobbying firms, spending several million dollars, and has leveraged several former officials and businessmen hopeful to have KRG contracts to act as unofficial and, frankly, illegal lobbyists with Congress.

The crux of the Kurdish lobbying campaign is to convince Congress that:

Kurdistan lacks weaponry to fight the Islamic State. Iraqi Kurdistan may seek more weaponry, but a greater problem is that political bickering within the KRG is preventing the weapons from getting where they need to be. After Ramadi’s fall, the largely Kurdish city of Kirkuk is next in the Islamic State’s crosshairs. And yet, Masoud Barzani and his sons Masrour Barzani (chief of the intelligence service) and Mansour Barzani (a general) refuse to deliver weaponry to peshmerga in Kirkuk. The problem? Kirkuk did not vote for Barzani’s political party.The Kurds have acquired weaponry directly from Iran and several European countries. In the idea that he lacks weaponry, Barzani has found an effective tale, and he’s milking it to great effect. Alas, rather than use the weapons against the Islamic State, he is hoarding them for use against his Kurdish political rivals.

Baghdad does not provide weaponry to Kurdistan. Along the lines of the above point, the Kurdish line that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government is refusing to transfer weaponry to the Kurds is an outright lie. It’s simply false. Baghdad doesn’t itself have enough, but what it does get, it shares. Indeed, even the United States government recognizes that in some ways, the KRG is better armed than Baghdad. Check out this State Department press briefing from yesterday (emphasis mine):
“They [the Islamic State] wield these things [car and truck bombs] so they’re totally impervious to a lot of weapons systems that the Iraqis have to try to take them out. It was one of – I have to say it was one of Abadi’s main demands when he was here. He needed a weapon system to defeat suicide VBIEDs. And we made the decision immediately while he was here to get 1,000 AT4 anti-tank systems to Iraqi Security Forces. And those are going to be arriving fairly soon. And that’s specifically, as I understand it – I’ll defer to experts on this, but that’s specifically a kind of close-in weapon system for a VBIED that is coming in your direction. The Peshmerga have been using them to good effect and we’re getting 1,000 to the Iraqi Security Forces.”
So, it seems that despite the complaints of no weaponry, the Kurds have AT4 missiles but have not shared them with Baghdad to help Baghdad defeat the Islamic State. And they are not giving them to Kirkuk, and they refused to provide them to the Yezidis before the fall of Mount Sinjar.

Kurdistan is pro-American and a bulwark against Iran.
 Kurds like America, but the Kurdistan government is opportunistic; it is not ideologically or culturally attached to the United States. Any Congressman who believes lobbyists who use concern about Iran to push deeper relations with Iraqi Kurdistan should request an intelligence briefing. The Iranians have penetrated as deeply into the Kurdish leadership as they have in Baghdad. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Qods Force, the elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans, spends as much time as a guest of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan as he did as a guest of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. There is no intelligence which the United States provides the KRG that does not find its way to Soleimani within hours. Indeed, Barzani has previously betrayed American intelligence and plans to the IRGC. And, while Kurdish leaders say the right things to American congressional delegations in Erbil or during visits to Washington, they say the complete opposite in Iran and to Iranian delegations. Remember, the Kurdish leaders spent their exile years in Iran; ties are deep, even if they are less ties of the heart and more the result of Iranian blackmail and extortion.

Kurdistan is democratic. Most Kurds seek democracy, but its leaders do not. Masoud Barzani is a dictator who refused to step down at the end of his term. Given a choice to be Nelson Mandela or Bashar al-Assad, Barzani chose Assad. The only difference between the two is that American officials still believe the spin of reform when it comes to Barzani. Indeed, Barzani has modeled his Kurdistan Democratic Party after Assad’s Baath Party minus the Arab nationalism; it’s just what he knows. Journalists who criticize Barzani end up in prison or worse. Lobbyists and KRG officials may like to suggest that “Kurdistan is a new Israel.” Like Israel, Kurdistan does respect freedom of religion. But the similarities end there: Kurdistan is not democratic; it does not respect rule-of-law; it restricts press freedom; American and European firms have learned it no more upholds contractual commitments than do China or Turkmenistan; and it does not protect its own people from ISIS.

Every Iraqi should receive weaponry to fight the Islamic State, but Kurdish lies have consequence. Not only does a credulous Congress accepting Kurdish spin fail to correct the real problems preventing Kurdish success against the Islamic State, but it backfires and helps the Iranians. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has bent over backwards to accommodate US interests and nudge Iraqis closer to Iran. Congressional willingness to supply Sunni militias directly with arms (instead of respect the fact that Sunnis are fighting alongside Shi’ites in the Iraqi Security Forces) or to treat Kurdistan as a separate country, whether or not it deserves to be, have only strengthened the hand of the most radical pro-Iranian elements in Baghdad who rightly say that Abadi put his trust in the Americans, and the Congress responded to his outreach by undercutting Iraq. It’s time Congress has a real conversation about Iraq strategy, how best to help Kurdistan, and how to defeat the Islamic State. It should not allow itself to be duped by a family with a flag.

mercredi 13 mai 2015

Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict

Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict

Middle East Report N°15812 May 2015
A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter holds a a rocket-propelled grenade launcher as he takes up position in an area overlooking Baretle village (background), which is controlled by the Islamic State, in Khazir, on the edge of Mosul September 8, 2014.

Loosely organised in an ad hoc coalition, Western countries rushed military aid to Iraqi Kurds in the face of a lightning assault by the Islamic State (IS) in June 2014. They failed, however, to develop a strategy for dealing with the consequences of arming non-state actors in Iraq, a country whose unity they profess to support. Rather than forging a strong, unified military response to the IS threat, building up Kurdish forces accelerated the Kurdish polity’s fragmentation, increased tensions between these forces and non-Kurds in disputed areas and strengthened Iraq’s centrifugal forces. Delivered this way, military assistance risks prolonging the conflict with IS, worsening other longstanding, unresolved conflicts and creating new ones. A new approach is called for that revives and builds on past efforts to transform Kurdish forces into a professional institution.
Despite Western concerns, doing so is unlikely to enhance chances of Kurdish independence. Kurdish parties have become even more dependent, not less, on their alliances with Turkey and Iran since IS’s arrival. Turkey, the country with the ability to give the Kurds the independent revenue stream from oil sales they would need to move effectively toward independence, has given no indication it is prepared to do so and every indication it wishes to preserve Iraq’s unity. Western states’ current practice of channelling weapons to the Kurds via Baghdad and encouraging the two sides to resolve their outstanding disputes over oil exports and revenues also will keep the Kurdish region inside Iraq. Indeed, the development of a professional Kurdish military force is a necessary condition for effective coordination with the Baghdad government in joint operations against IS and in preparing a post-IS political plan.
Coalition military aid is premised on a belief that giving weapons and training to Kurdish forces, known as peshmergas, will in itself improve their performance against IS, a notion Kurdish leaders were quick to propagate. But the evolving state of Iraqi Kurdish politics makes for a rather more ambiguous picture: the dominant, rival parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), have been moving away from a strategic framework agreement that had stabilised their relationship after a period of conflict and allowed them to present a unified front to the central government as well as neighbouring Iran and Turkey. Moreover, their historic leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, are on the political wane, triggering an intra-elite power struggle.
This is, therefore, a particularly fragile moment. Rather than shore up Kurdish unity and institutions, the latest iteration of the “war on terror” is igniting old and new internecine tensions and undermining whatever progress has been achieved in turning the peshmergas into a professional, apolitical military force responding to a single chain of command. In doing so, it is also paving the way for renewed foreign involvement in Kurdish affairs, notably by Iran. And it is encouraging Kurdish land grabs and a rush on resources in territories they claim as part of their autonomous region, further complicating their rapport with Sunni Arab neighbours and the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.
On the face of it, after an initial delivery directly to the KDP in August 2014, Western military aid has been provided to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with prior approval from Baghdad. In practice, however, weapon deliveries from a variety of donors are unilateral, mostly uncoordinated and come without strings regarding their distribution and use on the front lines. As a result, they have disproportionately benefited the KDP, which is dominant in Erbil, the region’s capital, and thus have pushed the PUK into greater reliance on Iranian military assistance and an alliance with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Kurdish rebel organisation in Turkey. In this context, the KDP and PUK, formal partners in a unity government, have shown little inclination to distribute roles or mount joint operations, preferring competition over coordination. As a result, Kurdish forces have been less effective in fighting IS than they could have been.
While coalition members have tied military assistance to acceptance of the central government’s sovereign role in its distribution, they are jeopardising their stated interest in preserving Iraq’s unity. Indeed, by upsetting the fragile equilibrium among Kurds, between Kurds and Sunni Arabs and between the Kurds and the governments in Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, they risk weakening it; moreover, by empowering Kurdish party-based forces, they hasten the state’s de-institutionalisation and invite external interference. Given how fragile and fragmented Iraq has become, one can only wonder how pouring more arms into it could have any chance of making it stronger.
Coalition members, working in coordination, need instead to persuade Kurdish parties to complete the reunification of their parallel military, security and intelligence agencies within a single, non-partisan structure by empowering the KDP-PUK joint brigades and the peshmergas’ most professional elements; to cooperate with non-Kurdish actors in the disputed territories; and to develop a post-IS plan with the central government that cements security cooperation in these territories and moves forward the process of resolving their status through negotiation.
The KRG leadership is overdue in putting its own house in order. It may revel in momentary support for its fight against IS, but old problems will soon return, arguably posing a far more serious threat to the region’s stability than IS by itself could ever represent.
To the governments of the U.S. and other coalition members:
1.  Establish a coalition central command through which to channel military aid to Iraqi Kurds and charge it with:
a) coordinating weapons deliveries to, and training of, Kurdish peshmerga forces by coalition members;
b) ensuring that weapons are exclusively distributed to, and used by, KDP-PUK joint brigades;
c) engaging the peshmerga affairs minister and KDP-PUK joint-brigade commanders on military tactics and the use of coalition-supplied weapons; and
d) conditioning military support on coordination of anti-IS operations with non-Kurdish actors in the disputed territories and the Abadi government, and drafting with the Abadi government a post-IS plan that foresees the reinstatement of local institutions and security forces in these areas.
To the peshmerga affairs minister and the KDP and PUK leaderships:
2.  Establish a joint operations room bringing together the minister, KDP-PUK joint-brigade commanders and relevant security agencies to draft a Kurdish national security strategy that would ease delivery of coalition military aid.
3.  Continue to integrate paramilitary forces into KDP-PUK joint brigades that respond to a single chain of command and refrain from deploying irregular forces against IS.
4.  Improve coordination with the Abadi government and Iraqi army on the provision of weapons and training to the KRG.
5.  Complete integration of the KDP and PUK military, security and intelligence services into the KRG.
To the Kurdistan region presidency:
6.  Encourage consolidation of KRG institutions in general and the peshmerga affairs ministry in particular and their emancipation from partisan control.
7.  Engage the Abadi government on the future of the disputed territories and local institutions and refrain from calls for Kurdish independence.
8.  Redouble efforts to coordinate KRG regional security operations with PKK and PKK-allied forces.
To the government of Iraq:
9.  Develop a joint security strategy with the KRG to counter IS, and work with the KRG to settle outstanding disputes over oil exports and budget allocations.
To the governments of Turkey and Iran:
10.  Support coalition efforts toward institutionalising peshmerga forces and reinforcing their cooperation with the central government.
Baghdad/Erbil/Brussels, 12 May 2015

lundi 11 mai 2015

Team of Turkmen Rescue Foundation in Washington

‎مؤسسة إنقاذ التركمان Turkmen rescue foundation‎'s photo.
مؤسسة انقاذ التركمان في واشنطن
نتيجة الجهود الحثيثة لمؤسسة إنقاذ التركمان في إيصال مظلومية جميع المكونات العراقية بصورة عامة والمكون التركماني على وجه الخصوص الى المحافل الدولية ومراكز القرار في العالم، ولا سيما الدور الكبير لكادر المؤسسة لمشاركتهم في إعداد التقرير الدولي الأخير بعنوان ( بين المطرقة والسندان ، الأقليات في العراق ) والذي صدر بتاريخ ٢٧/٢/٢٠١٥ بجهود اربع منظمات دولية نشطة أهمها "منظمة حقوق الانسان والقانون الدولي الامريكية" وبرعاية مباشرة من قبل "البرلمان الأوربي" حيث تطرق التقرير عن انتهاكات داعش ضد حقوق المكونات الأقليات في العراق.
وعلى هذا الاساس تلقت "مؤسسة انقاذ التركمان" دعوة رسمية من تلك المنظمات الدولية في ‫#‏امريكا‬ لزيارة واشنطن وذلك لمناقشة فقرات التقرير بشكل تفصلي مع الجهات المختصة.
هذا وقد وصل الوفد من العراق يوم أمس إلى العاصمة الامريكية واشنطن برئاسة الدكتور علي اكرم رئيس مؤسسة انقاذ التركمان، وبرفقة العديد من المنظمات ضم من كل المكونات والأقليات العرقية في العراق وذلك للقاء مع المنظمات الدولية المختصة في مجال حقوق الانسان والإغاثة.
المكتب الاعلامي
لمؤسسة انقاذ التركمان

We wish you great success in Washington and please give our regards to Mr. William Spencer.

For your info Dr. Hassan Aydinli, ITF EU Representative, met with Mr. William Spencer several 
times in Brussels, the last time for
the Launch of “Between the Millstones: Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul”
A report of a consortium of NGOs on 27th February 2015. 

Please see:

dimanche 10 mai 2015

UNPO calls for immediate investigation into Attack on Iraqi Turkmen Academic


Photo above: Prof. Dr. Abbas TAQI, Rector of the University of Kirkuk (Turkmen).

May 8, 2015

UNPO Calls for Immediate Investigation into Attack on Iraqi Turkmen Academic

On 4 May 2015, at the University of Kirkuk, a number of armed students arbitrarily attacked the office of the University’s newly appointed President, Dr Abbas Taqi, a prominent academic of Turkmen origin. Dr Taqi was reportedly threatened by the armed men and forced to sign a letter of resignation. The local Government of Kirkuk has turned a blind eye to the incident and no intervention by local security forces has been reported. Instead, official sources claim that Dr Taqi’s resignation was voluntary.

Dr Taqi had been appointed as the President of the University of Kirkuk only two weeks prior to the attack by the Iraqi Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Dr Hussain Al-Shahristani. When announced in the Iraqi Parliament, his appointment caused reactions among MPs who did not consider favourable the idea of having an ethnic Turkmen oversee higher education in the disputed area of Kirkuk. However, convinced that this was not a wilful decision to step down, Minister Al-Shahristani has announced in a written statement that Dr Taqi will continue with his academic assignment as the Head of the University.

While the advance of the so called ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq has had devastating consequences for the Iraqi Turkmen, with Turkmen towns and villages being occupied and the majority of the population displaced, the recent attack on Dr Taqi ought to be seen in light of the marginalisation and discrimination the Turkmen of Iraq have been enduring for years. The emergence of ISIS and its rapid growth has prompted large scale international action, including military and humanitarian support, but the plight of the Iraqi Turkmen has been left underreported. The failure on part of both Kurdish and Iraqi federal authorities to protect Kirkuk’s population has allowed for a dramatic demographic change in the already disputed area, which in turn has caused further tensions, as exemplified through the recent attack on Dr Taqi.

While strongly condemning the attack on Dr Taqi, UNPO calls for an immediate and credible investigation into the incident, as well as into any allegations claiming it may not have been an autonomous initiative of a few violent students. By highlighting this, UNPO strives to draw much needed attention to the ongoing and rapidly increasing tensions in Iraq, and wishes to stress that whereas defeating ISIS represents a crucial short term priority, planning for what comes next is of utmost importance, as tensions between Iraq’s ethnic components, segregation, and discrimination remain serious problems, which – if unaddressed – risk escalating into further violence.

Please find the statement attached.

samedi 9 mai 2015

Comment to ITF U.K. Representative Ms. Sundus Abbas’ re: article published in TNA Turkmen News Agency

Comment to ITF U.K. Representative Ms. Sundus Abbas’ re: article published in TNA Turkmen News Agency

Contrary to what you are implying in your article, Ms. Sundus Abbas, the plight of the Iraqi Turkmens has been very well defended at international level and especially in the European Union since years by Dr. Hassan Aydinli, who is the Iraqi Turkmen Front E.U. Representative based in Brussels, the capital of the European Union. Your constant denigrating of Dr.Hassan Aydinli’s work is simply mean and COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, it DOES NOT SERVE THE TURKMEN CAUSE.

It seems to me that you are not getting your priorities right,  it is not the first time that you are putting your own personal promotion before the Turkmen cause by trying to belittle Dr. Hassan Aydinli’s work in the European Union. This is unacceptable coming from a fellow compatriot and colleague.

Hereunder, to prove that your allegations that the Turkmen cause has not been sufficiently promoted and defended in Brussels are unfounded, are links to articles showing examples of the activities and writings (in English, French, Turkish and Arabic) of ITF’s E.U. Representative Dr. Hassan Aydinli.
There are plenty more.

Given that you are the ITF representative in the U.K. based in London, do you consider that you have sufficiently promoted the Turkmen cause at the Parliaments in London, Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff?
Have you held meetings with Scottish, Northern Ireland and Welsh politicians and decision makers at their respective Parliaments?
What concrete results have you obtained for the Turkmen cause from English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland politicians and decision makers?

Merry Fitzgerald
President of Europe-Iraqi Turkmen Friendships – Belgium.

Declaration of the Turkmen, Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian and Yazidi people of Iraq at the European Parliament in Brussels


A joint delegation representing the Turkmen, Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian and Yazidi peoples of Iraq was received by the Chair of the EU Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs


Iraklı Türkmenler, Keldaniler, Süryaniler, Asuriler ve Kürt Yezidilerin ortak bildirgesi - Hükümi varlığı olmayan kadim Irak haklarına insan haklarının düzeltilmesi için çağrı


Presentation first Common Declaration of the Yezidi, Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian and Turkmen Peoples of Iraq at the European Parliament in Brussels on 19 November 2014


A joint delegation representing the Turkmen, Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian and Yazidi peoples of Iraq was received by the Chair of the EU Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs






ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli met Member of the European Parliament Mr. Metin Kazak


IRAQI TURKMEN PUBLIC HEARING AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND Chairwoman of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights,to Dr Hassan Aydinli


UNPO Expert Speech On Iraqi Turkmen At European Parliament Hearing


ITF EU representative Dr. Hassan Aydinli attended the Delegation for Relations with Iraq meeting at the EU Parliament in Brussels


ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli attended the 4th European Parliament – Iraq Interparliamentary Meeting in Brussels


ITF EU Representative met with the Vice-President of the EU Parliament MEP Laszlo Tokes


ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli represented the Iraqi Turkmens at the International Demonstration in Brussels in favour of Nations without a State


Launch of “Between the Millstones: Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul” A report of a consortium of NGOs 






ITC Avrupa Birliği Temsilcisi, Dr Hassan Aydınlı, Irak Türkmenlerine yapılan İnsan Hakları ve mülkiyet hakkı ihlallerinin Avrupa Parlamentosunda tartışmasını ve durumun Türkmenler lehine düzeltilmesi yönünde Irak Hükümetine baskı yapılması için girişimlerde bulunmuştur.


ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli speaking in Antwerp, Belgium at Workshop: “Archival Awareness” – PRESERVING THE UNIQUE HERITAGE OF INDIGENOUS CULTURES-


ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli met with Minister Brigitte Grouwels and her political advisors in Brussels


ITF EU representative Dr Hassan Aydinli attended the Delegation for relations with Iraq at the EU Parliament




ITF EU Representative Dr Hassan Aydinli met with the Chair of the Iraqi Council of Representatives’ Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Humam Hamoudi




Hassan Aydinli met with MEP Struan Stevenson and William Spencer at the EU Parliament in Brussels


ITF EU representative Dr. Hassan Aydinli met with UNICEF representative for Iraq, Dr. Marzio Babille, at the EU Parliament in Brussels


The Crisis of Unilateralism: The Reality in the Middle East Today.

by Dr. Hassan AYDINLI, Committee for the Defence of the Iraqi Turkmens' Rights, Belgium – speech at Conference in Madrid, Spain