Stalemate, Not
Statehood, for Iraqi Kurdistan
U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry chats with President Masoud Barzani upon arrival
at the Kurdistan Regional Government Presidential Compound in Erbil, Iraq, on
June 24, 2014. [State Department photo/public domain]
Editor’s Note: The Kurds are the largest
nation in the Middle East without a state of their own and their quest for more
rights and at times independence has led to civil wars, unrest, and
near-genocidal levels of killing. Iraq has often been the center of the Kurdish
struggle, and the decline of the Iraqi state since 2003 – and the latest
dysfunction manifest in its efforts to fight the Islamic State – seems to offer
opportunities for Iraqi Kurds to carve out their own state. Denise Natali, an
expert on the Kurds at the National Defense University, challenges this claim.
She argues that the Iraqi Kurds’ current in-between status is likely to endure
and, indeed, offers benefits for Kurdish leaders.
***
Since the creation of a weak federal Iraqi state a decade ago, the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has moved toward what many analysts, pundits, and Kurds consider
a desired end state: independence. Taking advantage of the ambiguous 2005 Iraqi
constitution, disfranchised Sunni Arab community, sectarian conflicts, and
dysfunctional Iraqi government, the KRG has developed
its own energy sector; assumed de
facto control over disputed lands; and created a
cohort of influential supporters to lobby
Kurdish interests in Washington and abroad. These trends
have been further bolstered by the Islamic State threat, which has allowed the
KRG to access U.S. and coalition military support, further expand its
territorial reach, and challenge Baghdad with “independent” oil exports.
Yet a deeper look into the Iraqi Kurdish trajectory reveals a more
complicated and interrupted scenario defined by legal, economic, and geopolitical
constraints. The KRG may have created new “facts on the ground” that strengthen
its internal sovereignty and international recognition, but it remains a
landlocked, quasi-state entity lacking external sovereignty.
This condition means that the degree and nature of Kurdish autonomy,
including any potential for independence, is not determined by unilateral
decisions made by Kurdish elites but rather by the demands, deals, and
incentive structures brokered by powerful regional states and non-state actors.
These influences have not only checked Kurdish leverage and kept Kurds within
the Iraqi state, at least nominally, they have also created necessary political
ambiguity that benefits KRG officials. Maintaining the status quo has allowed
the KRG to realize rights, revenues, and recognition as part of aweak
federal Iraqi state while also pursuing a nationalist agenda
based on victimization, struggle, territorial expansion, and opaque, oil-based
economic development, supported by external networks.
continued./...