http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-displaced5-2008oct05,0,822267.story
From the Los Angeles Times
Iraq too dangerous for many professionals
The brain drain continues as doctors, professors, engineers and other well-educated, affluent or secular Iraqis flee or stay away, nervous about kidnappings and random violence.
By Tina Susman
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
October 5, 2008
BAGHDAD — Naqi Shakir sits on a sagging mattress pushed against a wall. His wife and two daughters perch on tattered sofas and chairs crowded into the one room of the house with signs of family life: personal photographs tacked to the wall, a TV, books, and knickknacks on dusty shelves. Except for a folding table and chairs in the kitchen, nearly everything has been sold so the family can bolt as soon as someone rents the two-story home in a relatively safe Baghdad neighborhood.
At a time when the Iraqi government is encouraging its citizens to return and the U.S. military is highlighting security gains across Iraq, the Shakirs want out. They see no future here for Iraqis such as themselves: well educated, affluent, secular or non-Muslim. Their imminent departure is a major problem facing Iraq, which has suffered a brain drain in the last five years and is struggling to lure back or hang on to educated professionals.
In June, the government raised civil servant salaries 50% to 75% to attract state employees such as teachers and doctors, many of whom were fired after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein. Iraq's Ministry of Displacement and Migration says tens of thousands of people have returned since last fall. But more than 2.5 million Iraqis have fled, and the exodus continues. Political and business leaders believe it will be many years before the loss of professionals can be reversed.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said it monitored numbers at the main border crossing linking Iraq to Syria from January to July this year and found that 7,200 more Iraqis left than entered.
And some say a new U.S. policy opening the door to more Iraqi refugees each year is exacerbating the situation."It's counterproductive," said Raad Ommar, president of the Iraqi American Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Baghdad. "They're trying to achieve their goal on one hand of taking Iraqis to the United States, and on the other hand they're trying to get Iraq stabilized and improve the economy and everything else. The flight of qualified Iraqis is not going to help that."
After the fall of Hussein, the chamber would get 200 to 300 applications when it placed a newspaper ad seeking a staff attorney, public relations executive, engineer or administrative worker. Now, Ommar is lucky to get 20, usually from people sorely lacking in experience and with checkered resumes resulting from wartime upheavals.
Ommar used to say it would take Iraq a couple of years to recover economically. "Now, if I say five years, I'm not confident," he said. "I think, in general, people don't really have much confidence in the future."
More than 7,000 physicians have left, including virtually all who had 20 years' or more experience, said Mustafa Hiti, a member of parliament who sits on its health committee. About 600 have returned, he said, but none are the sort of top-flight specialists needed here.
Most specialists were Sunni Arabs who, to achieve their professional status, were members of Hussein's Baath Party. Even if they did not adhere to its ideology, they were ostracized and forced from their jobs after Hussein was ousted. Now, they do not feel comfortable in a country run by Shiite Muslims, said Hiti, who expressed doubts about the government's commitment to moving away from the so-called de-Baathification policies. "Are the parties in the government now willing to give jobs to the right people, or do they see these jobs as political spoils?" Hiti said.
At the Ministry of Higher Education, spokeswoman Siham Shujairi said 6,700 professors had left Iraq and only about 150 had returned. About 300 have been killed.
Shakir, 65, used to make good money as a customs clearing agent, but he closed shop after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion because of security worries. The family smuggled his son out of the country in 2005 after two kidnapping attempts. The Shakirs' car has been riddled with bullets in a random shooting on a Baghdad street, and a car bomb in the neighborhood damaged their home. "There is nobody upholding justice here," Shakir said as a soap opera flickered on the TV and the family's Pekingese dog ran excited circles across the floor. "You live your life according to chance. Anyone can do anything."
His daughters Rafah and Raghad, both in their 30s, feel pressure to wear veils outside even though the family is Christian. Rafah Shakir tucks her small cross pendant into her shirt when she goes out."I used to have an import-export business. I used to be able to go to my office and work on my own," said Rafah, who is studying to be a human rights lawyer in Sulaymaniya, in the semiautonomous Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. "I can't do it anymore. I can't even wear short sleeves anymore."
Even though security has improved, professionals continue to be targets of assassinations by extremists who see them as being pro-Western or religious infidels. In addition, the power in Iraq lies with conservative Shiites, and there is no sign that will change any time soon. Even if provincial elections, considered key to balancing power among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and others, take place by early next year, the parties now in power probably will come out on top again.
That's because of name recognition and their appeal to religious voters.
A new election law that awaits final approval seeks to address the issue, banning the use of religious symbols and images on ballots.
This scenario, combined with anger over Iraq's failing infrastructure and distrust of its stability, does not encourage moderate Muslims such as Ali, 26, who has a medical degree and hopes to immigrate to the United States. "Nothing is guaranteed. That's the problem," said Ali, who asked that his surname not be used to avoid problems with his employer. "Here, everything is possible -- but in a negative sense." Ali ticked off the frustrations of everyday life: power outages, lack of clean tap water, hours-long waits to buy fuel for cars and generators, and the lack of social life because of most of his friends' departures and the closure of late-night restaurants, nightclubs, and cinemas. "Even if it's safe, if the services are not available it makes life hard," said Ayad Abdul Ameer, an electrical engineer. "
The gas lines -- people just sit there for hours and hours, like they're dead," Ali said, growing visibly infuriated as he spoke. "It's like a Stage 4 cancer," he said of Iraq's growing problems.
Ameer returned to Iraq in April after a year abroad but doesn't plan on staying. He came back because his work visa application was rejected in Oman, and because he needed to repair his house, which had been hit by mortar rounds a couple of months earlier.
Ahmed Farhan, who works as a chef in Scotland, returned to Iraq for the first time in 14 years this month and couldn't wait to leave again. Even though he and his family are Shiites, Farhan said he found the atmosphere stifling and the sight of armed police and soldiers on street corners unnerving."It's a losing battle," he said, arguing against the idea that educated Iraqis such as himself are the best hope for reversing the brain drain.
Hiti, the parliament member, has some hope. He is lobbying the health minister to establish a specially protected zone for doctors and their families to live in, in central Baghdad. That could encourage their return, he said. On Monday, the government said doctors would be allowed to carry guns for self-protection.
At least 176 physicians have been killed since 2003.
Spokeswoman Shujairi said the Ministry of Higher Education has received hundreds of e-mailed requests from professors outside Iraq who want to know how they can return to their jobs.
Hiti, though, hesitated when asked whether he would encourage Iraqi doctors to come home under the current circumstances."I would not give it an absolute 'yes,' " he said, adding that he would prefer his protected zone be finished before doctors return en masse."
Accidents happen everywhere, but the probability in Iraq is very high."
tina.susman@latimes.com
Times staff writers Saif Rasheed, Saif Hameed, Mohammed Rasheed and Caesar Ahmed contributed to this report.
lundi 6 octobre 2008
samedi 4 octobre 2008
Biden's 700 Years and the Dangerous Road to a "Settlement" in Iraq
OPINION
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
3 October 2008
During yesterday’s vice-presidential debate, Joe Biden repeated the basic thrust of Barack Obama’s comments on Iraq one week ago. According to Biden, “John McCain was saying the Sunnis and Shiites got along with each other without reading the history of the last 700 years.”
In other words, Barack Obama’s apparent assumption of an endless conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq was more than a slip of the tongue. Instead this seems to constitute a key ingredient in the Democratic narrative on Iraq: the country can be held together only by a strong ruler, otherwise Shiites and Sunnis would be at each other’s throats. Biden’s incarnation of the argument also served to clarify that Democrats quite literally are thinking of hundreds of years when they advance this contention; by his counting, the problems began in the early fourteenth century. That is certainly a slightly odd place to start, since Baghdad at the time was governed by Mongol rulers who themselves were rather difficult to label, sometimes they were pro-Shiite, sometimes pro-Sunni.
At any rate, even if the exact number of centuries in this case may be attributable to a Biden idiosyncrasy, the main point is clear. Democrats do not think Shiites and Sunnis have any tradition of coexistence in Iraq.
This assumption overlooks the fact that there were in fact no more than three major episodes of large-scale sectarian violence in Iraq prior to the rise of the Baathists: in 1508, 1623 and 1801; in all cases violence was instigated by foreign invaders from Iran or the Arabian Peninsula. Still, many will dismiss this entire discussion. Why should we care about such historical details when there are bigger issues at stake such as the US economy?
The reason these matters are important is that they relate to a more fundamental aspect of Democratic strategy in Iraq which has become clearly evident over the past weeks, despite apparent attempts by Joe Biden to avoid going into too much detail about his notorious “Iraq plans”. Democrats want a “settlement” in Iraq, otherwise they think that US forces will have to be sent back there again. (Biden told reporters a few weeks ago, “Without a political settlement, Tom, we’re going to be back there in another year or two or three or five.”)
A shift to the political sphere instead of the almost exclusive emphasis on the military found among many Republican strategists, now that seems perfectly plausible. But the danger with regard to Democratic strategy has to do with exactly how they want to perform this shift and what sort of knowledge about Iraq is going to inform it.
So far, three tendencies stand out: the Democrats want swiftness, involvement by the neighbours, and a “deal” to end what is seen as “centuries-long” conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis. Also – and this may come as a surprise to those who think of Democrats as less interventionist in the affairs of other nations than neo-Conservatives – Joe Biden’s confidence in America’s superior ability to handle these issues is not inconsiderable. Here are a few more notable quotes from his performance yesterday:
“We took Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, being told by everyone, I was told by everyone that this would mean that they had been killing each other for a thousand years, it would never work [i.e. but we gave them the Dayton accords].”
“When we kicked -- along with France, we kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon, I said and Barack said, ‘Move NATO forces in there. Fill the vacuum, because if you don't know -- if you don't, Hezbollah will control it [presumably this is an interesting way of referring to the process toward UN Security Council Resolution 1701]. "
With regard to Iraq, this kind of arrogant drive towards a “settlement” would threaten to derail potentially positive developments currently going on inside the country, and would play into the hands of the neighbouring countries, especially Iran. It has to be stressed that those positive developments – a cross-sectarian alliance of parties generally seeking to diminish the exaggerated privileges accorded to ethno-sectarian forces in the 2005 constitution – take place despite current US policy, which continues to favour those who put sectarian identity and not Iraqiness first.
Nevertheless, backers of the new political current have managed to move from a situation in which they were in the minority in parliament back in October 2006 (when the law for implementing federalism was adopted) to a position of strength in the summer of 2008 (when they created a parliamentary majority to demand exceptional interim arrangements for Kirkuk instead of a mere postponement of elections there and earned the name “the forces of 22 July”).
These forces have consistently been ignored by the Bush administration. It is now clear that the Democrats, too, are unable or unwilling to detect their existence. But the particularly dangerous aspect of Democratic strategy concerns the eagerness for the “settlement” to be quick and easy.
Today, perhaps for the first time since 2003, it seems realistic to think that Iraq gradually may be able to fix itself, despite US policies that often work to the advantage of those who want to fish in sectarian waters. If the more nationalist forces continue to make advances in the provincial elections they could get to a position where they could contest the 2009 parliamentary elections as a wide coalition through mobilising on shared issues of constitutional reform with enormous resonance among the general population (among the recurrent slogans are “no cession of Kirkuk to Kurdistan”, “no sectarian federalism”, “no decentralisation of the oil sector” and “no ethno-sectarian quotas in government”).
In that perspective, perhaps the best thing the United States could do would be to ensure two rounds of fair and free elections in 2009 and then leave – with a unified Iraq with out without Kurdistan as the most likely result. On the other hand, if we are to have a quick “settlement” based on Biden’s ideas about “700 years of conflict” and other similar guesswork about Iraqi history, then the region could very soon turn into a quagmire far worse than anything seen since 2003.
It is in this perspective it is hard for an outsider to share the viewpoints of American intellectuals who talk of a big difference between Joe Biden and Sarah Palin when it comes to credibility on Iraq.
http://www.historiae.org/biden-palin.asp
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
3 October 2008
During yesterday’s vice-presidential debate, Joe Biden repeated the basic thrust of Barack Obama’s comments on Iraq one week ago. According to Biden, “John McCain was saying the Sunnis and Shiites got along with each other without reading the history of the last 700 years.”
In other words, Barack Obama’s apparent assumption of an endless conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq was more than a slip of the tongue. Instead this seems to constitute a key ingredient in the Democratic narrative on Iraq: the country can be held together only by a strong ruler, otherwise Shiites and Sunnis would be at each other’s throats. Biden’s incarnation of the argument also served to clarify that Democrats quite literally are thinking of hundreds of years when they advance this contention; by his counting, the problems began in the early fourteenth century. That is certainly a slightly odd place to start, since Baghdad at the time was governed by Mongol rulers who themselves were rather difficult to label, sometimes they were pro-Shiite, sometimes pro-Sunni.
At any rate, even if the exact number of centuries in this case may be attributable to a Biden idiosyncrasy, the main point is clear. Democrats do not think Shiites and Sunnis have any tradition of coexistence in Iraq.
This assumption overlooks the fact that there were in fact no more than three major episodes of large-scale sectarian violence in Iraq prior to the rise of the Baathists: in 1508, 1623 and 1801; in all cases violence was instigated by foreign invaders from Iran or the Arabian Peninsula. Still, many will dismiss this entire discussion. Why should we care about such historical details when there are bigger issues at stake such as the US economy?
The reason these matters are important is that they relate to a more fundamental aspect of Democratic strategy in Iraq which has become clearly evident over the past weeks, despite apparent attempts by Joe Biden to avoid going into too much detail about his notorious “Iraq plans”. Democrats want a “settlement” in Iraq, otherwise they think that US forces will have to be sent back there again. (Biden told reporters a few weeks ago, “Without a political settlement, Tom, we’re going to be back there in another year or two or three or five.”)
A shift to the political sphere instead of the almost exclusive emphasis on the military found among many Republican strategists, now that seems perfectly plausible. But the danger with regard to Democratic strategy has to do with exactly how they want to perform this shift and what sort of knowledge about Iraq is going to inform it.
So far, three tendencies stand out: the Democrats want swiftness, involvement by the neighbours, and a “deal” to end what is seen as “centuries-long” conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis. Also – and this may come as a surprise to those who think of Democrats as less interventionist in the affairs of other nations than neo-Conservatives – Joe Biden’s confidence in America’s superior ability to handle these issues is not inconsiderable. Here are a few more notable quotes from his performance yesterday:
“We took Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, being told by everyone, I was told by everyone that this would mean that they had been killing each other for a thousand years, it would never work [i.e. but we gave them the Dayton accords].”
“When we kicked -- along with France, we kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon, I said and Barack said, ‘Move NATO forces in there. Fill the vacuum, because if you don't know -- if you don't, Hezbollah will control it [presumably this is an interesting way of referring to the process toward UN Security Council Resolution 1701]. "
With regard to Iraq, this kind of arrogant drive towards a “settlement” would threaten to derail potentially positive developments currently going on inside the country, and would play into the hands of the neighbouring countries, especially Iran. It has to be stressed that those positive developments – a cross-sectarian alliance of parties generally seeking to diminish the exaggerated privileges accorded to ethno-sectarian forces in the 2005 constitution – take place despite current US policy, which continues to favour those who put sectarian identity and not Iraqiness first.
Nevertheless, backers of the new political current have managed to move from a situation in which they were in the minority in parliament back in October 2006 (when the law for implementing federalism was adopted) to a position of strength in the summer of 2008 (when they created a parliamentary majority to demand exceptional interim arrangements for Kirkuk instead of a mere postponement of elections there and earned the name “the forces of 22 July”).
These forces have consistently been ignored by the Bush administration. It is now clear that the Democrats, too, are unable or unwilling to detect their existence. But the particularly dangerous aspect of Democratic strategy concerns the eagerness for the “settlement” to be quick and easy.
Today, perhaps for the first time since 2003, it seems realistic to think that Iraq gradually may be able to fix itself, despite US policies that often work to the advantage of those who want to fish in sectarian waters. If the more nationalist forces continue to make advances in the provincial elections they could get to a position where they could contest the 2009 parliamentary elections as a wide coalition through mobilising on shared issues of constitutional reform with enormous resonance among the general population (among the recurrent slogans are “no cession of Kirkuk to Kurdistan”, “no sectarian federalism”, “no decentralisation of the oil sector” and “no ethno-sectarian quotas in government”).
In that perspective, perhaps the best thing the United States could do would be to ensure two rounds of fair and free elections in 2009 and then leave – with a unified Iraq with out without Kurdistan as the most likely result. On the other hand, if we are to have a quick “settlement” based on Biden’s ideas about “700 years of conflict” and other similar guesswork about Iraqi history, then the region could very soon turn into a quagmire far worse than anything seen since 2003.
It is in this perspective it is hard for an outsider to share the viewpoints of American intellectuals who talk of a big difference between Joe Biden and Sarah Palin when it comes to credibility on Iraq.
http://www.historiae.org/biden-palin.asp
mardi 30 septembre 2008
Enquête: L'Eldorado irakien
Enquête - Afrique-Asie
http://www.afrique-asie.fr/article.php?article=494
Les sociétés militaires privées occupent une place centrale dans la machine de guerre des États-Unis dans le monde. Elles intéressent la haute finance, à l’origine de cette logique de guerres permanentes et déjà propriétaire d’une partie du complexe militaro-industriel. Quelles sont ces sociétés ? Que font-elles exactement? Qui les possèdent? Quels sont leurs profits?
Le meilleur – ou plutôt pire – exemple de l’essor des activités des sociétés militaires privées est l’actuelle guerre d’Irak. Ce pays, en effet, s’est transformé en terrain d’action privilégié du nouveau marché de la guerre, avec le recours généralisé du gouvernement étasunien à ces firmes. Et, en tout premier lieu, à des mercenaires chargés de missions tactiques.
Mais l’Irak n’est pas le seul : on retrouve aussi les sociétés militaires en Afghanistan, employés notamment par la firme DynCorp, celle-là même qui. Le directeur de Control Risk Group, R. Fenning, explique : « Juste après l’invasion de l’Irak, des milliers d’étrangers sont arrivés pour participer à la reconstruction. Mais l’insurrection a très vite pris de l'ampleur. Ils ont compris qu’ils avaient besoin de protection et se sont tournés vers les armées de la coalition. Or, les officiers ont refusé de leur fournir des gardes du corps : ils n’avaient pas assez d’effectifs et savaient qu’ils ne recevraient pas de renforts. En réalité, les soldats étaient occupés à mener une guerre qui n'était pas censée exister. Alors, les entreprises ont décidé de s’occuper elles-mêmes de leur sûreté. Un énorme marché s’est créé du jour au lendemain… C’est une vraie révolution dans les mœurs de l’administration, qui aura des conséquences sur la conduite des guerres à venir. » (1)
Salariés entraînés, aguerris et disciplinés de MPRI, Blackwater ou Erinys ( lire article p. 18), les combattants privés auraient été 20 000 à la mi-2007, employés pour des missions dites « défensives ». Mais certaines estimations avancent le chiffre de 48 000 paramilitaires privés en activité, pour le compte de 180 sociétés (2), ce qui représenterait le deuxième contingent engagé dans le conflit et correspond au moins aux troupes alliées des États-Unis, soit 23 000 militaires.
En plus des effectifs prenant directement part aux combats, d’autres agents privés s’occupent du gîte et du couvert des militaires étasuniens, mais aussi de la maintenance de systèmes d’armes sophistiqués, comme les avions furtifs ou les bâtiments de la flotte les plus modernes, ou encore de l’ instruction militaire, des interrogatoires et des traductions…
Jusqu’en 2006, le rapport des employés des sociétés militaires privées aux effectifs des armées aurait été de un à dix, ce qui veut dire qu’il aurait été plus que décuplé depuis la première guerre du Golfe en 1991 . Le décompte de « civils » étrangers travaillant sous contrat privé présents en Irak pour y remplir des fonctions traditionnellement assurées par l’armée – y compris la remise en marche et le fonctionnement de l’industrie pétrolière – n’a pas été rendu public.
Le Pentagone communique très peu de chiffres : au printemps 2007, il a cependant reconnu la présence de 300 entreprises de toutes nationalités, employant plus de 125 000 agents en Irak – à comparer au pic de 162 000 soldats étasuniens.
Le 4 juillet 2007, le Los Angeles Times « Plus de 180 000 civils travaillent en Irak sous contrats étasuniens. Ce chiffre [182 000 exactement] comprend au moins 21 000 Américains. » (3) indiquait :
Parmi les combattants privés de la coalition, bien mieux payés que les soldats réguliers, figurent beaucoup de vétérans de l’armée étasunienne, mais également des Britanniques, sans doute en plus grand nombre que le contingent envoyé par le gouvernement Blair. Pour réduire leurs coûts de main-d’œuvre, les sociétés privées vont aussi recruter des militaires à la retraite d’Afrique du Sud – qui ont fait partie d’escadrons de la mort durant le régime de l’apartheid –, du Chili – dont certains ont servi dans les services de sécurité du général Augusto Pinochet –, de Bosnie, ou encore de s Philippines. Ils sont engagés, sous des contrats très flexibles et sur la base de rémunérations souvent cumulables avec leurs pensions de retraite, avec des qualifications allant d’agents de sécurité d’aéroports à la protection rapprochée des hautes personnalités du pouvoir de la coalition. En Irak, les recrues ayant quitté l’armée étasunienne pour aller vendre leurs services aux sociétés militaires privées ne sont pas rares.
En 2004, la société britannique Erinys, fondée trois ans plus tôt et dirigée par un ex-officier du Special Air Service (SAS) – les commandos d’élite de l’armée britannique –, avait déjà déployé à elle seule une force de plus de 16 000 personnes en Irak pour protéger les installations pétrolières. Des Français sont aussi présents là-bas, notamment ceux recrutés depuis octobre 2003 par Earthwind Holding Corporation (EHC), qui a plus d’une cinquantaine d’employés sur le terrain. L’une des plus anciennes sociétés militaires privées, Risk Advisory Group, a aussi ouvert en Irak les bureaux d’une de ses filiales, Janusian.
Fin janvier 2007, c’était la firme KBR – alors filiale du groupe Halliburton – qui était le premier contractant privé du gouvernement des États-Unis en Irak, grâce à plusieurs contrats en dizaines de millions de dollars remportés pour la gestion de bases et l’entraînement des troupes de la coalition (4). Un article du journal Houston Chronicle du 28 janvier 2007 soutenait que KBR disposait à cette époque d’un effectif de plus de 50 000 employés ou sous-traitants, en activité en Irak, mais aussi en Afghanistan et au Koweït (5).
En moins de dix ans, Blackwater USA est devenu l’un des acteurs majeurs sur ce marché. Ex- commando des forces spéciales de l’US Navy, gros donateur des campagnes républicaines et cofondateur de Blackwater en 1996 (avec E. Prince, fondamentaliste chrétien milliardaire), son président, G. Jackson, déclarait au Guardian en 2004 : « La firme a connu une croissance de 300 % en trois ans » (2001-2003) à partir d’ « un petit marché de niche » et dans un contexte où « la privatisation de la sécurité se généralise en Irak ».
L’essor de Blackwater est lié à la guerre au « terrorisme » que livre le gouvernement étasunien depuis le 11 septembre 2001 partout dans le monde. Son Training Center à Moyock ( Caroline du Nord), la plus grande installation privée de tir et d’entraînement des États-Unis, au sud de la base navale de Norfolk (Virginie), la plus grande base navale du monde ( 108 000 marins et marines, soit 11 milliards de dollars injectés par an dans l’économie locale) , a déjà formé plus de 50 000 militaires et agents des forces de l’ordre, notamment aux techniques antiterroristes.
En septembre 2005, après le passage de l’ouragan Katrina à La Nouvelle-Orléans, ses milices armées se sont substituées à la police locale plongée dans le chaos, afin de chasser, à leur manière, les pillards des rues.
À partir de sa spécialité de base (entraînement), elle a diversifié ses activités : pilotes de chasse, parachutistes, conducteurs de blindés… Début 2007, le groupe comptait 2 300 employés, déployés dans une dizaine de pays, mais pouvait mobiliser jusqu’à 21 000 personnes à partir de ses bases de données. Près d’un millier de ses employés, lourdement équipés (avions, hélicoptères, chars…), serait actuellement déployé en Irak.
C’est cette firme qui a reçu les 21 millions de dollars pour la protection de l’administrateur étasunien P. Bremer, jusqu’en juin 2004. Mais le total des contrats avec le gouvernement fédéral que Blackwater a décroché sur les cinq dernières années dépasserait le demi-milliard de dollars.
Après avoir obtenu, fin 2006, un contrat pour du personnel de maintien de l’ordre embarqué dans l’armée étasunienne en Irak et en Afghanistan, la société Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) signait en avril 2007 un nouvel accord de 15 millions de dollars pour former des instructeurs au centre de contre-insurrection de Bagdad.
Cette firme , intégrée à l’opération « Iraqi Freedom », avait été créée en Virginie en 1988 par d’ex-officiers pour recruter des spécialistes placés au service du gouvernement étasunien et lui proposer son expérience opérationnelle des conflits armés. Son président, le général C. E. Vuono, a d’ailleurs commandé les troupes étasuniennes durant la première guerre d’Irak en 1991.
MPRI assure aujourd’hui l’entraînement des officiers de réserve aux États-Unis. Elle tient aussi des centres de recrutement (jusque dans les universités) qui, avec ceux de Serco, une autre société de Virginie servant de recruteur, ont engagé près de 15 000 soldats depuis le début de la guerre en Irak. Chaque recrue rapporte quelque 5 700 dollars à l’entreprise, qui intéresse ses recruteurs aux résultats.
En 2006, la firme comptait près de 3 000 permanents sur le terrain et disposait d’un fichier de 12 000 personnes mobilisables. À l’heure présente, elle opère dans une quarantaine de pays, en plus de l’Afghanistan et de l’Irak, et intervient dans plusieurs programmes financés par le gouvernement étasunien (6) .
(1) Le Monde , « La Guerre en privé », 4 avril 2007.
(2) New York Times , « Death Toll for Contractors Reaches New High in Iraq », 19 mai 2007.
(3) Los Angeles Times, « Private Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Iraq », 4 juillet 2007.
(4) SourceWatch , http://www.sourcewatch.org .
(5) Houston Chronicle, « Contractors Deaths in Iraq Nearing 800 », 28 janvier 2007.
(6) Washington Post , « Army Tries Private Pitch For Recruits », 6 septembre 2006.
http://www.afrique-asie.fr/home.php
http://www.afrique-asie.fr/article.php?article=494
Les sociétés militaires privées occupent une place centrale dans la machine de guerre des États-Unis dans le monde. Elles intéressent la haute finance, à l’origine de cette logique de guerres permanentes et déjà propriétaire d’une partie du complexe militaro-industriel. Quelles sont ces sociétés ? Que font-elles exactement? Qui les possèdent? Quels sont leurs profits?
Le meilleur – ou plutôt pire – exemple de l’essor des activités des sociétés militaires privées est l’actuelle guerre d’Irak. Ce pays, en effet, s’est transformé en terrain d’action privilégié du nouveau marché de la guerre, avec le recours généralisé du gouvernement étasunien à ces firmes. Et, en tout premier lieu, à des mercenaires chargés de missions tactiques.
Mais l’Irak n’est pas le seul : on retrouve aussi les sociétés militaires en Afghanistan, employés notamment par la firme DynCorp, celle-là même qui. Le directeur de Control Risk Group, R. Fenning, explique : « Juste après l’invasion de l’Irak, des milliers d’étrangers sont arrivés pour participer à la reconstruction. Mais l’insurrection a très vite pris de l'ampleur. Ils ont compris qu’ils avaient besoin de protection et se sont tournés vers les armées de la coalition. Or, les officiers ont refusé de leur fournir des gardes du corps : ils n’avaient pas assez d’effectifs et savaient qu’ils ne recevraient pas de renforts. En réalité, les soldats étaient occupés à mener une guerre qui n'était pas censée exister. Alors, les entreprises ont décidé de s’occuper elles-mêmes de leur sûreté. Un énorme marché s’est créé du jour au lendemain… C’est une vraie révolution dans les mœurs de l’administration, qui aura des conséquences sur la conduite des guerres à venir. » (1)
Salariés entraînés, aguerris et disciplinés de MPRI, Blackwater ou Erinys ( lire article p. 18), les combattants privés auraient été 20 000 à la mi-2007, employés pour des missions dites « défensives ». Mais certaines estimations avancent le chiffre de 48 000 paramilitaires privés en activité, pour le compte de 180 sociétés (2), ce qui représenterait le deuxième contingent engagé dans le conflit et correspond au moins aux troupes alliées des États-Unis, soit 23 000 militaires.
En plus des effectifs prenant directement part aux combats, d’autres agents privés s’occupent du gîte et du couvert des militaires étasuniens, mais aussi de la maintenance de systèmes d’armes sophistiqués, comme les avions furtifs ou les bâtiments de la flotte les plus modernes, ou encore de l’ instruction militaire, des interrogatoires et des traductions…
Jusqu’en 2006, le rapport des employés des sociétés militaires privées aux effectifs des armées aurait été de un à dix, ce qui veut dire qu’il aurait été plus que décuplé depuis la première guerre du Golfe en 1991 . Le décompte de « civils » étrangers travaillant sous contrat privé présents en Irak pour y remplir des fonctions traditionnellement assurées par l’armée – y compris la remise en marche et le fonctionnement de l’industrie pétrolière – n’a pas été rendu public.
Le Pentagone communique très peu de chiffres : au printemps 2007, il a cependant reconnu la présence de 300 entreprises de toutes nationalités, employant plus de 125 000 agents en Irak – à comparer au pic de 162 000 soldats étasuniens.
Le 4 juillet 2007, le Los Angeles Times « Plus de 180 000 civils travaillent en Irak sous contrats étasuniens. Ce chiffre [182 000 exactement] comprend au moins 21 000 Américains. » (3) indiquait :
Parmi les combattants privés de la coalition, bien mieux payés que les soldats réguliers, figurent beaucoup de vétérans de l’armée étasunienne, mais également des Britanniques, sans doute en plus grand nombre que le contingent envoyé par le gouvernement Blair. Pour réduire leurs coûts de main-d’œuvre, les sociétés privées vont aussi recruter des militaires à la retraite d’Afrique du Sud – qui ont fait partie d’escadrons de la mort durant le régime de l’apartheid –, du Chili – dont certains ont servi dans les services de sécurité du général Augusto Pinochet –, de Bosnie, ou encore de s Philippines. Ils sont engagés, sous des contrats très flexibles et sur la base de rémunérations souvent cumulables avec leurs pensions de retraite, avec des qualifications allant d’agents de sécurité d’aéroports à la protection rapprochée des hautes personnalités du pouvoir de la coalition. En Irak, les recrues ayant quitté l’armée étasunienne pour aller vendre leurs services aux sociétés militaires privées ne sont pas rares.
En 2004, la société britannique Erinys, fondée trois ans plus tôt et dirigée par un ex-officier du Special Air Service (SAS) – les commandos d’élite de l’armée britannique –, avait déjà déployé à elle seule une force de plus de 16 000 personnes en Irak pour protéger les installations pétrolières. Des Français sont aussi présents là-bas, notamment ceux recrutés depuis octobre 2003 par Earthwind Holding Corporation (EHC), qui a plus d’une cinquantaine d’employés sur le terrain. L’une des plus anciennes sociétés militaires privées, Risk Advisory Group, a aussi ouvert en Irak les bureaux d’une de ses filiales, Janusian.
Fin janvier 2007, c’était la firme KBR – alors filiale du groupe Halliburton – qui était le premier contractant privé du gouvernement des États-Unis en Irak, grâce à plusieurs contrats en dizaines de millions de dollars remportés pour la gestion de bases et l’entraînement des troupes de la coalition (4). Un article du journal Houston Chronicle du 28 janvier 2007 soutenait que KBR disposait à cette époque d’un effectif de plus de 50 000 employés ou sous-traitants, en activité en Irak, mais aussi en Afghanistan et au Koweït (5).
En moins de dix ans, Blackwater USA est devenu l’un des acteurs majeurs sur ce marché. Ex- commando des forces spéciales de l’US Navy, gros donateur des campagnes républicaines et cofondateur de Blackwater en 1996 (avec E. Prince, fondamentaliste chrétien milliardaire), son président, G. Jackson, déclarait au Guardian en 2004 : « La firme a connu une croissance de 300 % en trois ans » (2001-2003) à partir d’ « un petit marché de niche » et dans un contexte où « la privatisation de la sécurité se généralise en Irak ».
L’essor de Blackwater est lié à la guerre au « terrorisme » que livre le gouvernement étasunien depuis le 11 septembre 2001 partout dans le monde. Son Training Center à Moyock ( Caroline du Nord), la plus grande installation privée de tir et d’entraînement des États-Unis, au sud de la base navale de Norfolk (Virginie), la plus grande base navale du monde ( 108 000 marins et marines, soit 11 milliards de dollars injectés par an dans l’économie locale) , a déjà formé plus de 50 000 militaires et agents des forces de l’ordre, notamment aux techniques antiterroristes.
En septembre 2005, après le passage de l’ouragan Katrina à La Nouvelle-Orléans, ses milices armées se sont substituées à la police locale plongée dans le chaos, afin de chasser, à leur manière, les pillards des rues.
À partir de sa spécialité de base (entraînement), elle a diversifié ses activités : pilotes de chasse, parachutistes, conducteurs de blindés… Début 2007, le groupe comptait 2 300 employés, déployés dans une dizaine de pays, mais pouvait mobiliser jusqu’à 21 000 personnes à partir de ses bases de données. Près d’un millier de ses employés, lourdement équipés (avions, hélicoptères, chars…), serait actuellement déployé en Irak.
C’est cette firme qui a reçu les 21 millions de dollars pour la protection de l’administrateur étasunien P. Bremer, jusqu’en juin 2004. Mais le total des contrats avec le gouvernement fédéral que Blackwater a décroché sur les cinq dernières années dépasserait le demi-milliard de dollars.
Après avoir obtenu, fin 2006, un contrat pour du personnel de maintien de l’ordre embarqué dans l’armée étasunienne en Irak et en Afghanistan, la société Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) signait en avril 2007 un nouvel accord de 15 millions de dollars pour former des instructeurs au centre de contre-insurrection de Bagdad.
Cette firme , intégrée à l’opération « Iraqi Freedom », avait été créée en Virginie en 1988 par d’ex-officiers pour recruter des spécialistes placés au service du gouvernement étasunien et lui proposer son expérience opérationnelle des conflits armés. Son président, le général C. E. Vuono, a d’ailleurs commandé les troupes étasuniennes durant la première guerre d’Irak en 1991.
MPRI assure aujourd’hui l’entraînement des officiers de réserve aux États-Unis. Elle tient aussi des centres de recrutement (jusque dans les universités) qui, avec ceux de Serco, une autre société de Virginie servant de recruteur, ont engagé près de 15 000 soldats depuis le début de la guerre en Irak. Chaque recrue rapporte quelque 5 700 dollars à l’entreprise, qui intéresse ses recruteurs aux résultats.
En 2006, la firme comptait près de 3 000 permanents sur le terrain et disposait d’un fichier de 12 000 personnes mobilisables. À l’heure présente, elle opère dans une quarantaine de pays, en plus de l’Afghanistan et de l’Irak, et intervient dans plusieurs programmes financés par le gouvernement étasunien (6) .
(1) Le Monde , « La Guerre en privé », 4 avril 2007.
(2) New York Times , « Death Toll for Contractors Reaches New High in Iraq », 19 mai 2007.
(3) Los Angeles Times, « Private Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Iraq », 4 juillet 2007.
(4) SourceWatch , http://www.sourcewatch.org .
(5) Houston Chronicle, « Contractors Deaths in Iraq Nearing 800 », 28 janvier 2007.
(6) Washington Post , « Army Tries Private Pitch For Recruits », 6 septembre 2006.
http://www.afrique-asie.fr/home.php
lundi 29 septembre 2008
EID MUBARAK - RAMAZAN MUBARAK
Dawn on the Tigris
EID MUBARAK - RAMAZAN BAYRAMINIZ MÜBAREK OLSUN
A l'occasion du mois de Ramadan je souhaite PAIX, PROSPERITE et PROGRES à l'ensemble du monde musulman.
I wish the Muslim World PEACE, PROSPERITY and PROGRESS.
samedi 27 septembre 2008
ERGEÇ: SEÇİM YASASININ ONAYLANMASI BİR KAZANÇTIR
Aylardı Irak parlamentosunun gündeminde bir kriz haline dönüşen vilayetler sçimi yasası nihayet onaylandı .Irak parlamanosunun 24 Eylül günü yaptığı toplantıda ( Kerkük hariç) vilayetler seçim yasasını oy birliğiyle onayladı bu konuyla ilgili DHA'ya bir açıklamada buluna Irak Türkmen Cephesi başkanı ve millet vekili Dr. Sadettin Ergeç şunlara değindi:Geçen süre içerisinde parlamantoda bu konuyla ilgili çok tartışmalar oldu ama netice itibariyle bu sonuca vardık bu sonuç bizce bir kazançtır çünkü parlamanto tarafından onaylanan bu yasa şu önemli noktaları içermektedir :
1- Kerkük'ün idaresi Kerkük halkı arasında eşit bir şekilde dağıtılacak.
2- Kerkükteki ana görevler ( Vali , Meclis başkanı ) gibi görevler yine eşit bir şekilde dağıtılacak.
3- bu konuyla ilgili komisyonlar kuruldu bu komisyonlar en önemli görevi yıllardı bağırıp çağırdığımız tecavuz meselesini hal edecek .
4- nüfus kütüklerini gözden geçirmek.Son olarak Kerkük'ü özel bir vilayet bir vilayet tanımak bizce çok önemli bir noktadır. dedi
vendredi 26 septembre 2008
Tensions between Iraq's ethnic groups
A new divide
Arab-Kurd strife might shape future Iraqi politics, writes Saif Nasrawi
Rising tensions between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds over a proposed provincial elections law and the redeployment of Kurdish military forces outside Iraq's ethnically mixed cities indicate a potentially grave ethnic divide that could tear apart an already fragile nation.
Over the last three weeks, Iraqi Arab and Kurdish lawmakers have been intensely quarrelling over passing legislation to move forward with provincial elections originally scheduled for October. UN officials had suggested moving ahead with the vote in all provinces except Kirkuk, pending a committee determining the status of the northern oil-rich city.
The Iraqi parliament Tuesday failed for the sixth time this month to reach agreement on a proposal put forward by Stephen de Mistura, UN special representative in Iraq, to postpone elections in Kirkuk while the remaining 17 Iraqi provinces go to the polls.
Earlier this month, Mistura proposed forming a parliamentary committee of Kirkuk's major ethnic groups to draft a specific electoral law for the city no later than 31 March 2009 alongside a census to identify the exact demographic composition of Kirkuk.
Arab and Turkomen political factions have rejected the fourth article in Mistura's proposal that gives the largely Kurdish-dominated local government of Kirkuk the principal supervisory role over the committee, a condition they view as favouring the Kurds who also maintain a strong military presence in the city located 260 kilometres north of Baghdad.
Omar Al-Juburi, a prominent Sunni lawmaker, accused Kurdish leaders of trying to undermine the powers granted to the central government by the constitution. "Arabs and Turkomens are worried by the Kurds' insistence to control the Kirkuk committee," he told reporters Tuesday.
Al-Juburi added that the Iraqi constitution clearly stipulates that organising local and national polls is the sole responsibility of the central government.
Similar reservations were echoed by Turkomen leaders who have raised fears of ongoing plans to annex Kirkuk to Kurdistan, the highly autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. "We don't trust the local government of Kirkuk as the Kurds occupy over 90 per cent of its seats," Hassan Touran, a leading member of the Turkomen Front of Iraq, said.
Kurds, on the other hand, have strongly condemned continued controversy over Kirkuk, considering it prelude to retreat from a constitutional commitment to create a federal system in Iraq.
"The Kurds have given their utmost concessions so far," Adnan Al-Mufti, the parliamentary speaker in Kurdistan said. "Everybody must be responsible for keeping [to] a federal Iraq," he told Kurdish lawmakers during a parliamentary session Tuesday.
Adnan added that current disputes over the provincial elections law "must not be portrayed as a national struggle between Arabs and Kurds".
Masoud Al-Barzani, chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, suggested Monday that recent political developments in Iraq concern redefining the foundations of the political process, especially the establishment of a federal government. "The impasse between Baghdad and Irbil [the capital of Iraq's Kurdistan region] is basically about the different interpretations of the constitution and the power-sharing mechanisms," he said.
Kurdish leaders strongly rejected in July a draft local elections law that granted a 32 per cent equal representations in Kirkuk's governing bodies to Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen, while the remaining four per cent of the city's local council seats would go to the Christian minority.
The growing rift between Iraq's once resolute political allies, Kurds and Shias, was also evident on two recent occasions: the confrontation in the ethnically mixed province of Diyala and the Kurd's objection to Baghdad's plans to upgrade the Iraqi air force by procuring US F-16 attack aircraft.
Last week, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki ordered his troops to stop short of entering Khanaqin, a mixed town of Arab and Kurdish residents along the Iranian border in Diyala province. Khanaqin is considered one of the "disputed territories" cited in Article 140 of the Iraq constitution. The article outlines a legal process intended to reverse the "Arabisation" campaigns of the former Baathist regime and settle the territorial disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad.
Driven by force from Khanaqin, Iraqi Kurds have been returning to the city since 2003 and now form the majority. The local council has proposed integrating the city within the Kurdistan region, but like with Kirkuk and Mosul, a reluctant Shia-dominated government in Baghdad has delayed finalising Khanaqin's status.
Last month, under Al-Maliki's authority, the Iraqi army ordered Kurdish forces to withdraw from Khanaqin within 24 hours. Citing direct orders from the KRG, the Peshmerga refused and Iraqi troops entered Khanaqin. To defuse the escalating situation, the KRG and the central government came to a temporary agreement calling for the restoration of the status quo. As part of the accord, Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from the Khanaqin affiliated districts of Qurat Taba and Jalawlaa.
Recent media reports suggest that Iraqi and US officials are growing wary of Kurdish encroachment on a 480 kilometre-long swath of territory beyond the borders of Kurdistan, a process that has pushed thousands of Iraqi Arabs to flee their lands. Top Iraqi officials argue that recent standoff between Arab and Kurdish political factions should not be seen as a possible ethnic battleground, but must rather be viewed as a step on the way to creating a strong central government and maintaining recent security gains.
Al-Maliki emphasised Friday that the prerequisite for federalism in Iraq is the creation of a strong central authority. "A state can not be established without a strong national government. Political partnership (between Arabs and Kurds) must not mean vetoing a strong central government," Al-Maliki told Iraqi reporters.
He added that security, diplomacy, and the distribution of Iraqi oil revenues should be laid entirely within the powers of the central government.
"Al-Maliki is trying to take advantage of his recent military successes in central and southern Iraq to retract from federalism," a senior Kurdish official told Al-Ahram Weekly on condition of anonymity. He cautioned that the Kurds would not tolerate any attempt to go back to the pre-2003 Iraqi political system with Baghdad being the prime mover of all political, economic, military and cultural affairs.
"Kurds are ready to negotiate the details of federalism, not the principle per se," he said.
Another Kurdish lawmaker attributed the defiant tone of the Shia-led government to the upcoming US presidential elections. "The Shia believe that [Barack] Obama has a strong chance of becoming the next president. This is why they are toughening their positions," he said on condition of anonymity.
The same source added that Al-Maliki's calculations are based on the idea that Obama's victory will lay the grounds for a huge reduction in US troops in Iraq, a vacuum that the Shia- dominated security forces could fill.
Obama has pledged to substantially reduce US forces in Iraq within 16 months of assuming power.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/916/re5.htm
Arab-Kurd strife might shape future Iraqi politics, writes Saif Nasrawi
Rising tensions between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds over a proposed provincial elections law and the redeployment of Kurdish military forces outside Iraq's ethnically mixed cities indicate a potentially grave ethnic divide that could tear apart an already fragile nation.
Over the last three weeks, Iraqi Arab and Kurdish lawmakers have been intensely quarrelling over passing legislation to move forward with provincial elections originally scheduled for October. UN officials had suggested moving ahead with the vote in all provinces except Kirkuk, pending a committee determining the status of the northern oil-rich city.
The Iraqi parliament Tuesday failed for the sixth time this month to reach agreement on a proposal put forward by Stephen de Mistura, UN special representative in Iraq, to postpone elections in Kirkuk while the remaining 17 Iraqi provinces go to the polls.
Earlier this month, Mistura proposed forming a parliamentary committee of Kirkuk's major ethnic groups to draft a specific electoral law for the city no later than 31 March 2009 alongside a census to identify the exact demographic composition of Kirkuk.
Arab and Turkomen political factions have rejected the fourth article in Mistura's proposal that gives the largely Kurdish-dominated local government of Kirkuk the principal supervisory role over the committee, a condition they view as favouring the Kurds who also maintain a strong military presence in the city located 260 kilometres north of Baghdad.
Omar Al-Juburi, a prominent Sunni lawmaker, accused Kurdish leaders of trying to undermine the powers granted to the central government by the constitution. "Arabs and Turkomens are worried by the Kurds' insistence to control the Kirkuk committee," he told reporters Tuesday.
Al-Juburi added that the Iraqi constitution clearly stipulates that organising local and national polls is the sole responsibility of the central government.
Similar reservations were echoed by Turkomen leaders who have raised fears of ongoing plans to annex Kirkuk to Kurdistan, the highly autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. "We don't trust the local government of Kirkuk as the Kurds occupy over 90 per cent of its seats," Hassan Touran, a leading member of the Turkomen Front of Iraq, said.
The majority of Iraqi Arab and Turkomen political factions boycotted the last local polls in 2005 in protest against what they viewed as widespread fraud and voter intimidation carried out by the Peshmerga, the nearly 280,000-strong well-trained Kurdish security forces.
Kurds, on the other hand, have strongly condemned continued controversy over Kirkuk, considering it prelude to retreat from a constitutional commitment to create a federal system in Iraq.
"The Kurds have given their utmost concessions so far," Adnan Al-Mufti, the parliamentary speaker in Kurdistan said. "Everybody must be responsible for keeping [to] a federal Iraq," he told Kurdish lawmakers during a parliamentary session Tuesday.
Adnan added that current disputes over the provincial elections law "must not be portrayed as a national struggle between Arabs and Kurds".
Masoud Al-Barzani, chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, suggested Monday that recent political developments in Iraq concern redefining the foundations of the political process, especially the establishment of a federal government. "The impasse between Baghdad and Irbil [the capital of Iraq's Kurdistan region] is basically about the different interpretations of the constitution and the power-sharing mechanisms," he said.
Kurdish leaders strongly rejected in July a draft local elections law that granted a 32 per cent equal representations in Kirkuk's governing bodies to Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen, while the remaining four per cent of the city's local council seats would go to the Christian minority.
The growing rift between Iraq's once resolute political allies, Kurds and Shias, was also evident on two recent occasions: the confrontation in the ethnically mixed province of Diyala and the Kurd's objection to Baghdad's plans to upgrade the Iraqi air force by procuring US F-16 attack aircraft.
Last week, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki ordered his troops to stop short of entering Khanaqin, a mixed town of Arab and Kurdish residents along the Iranian border in Diyala province. Khanaqin is considered one of the "disputed territories" cited in Article 140 of the Iraq constitution. The article outlines a legal process intended to reverse the "Arabisation" campaigns of the former Baathist regime and settle the territorial disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad.
Driven by force from Khanaqin, Iraqi Kurds have been returning to the city since 2003 and now form the majority. The local council has proposed integrating the city within the Kurdistan region, but like with Kirkuk and Mosul, a reluctant Shia-dominated government in Baghdad has delayed finalising Khanaqin's status.
Last month, under Al-Maliki's authority, the Iraqi army ordered Kurdish forces to withdraw from Khanaqin within 24 hours. Citing direct orders from the KRG, the Peshmerga refused and Iraqi troops entered Khanaqin. To defuse the escalating situation, the KRG and the central government came to a temporary agreement calling for the restoration of the status quo. As part of the accord, Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from the Khanaqin affiliated districts of Qurat Taba and Jalawlaa.
Recent media reports suggest that Iraqi and US officials are growing wary of Kurdish encroachment on a 480 kilometre-long swath of territory beyond the borders of Kurdistan, a process that has pushed thousands of Iraqi Arabs to flee their lands. Top Iraqi officials argue that recent standoff between Arab and Kurdish political factions should not be seen as a possible ethnic battleground, but must rather be viewed as a step on the way to creating a strong central government and maintaining recent security gains.
Al-Maliki emphasised Friday that the prerequisite for federalism in Iraq is the creation of a strong central authority. "A state can not be established without a strong national government. Political partnership (between Arabs and Kurds) must not mean vetoing a strong central government," Al-Maliki told Iraqi reporters.
He added that security, diplomacy, and the distribution of Iraqi oil revenues should be laid entirely within the powers of the central government.
"Al-Maliki is trying to take advantage of his recent military successes in central and southern Iraq to retract from federalism," a senior Kurdish official told Al-Ahram Weekly on condition of anonymity. He cautioned that the Kurds would not tolerate any attempt to go back to the pre-2003 Iraqi political system with Baghdad being the prime mover of all political, economic, military and cultural affairs.
"Kurds are ready to negotiate the details of federalism, not the principle per se," he said.
Another Kurdish lawmaker attributed the defiant tone of the Shia-led government to the upcoming US presidential elections. "The Shia believe that [Barack] Obama has a strong chance of becoming the next president. This is why they are toughening their positions," he said on condition of anonymity.
The same source added that Al-Maliki's calculations are based on the idea that Obama's victory will lay the grounds for a huge reduction in US troops in Iraq, a vacuum that the Shia- dominated security forces could fill.
Obama has pledged to substantially reduce US forces in Iraq within 16 months of assuming power.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/916/re5.htm
mercredi 24 septembre 2008
After Compromise on Kerkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq's Governorates
By Reidar Visser (www.historiae.org)
24 September 2008
Iraq’s parliament today approved the remaining article 24 of the provincial elections law that was partially approved on 22 July except for the provisions relating to elections in Kirkuk.
The new article, which has been crafted in cooperation with the United Nations special representative in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, delays the elections in the disputed Kirkuk province, but also establishes a committee which will deal with power-sharing issues in local government there. The committee will consist of 7 parliamentary representatives from Kirkuk – 2 Kurds, 2 Turkmens, 2 Arabs and 1 Christian – and will have until 31 March 2009 to prepare its report. The Iraqi parliament will then proceed to create a special elections law for Kirkuk. (Or, if it fails to do so, the prime minister, the president and the speaker of the parliament will decree a suitable system for elections in cooperation with the United Nations!)
The new law is a compromise between federalists (in particular the Kurds) and nationalist centralists (now increasingly referred to as the “forces of 22 July”). Back in May this year, Kurdish politicians spoke in favour of postponing local elections in all disputed areas such as Kirkuk, arguing that their strong position in these areas – based on the heavily-boycotted January 2005 elections – would play to their advantage and could perhaps be a negotiating card towards a rapid settlement of territorial issues. The forces of 22 July, on the other hand, demanded more equitable power-sharing in the interim, thereby seeking to shake up Kurdish dominance in the local council and to challenge what they consider to be a number of pro-Kurdish placemen and figureheads that have been anointed by the Kurds to serve as “Arab” and “Turkmen” representatives in Kirkuk despite having little support in the communities they purport to represent.
The compromise is more than a mere postponement: it keeps Kirkuk and the issue of power sharing on the agenda, even if these issues are now lifted to the abstract realm of a parliamentary committee and with a timeline that stretches well into 2009. Also, it is noteworthy that the forces of 22 July scored at least a symbolic victory by gaining an explicit assurance that the central government would play an equally important role alongside the local authorities in facilitating the work of the parliamentary committee. The language on this disputed “fourth point” of article 24 is what held up the passage of the law for the last week or so, and in a testament to the lingering conflict between centralisers and decentralisers in the Iraqi parliament, both Kurds and ISCI (Jalal al-Din al-Saghir) had criticised the nationalists for insisting on a reference to the central government.
In the end, the role of the central government was confirmed, thus in some ways also confirming the diminishing parliamentary clout of the federalists in Iraq. This has apparently enabled many of the component elements of the 22 July forces – including MPs from Iraqiyya, Fadila and the Sadrists – to feel satisfaction about the passage of the law, as seen in a number of positive statements in the wake of the adoption of the law.
Perhaps the more important result of the process – in addition to the fact that provincial elections may now actually be held in late 2008 or early 2009 – is the increased awareness, both inside and outside the Iraqi parliament, of this cross-sectarian bloc and the potential it represents. The big question now is whether the Maliki government is prepared to go ahead with free and fair elections given the increasing signs of a cohesive challenge from the opposition.
Postscript: After having blown hot and cold – mostly cold – with regard to Kurdish participation in the elections, Kurdish leaders according to press reports now say that local elections will not be held anywhere in the Kurdistan region, as the right to legislate on those elections is seen as falling within the domain of the regional government.
While the Kurds are the most pro-federal force in Iraq, Kurdistan itself is quite centralised (with two competing centres in Arbil and Sulaymaniyya), with the local governorates having considerably less power vis-à-vis the Kurdistan Regional Government than their counterparts elsewhere in Iraq have towards Baghdad.
This stance does throw into question the heavy Kurdish involvement in drafting the law, where they dominated parliamentary debates in long periods with their insistent demands that closed lists be used due to the supposed illiteracy of the Iraqi electorate – no such qualms when it came to the constitution back in 2005, apparently!
24 September 2008
Iraq’s parliament today approved the remaining article 24 of the provincial elections law that was partially approved on 22 July except for the provisions relating to elections in Kirkuk.
The new article, which has been crafted in cooperation with the United Nations special representative in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, delays the elections in the disputed Kirkuk province, but also establishes a committee which will deal with power-sharing issues in local government there. The committee will consist of 7 parliamentary representatives from Kirkuk – 2 Kurds, 2 Turkmens, 2 Arabs and 1 Christian – and will have until 31 March 2009 to prepare its report. The Iraqi parliament will then proceed to create a special elections law for Kirkuk. (Or, if it fails to do so, the prime minister, the president and the speaker of the parliament will decree a suitable system for elections in cooperation with the United Nations!)
The new law is a compromise between federalists (in particular the Kurds) and nationalist centralists (now increasingly referred to as the “forces of 22 July”). Back in May this year, Kurdish politicians spoke in favour of postponing local elections in all disputed areas such as Kirkuk, arguing that their strong position in these areas – based on the heavily-boycotted January 2005 elections – would play to their advantage and could perhaps be a negotiating card towards a rapid settlement of territorial issues. The forces of 22 July, on the other hand, demanded more equitable power-sharing in the interim, thereby seeking to shake up Kurdish dominance in the local council and to challenge what they consider to be a number of pro-Kurdish placemen and figureheads that have been anointed by the Kurds to serve as “Arab” and “Turkmen” representatives in Kirkuk despite having little support in the communities they purport to represent.
The compromise is more than a mere postponement: it keeps Kirkuk and the issue of power sharing on the agenda, even if these issues are now lifted to the abstract realm of a parliamentary committee and with a timeline that stretches well into 2009. Also, it is noteworthy that the forces of 22 July scored at least a symbolic victory by gaining an explicit assurance that the central government would play an equally important role alongside the local authorities in facilitating the work of the parliamentary committee. The language on this disputed “fourth point” of article 24 is what held up the passage of the law for the last week or so, and in a testament to the lingering conflict between centralisers and decentralisers in the Iraqi parliament, both Kurds and ISCI (Jalal al-Din al-Saghir) had criticised the nationalists for insisting on a reference to the central government.
In the end, the role of the central government was confirmed, thus in some ways also confirming the diminishing parliamentary clout of the federalists in Iraq. This has apparently enabled many of the component elements of the 22 July forces – including MPs from Iraqiyya, Fadila and the Sadrists – to feel satisfaction about the passage of the law, as seen in a number of positive statements in the wake of the adoption of the law.
Perhaps the more important result of the process – in addition to the fact that provincial elections may now actually be held in late 2008 or early 2009 – is the increased awareness, both inside and outside the Iraqi parliament, of this cross-sectarian bloc and the potential it represents. The big question now is whether the Maliki government is prepared to go ahead with free and fair elections given the increasing signs of a cohesive challenge from the opposition.
Postscript: After having blown hot and cold – mostly cold – with regard to Kurdish participation in the elections, Kurdish leaders according to press reports now say that local elections will not be held anywhere in the Kurdistan region, as the right to legislate on those elections is seen as falling within the domain of the regional government.
While the Kurds are the most pro-federal force in Iraq, Kurdistan itself is quite centralised (with two competing centres in Arbil and Sulaymaniyya), with the local governorates having considerably less power vis-à-vis the Kurdistan Regional Government than their counterparts elsewhere in Iraq have towards Baghdad.
This stance does throw into question the heavy Kurdish involvement in drafting the law, where they dominated parliamentary debates in long periods with their insistent demands that closed lists be used due to the supposed illiteracy of the Iraqi electorate – no such qualms when it came to the constitution back in 2005, apparently!
Money for Iraq's reconstruction projects have been wasted or stolen
23-09-2008
By Dana Hedgpeth
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, September 23, 2008; Page A19
A former Iraqi official estimated yesterday that more than $13 billion meant for reconstruction projects in Iraq was wasted or stolen through elaborate fraud schemes. Salam Adhoob, a former chief investigator for Iraq's Commission on Public Integrity, told the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, an arm of the Democratic caucus, that an Iraqi auditing bureau "could not properly account for" the money. While many of the projects audited "were not needed -- and many were never built," he said, "this very real fact remains: Billions of American dollars that paid for these projects are now gone."
He said a report that went to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other top Iraqi officials was never published because "nobody cares" about investigating such cases. Many investigators, he said, feared for their safety because 32 of his co-workers have been murdered. Adhoob said he reported the abuses to the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, an agency charged by Congress with helping to root out cases of waste, fraud and abuse in the nearly $50 billion U.S. reconstruction effort.
SIGIR spokeswoman Kristine Belisle said her agency continues to "actively follow up" on Adhoob's information, but she would not discuss ongoing investigations. Adhoob was one of three Iraqi men who testified before the Democratic panel yesterday.
Abbas S. Mehdi, a former Iraqi official who held a cabinet-level post, told of widespread corruption. And an Iraqi American who for five years has been a senior adviser to Defense and State department officials in Iraq testified in silhouette by video from an undisclosed location because, he said, he feared for his safety. In a modified voice, he said Iraqi government officials worked with al-Qaeda terrorists at the Baiji refinery to steal oil to sell on the black market. Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), who chairs the committee, said that "taxpayers have been bled dry with massive misuse of public dollars." "It is all pretty sobering," he added later. "Our country cannot continue to be blind or oblivious to what is happening."
Adhoob, who worked for three years at the Iraqi agency and oversaw 200 investigators and other employees, said he had a "firsthand, up-close look at corruption" and eventually had to flee the country because of death threats. He said his agency -- the Commission on Public Integrity, which U.S. government officials say is the equivalent of the FBI -- estimates that an additional $9 billion in U.S. funds was lost because of corruption and waste. Because the $13 billion figure came from the Iraqi auditing bureau and the $9 billion figure came from Adhoob's agency, Dorgan's staff members said there could be some overlap.
Adhoob's agency has been accused of pursuing investigations against political rivals. In one scheme described by Adhoob, Iraqi Defense Ministry officials helped set up two front companies that were to buy airplanes, armored vehicles, guns and other equipment with $1.7 billion in U.S. funds.
The companies were paid, but in some cases they delivered only "a small percentage" of the equipment that had been ordered and, in one case, delivered bulletproof vests that were defective and could not be used. The companies also overcharged for military helicopters and tried to deliver aircraft that were more than 25 years old, he said. Instead of demanding the money back, Adhoob said, the Defense Ministry renegotiated with the companies for "a series of mobile toilets and kitchens -- which have never been delivered." Adhoob said some of the investigations conducted by his agency and others uncovered "ghost projects" that never existed or instances in which Iraqi and U.S. contractors did poor-quality work.
In one case, $24.4 million was spent on an electricity project in Nineveh province but an oversight agency found that it "existed only on paper." Investigations by Iraqi oversight agencies also found that some of the money sent to the Defense Ministry was diverted to al-Qaeda in Iraq, Adhoob said, and deposited into banks in Jordan and elsewhere.
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.
Inscription à :
Articles (Atom)
