Kurdish involvement in attacks on Assyrians in Mosul

Kurdish Involvement Suspected in Attacks on Assyrians in Mosul

GMT 10-17-2008 5:8:5

Assyrian International News Agency

Mosul, Iraq (AINA) -- The continuing attacks on Assyrians in Mosul have been followed by a string of accusations from different sources claiming Kurdish involvement in the events that has forced 15000 Assyrians to flee the city of Mosul. Iraqi MP Osama Al Najifi, a native of the Mosul area, was the first high ranking official to point to Kurdish involvement in the attacks (AINA 10-12-2008). More recently a spokesman from Iraq's interior ministry said there is no evidence of Al Qaeda involvement (AINA 10-16-2008), and a high ranking Assyrian leader, Mr Yonadam Kanna, also a member of parliament, confirmed to reporters the assailants were wearing army uniforms. Adding to the suspicion, five known Sunni insurgent groups, including Al Qaeda, issued statements denouncing the attacks and denying involvement in them.

Several observers have noted the attacks, which started two weeks ago, have occurred in the eastern side of the city, which is controlled of Kurdish forces. Assyrians (also known as Chaldeans and Syriacs) living in the western part have not been harmed, but on Tuesday a bomb went off in front of a church in the western, Arab dominated part of the city -- only after accusations of Kurdish involvement started being made.

Condemnations of the violence were issued by Kurdish leaders only after growing accusations in Iraq against the Kurds. The extensive measures taken by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in ordering its ministries and departments to provide aid to the affected Assyrian families, according to a KRG press release, could reflect a growing Kurdish desperation to divert attention from the mounting accusations it is facing. The KRG has not bothered to help Assyrians during previous periods of attacks against them.

Some media reports have described the recent attacks as retaliation by Islamic groups because of Assyrian demonstrations against the removal of their quota seats in the provincial councils (AINA 10-6-2008). Assyrians have, however, protested and taken to the streets several times since the war started and some 50,000 Assyrians take to the streets each year on April 1st, celebrating the Assyrian New Year, without any retaliation by terrorist groups.

Suspicions of Kurdish involvement are also strengthened by the unspoken aim of the Kurdish leadership of annexing large parts of the Nineveh province into their semi-autonomous region. The two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, hold 32 of 41 seats in the Nineveh Provincial Council and dominate its executive council. Police and army units in Mosul are comprised mostly of ethnic Kurds, and the Kurdish intelligence service the Asayesh, has been confirmed to operate in the Mosul area. Kurdish political and military control in the Nineveh province and its capital Mosul are considerable.

The Assyrians, who together with other non Muslim minorities dominate the Nineveh Plain area east of Mosul, have found themselves stuck in the midst of a power struggle between Arabs and Kurds. Attempts to provide adequate security for the minorities in the Nineveh Plain have been obstructed by the Kurdish majority in the Nineveh Province Council. The Kurds have stopped the implementation of a government order from June 2006 calling for the establishment of a local (Assyrian) police force for the Nineveh Plain (AINA 5-1-2008).

The Kurdish leadership has announced it aims to annex the Nineveh Plain into its semi-autonomous region. The obstruction of the local police force is believed to be a result of this. While hindering a legitimate police force from providing much needed security for the minorities in the Nineveh Plain, the Kurdish political parties are ushering in armed groups, under the disguise of "Christian defense committees," into the Nineveh Plain. The goal is to maintain Kurdish control in the area and coerce the inhabitants into voting for annexation to the KRG in future referendums.

Detention has a wide, destructive impact in Iraq: Two Million may be affected

The US military reports capturing about 200,000 Iraqis and detaining at least 96,000 of them in US-run prisons in Iraq since 2003. (Photo: Benjamin Lowy / The New York Times)

Friday 10 October 2008
by: Nick Mottern and Bill Rau, t r u t h o u t Report

Part I

Please click on:
http://www.truthout.org/101008C


Part 2

http://www.truthout.org/101208C

Interview between Nouri al-Maliki and The Times

From The Times
October 13, 2008

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article4931119.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1

Transcript: interview between Nouri al-Maliki and The Times
Edited transcript of interview between Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and The Times on October 11

Deborah Haynes and Richard Beeston

Do you think that the "Status of Forces Agreement" between Iraq and America will be decided by the end of the year?

The agreement is important to us and necessary and signing it before the expiry of the international resolution that covers the legal side for the presence of the coalition forces on December 31, 2008.

We want to sign such an agreement so that we don’t go to the Security Council (for an extension of the mandate) ... You know that the Security Council is now going through crisis. There are differences among the members. Our desire is to sign the treaty but this desire is also governed by the national will, which are represented by demands that are still the point of dialogue between us and the American side.

We have made clear advances in many demands ... We reached agreements, that are considered important and crucial in Iraq, for the final withdrawal (of all US forces) by the end of 2011, and the withdrawal from (Iraqi) cities by June 30, 2009. Laying down rules for the movement of the forces and their activities and not to carry out military operations or arrests unless they have permission from the Iraqi Government ...
Like I said yesterday after I met Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, there are obstacles along the road before signing the agreement in the near future.
We have presented a full view to the American side about these obstacles, which include the issue of legal sponsorship (Iraqi jurisdiction over US soldiers) and the issue of the inspection of weapons and machinery that come into Iraq to ensure that they are suitable for the security mission.
By responding to the Iraqi demands we will be very close to signing the treaty, but if they (Americans) do not respond to them I believe that the treaty will go through difficult circumstances and may not get the approval of the Parliament. Any agreement must be approved by Parliament, which has the final decision.

Is the biggest obstacle America's demand for immunity for its forces when they are not on duty?

Yes, yes definitely. If Iraqi and American soldiers move in an operation that is pre-agreed by both sides then they have the immunity unless he (an American soldier) commits a deliberate crime during the operation. He is just like the Iraqi solider in the operation. He has immunity...
The sticking point is about if the American soldier was not on a mission and commits a crime that is accountable to the Iraqi judicial system, whether small or big. The Iraqi judicial system should have jurisdiction over the American soldier. This is the point of difference.

Is Iran's open opposition to the agreement complicating the situation? Would you prefer if they did not interfere?

The Iranians have their own interests. They think that the agreement is a danger to their national security. So when they make a statement they do it to defend their interests and their policies. Also Syria, Saudi Arabia and other countries ? This does not affect much the pace of negotiations. In the first place, we do not want to jeopardise the security of these countries. The Iraqi constitution does not allow the Iraqi Government to grant permission to use Iraqi territory to harm the interests of neighbouring countries. Among the contents of the agreement is a specific section that prohibits interference in the interests of the neighbouring countries either politically or militarily. Therefore it is true that the Iranian statements may complicate, but this is an Iranian issue that has nothing to do with our decision as Iraqis in accepting or rejecting the agreement.

If the issue of immunity is not resolved how concerned are you that the treaty will not be signed by the end of the year?

Definitely if the Parliament rejects it then we will have to go to the United Nations which is a not a great choice for us or the Americans under the circumstances of the crisis at the Security Council. But we would have no choice because the American forces will lose their legal cover on December 31st. If that happens, according to the international law, Iraqi law and American law, the US forces will be confined to their bases and have to withdraw from Iraq. We always say that a sudden withdrawal may harm security.

Which is more likely an extension by the Security Council or a Status of Forces Agreement?

I am talking about ambitions. I hope that the American side will respond positively to the modifications suggested by the Iraqi side so that we can sign the treaty which is the best (solution) for us.
I think the most likely thing is that the American side will respond positively to the modifications asked for by the Iraqi side, because they are realistic modifications that do not harm the existence of the forces but achieve important national interests for the Iraqi side.

What is the situation like in Basra? Is it stable are you happy with the arrangement?

Definitely the situation is very good in Basra at the moment. The security forces and the people of Basra are restoring life to the city. It is under full control. The process of reconstruction and the return to normal life has started ... Basra was almost out of Iraqi control had it not been for the efforts of the Iraqi forces. It was a risky mission but indicated the ability of the Iraqi army and police to plan and carry out big and successful operations.

Did you fear that it might not work, it would have been a blow to you as a leader? The stakes were very high.

The state is not defeated by gangs or militias. Maybe the battle will be take a long time with them. We planned for a long battle to drain their energy. But the quick and consecutive blows quickened the pace to end the battle in nine days. But it is not possible for a government with national and political will to be defeated by gangs and militias.

Were you disappointed that the British did not move faster to help? The Americans moved faster but the British took a week to join the fray.

This is a page that we have turned over. We don’t go back to evaluate the situation that happened and the reasons. It is over, thank God. It ended on the side of the Iraqi security forces.

What did you feel about the state that Basra had fallen into under Britain’s watch?

I stress that the circumstances of Basra are difficult. The British military doctrine may have been one of the reasons that prevented the spread of security. Because in Basra there was a mixture of factors causing instability on the security front: tribal factions, organised gangs, militias, political differences between the components of the provincial council.

The British were not able to resolve all of these issues or deal with them in a clear manner. Therefore when we entered Basra, we entered in many directions, we held reconciliations with the tribes, won the tribes to our side in the battle, which was not possible for the British.
At the time Basra was not under control of the local government, but in the hands of the gangs and militias. The local government was just a screen. And didn’t have the ability to move or solve any security issue.

The British forces withdrew from the confrontation from inside the city to the area of the airport. They stayed away from the confrontation, which gave the gangs and the militias the chance to control the city.

At the time we were strongly pre-occupied with Baghdad and some other provinces, therefore our presence in Basra was not strong.

But when the British forces withdrew and the situation deteriorated so badly that corrupted youths were carrying swords and cutting the throats of women and children, the citizens of Basra called out for our help and we moved to regain the city.

The British forces did not have the capacity to do what the Iraqi forces did. For example, the British side found it absurd. They asked: 'Do you really want to go into this neighbourhood?'. And the military commanders answered yes. They said that this is insanity, because these neighbourhoods had lots of gangs and bombs and explosives. But the Iraqis are owners of the case and they did enter these neighbourhoods which were colonies for the militias.
In one neighbourhood they removed 730 roadside bombs.

The British military doctrine could not take such a risk and this is the difference between he who is fighting when he is the son of the neighbourhood and the country and those who are not from the area.

This did not happen in Basra alone. When Iraq’s sons intervened to confront (the militias) in al-Amara, the city was totally under the control of the militias and neither the British forces in the past nor the American forces later could take back the city until the Iraqi forces arrived. Also, in Sadr City in Baghdad and Sholia. For years the American forces were in charge of the security there. But they were unable to retrieve Sadr City. But when the Iraqi forces were determined they were able to do that.

That doesn’t mean that the coalition forces, Americans and the others, did not provide any help. They did provide help and their help was important. Especially in airplanes because we do not have fighter jets.

How did it make you feel when you heard about the deal that the British cut with the militias (in 2007)?

Of course we were not comfortable and we conveyed our discomfort and regarded it as the start a disaster. The disaster would have materialised, if we had not made the sacrifices. Had they told us that they wanted to do this [cut a deal] we would have consulted with them and come up with the best possible decision. But when they acted alone the problem happened.

Do you think the British withdrew from the city prematurely?

Very. Because the palaces where they were based were being shelled with mortars and missiles by the militias. When they withdrew from them we moved in. When I went to Basra I stayed at these palaces. Yes they shelled us a lot and people among us were killed. But if it was not for our going to Basra these palaces would have turned into camps for the gangs.

Why did Britain behave in this way?

I told you this was their military doctrine. Every army has a military doctrine.

How would you describe your relations now with the British, are they improved or are they still strained?

From our side what happened before will not affect a positive relationship between us and Britain or our desire is to have good relations in various fields, political, reconstruction, economic...
What happened does not affect Britain's positive role in participating in the downfall of (Saddam's) dictatorship. We recognise Britain's role in this.
Our relationship now is good and we are working to improve it further in other fields as we take over responsibility for security.
The Iraqi arena is open for British companies and British friendship, for economic exchange and positive cooperation in science and education.
We desire that our relationship with the countries that had a role in bringing down the dictatorship has a priority over those countries that supported the dictatorship.

Britain has a difficult legacy in Iraq. It established a Sunni monarch in Iraq, it put down a Shia revolt in the 1920s. I believe your grandfather was involved?

He was jailed twice by the British. He wrote important poetry about Britain, criticising British policy.
We should not allow ourselves to be controlled by what happened in the past ...Today people are motivated by common interest. And we do have common interests with various countries around the world, including Britain. We can correct the past with mutual interests and dialogue... Iraq is an old, civilised country and Britain is also a country well known for its long civilisation and democracy. This history can cooperate between the two countries to make a good relationship based on common interests.

British major-general is rewriting counter-insurgency strategy, what lessons can be learnt from Basra, what are the biggest mistakes that happened?

The military doctrine that they have and the complexities of Basra meant that they could not achieve anything.
The lesson is that military force cannot resolve civilian and political problems ? Frankly we could not resolve the battle in Basra militarily alone but we used other factors that the British could not use. Like tribes. The relationship between the British and the tribes was not good. Or they had not paid attention to the tribes. The political powers and the parties also joined us in the battle. Before they had not supported the British side.
Also, from a military standpoint we were prepared to take risks and make big sacrifices. Perhaps the British forces were not as prepared to make such sacrifices. We did not want to kill the other side, even the militias. We want to control the situation. Our principle is not to use deadly force because killing leaves orphans and widows and social problems...
For the first time the militias saw a true force confronting them. Before, the British forces would confront them (the militias) with sophisticated technology, like satellites, automatic weapons, aircraft and other advanced equipment. These are designed for confronting armies but not militias and people hiding in houses. Therefore the difference between what the Iraqi Army and the British Army did was that Iraqi soldiers entered the houses and entered small neighbourhoods and alleys and did not rely on technology and guided missiles, which had previously caused harm but not killed the gangsters.

What is security like in Iraq? Is al-Qaeda still active? Are there new forces trying to destablize the country?

Yes, the operations are going on and will keep going on. Iraq has inherited problems from the former Baathist regime that has social troubles and gangs that work in kidnapping and robbery. There are also cases of tribal revenge between the people, and activities by al-Qaeda and the Baath party.

In our latest report today attacks in Baghdad and the provinces are down 90 % on last year. The question we ask ourselves is: ‘Is the situation now in most of the provinces an internationally acceptable norm?' The answer is 'yes’, except for Mosul which is still above the average and in some areas of Diyala (province)...

We have liberated the land from the control of al-Qaeda and the militias. Entire cities, provinces, and districts were under the control of the gangs, the militias, and al-Qaeda. The roads that connected Baghdad to the rest of the country were all under the control of the gangs, al-Qaeda, and the outlaws. This is over now. There remains al-Qaeda gangs in hiding, but they are very weak ? We concentrate on intelligence work. The raids on terrorist elements and the gangs are based on intelligence information. This needs time to wear them out and dismantle their cells that have started breaking down gradually.

Maybe there is a noticeable escalation in the recent period, involving sticky (magnet) bombs on the cars of some citizens or officials. This is connected to the atmosphere of the [status of forces] agreement and the dialogue. It is also connected to the US elections, and the upcoming Iraqi elections.

We have laid down security plans and measures to confront it and reduce its impact so that it doesn't go beyond the accepted limit.

Generally, the security situation is satisfactory and under control and is improving. Improving the security situation, is not only connected to the military and intelligence work, but also improving the economic side, the turn of the reconstruction wheel in Iraq, the national reconciliation that took place between the components of the Iraqi people. This is advancing in big steps and is the biggest of the factors supporting the security, military, and intelligence effort. So we have many factors moving in one direction. We believe that security is not achieved only by weapons and security forces, army, and police.

What about the talks about the status of forces agreement with the British?

Until now, they have not started. We are prepared to talk to them about Iraq’s need for a number of British soldiers for training and for technical purposes (to pass on technical expertise). We would like to conduct this dialogue if Britain has the desire to forge such a treaty to support the capabilities of the Iraqi army.

Why haven't those talks started yet?

I do not know why. We had decided to start them.

When Gordon Brown came here, he mentioned that there will be working groups to look at this issue.

That is what we agreed. May be the situation in Britain is one of the issues. Now that there are changes and political movement, which may have an effect. There are ministerial changes, elections, the international financial crisis, maybe they are connected.

The agreement was also that there would be a presence of British companies in Iraq across a broad scale which also did not happen. Today or tomorrow we are expecting a British power company to approach us on how to solve our electricity crisis. We welcomed them.

Is the presence of the (4,100) British troops no longer crucial for security in the south?

Definitely, the presence of this number of British soldiers is no longer necessary. We thank them for the role they have played, but I think that their stay is not necessary for maintaining security and control.

There might be a need for their expertise in training and some technical issues, yes, but as a fighting force, I do not think it is necessary.

What about Kirkuk, is this a serious problem facing your Government? The area is controlled by Kurdish militias, can you ever imagine re-imposing Government authority by force?

Kirkuk is a city that belongs to the federal government and is outside the boundaries of the Kurdistan region. The existence of any force that is not formal and governmental is considered, as you said, outside the legal rules and goes by the principle of militias.

Kirkuk is a very sensitive area. Our opinion about Kirkuk is that it will not be solved by using force to impose a solution ... It is shared by Turkomans, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and a small ratio of Christians.

The only suitable solution, at this time, is to treat it as a special case, like being an independent region ...

The different ethnic groups accuse each other of bringing in people from outside the province and granting them residency. The province is under Kurdish control at the moment. The others, the Turkomans and the Sunni Arabs, accuse the local government of manipulating the census and the figures. It is better to have a solution between the groups based on consensus.

Do you have any information about the fate of the 5 British hostages?

We had some information earlier, which was not certain, but now this source has dried up. We tried to follow up our lead with the British Embassy and the Coalition Forces, but it did not lead to any result. The search is still going on.

What is going to happen at the end of the year if the talks on a status of forces agreement between Iraq and Britain aren’t finished?

Either the resolution will be extended by the Security Council, so they will have legal cover according to international law – and this seems to be unlikely at the moment. Or they lose will their legal cover and they have to leave Iraq.

What is the message you would like to give to the British Government? You said that you are ready to start talks but they have not started yet.

It’s a message of friendship and desire for cooperation in civilian, political, economic fields.
As for the British forces, to avoid reaching the critical deadline I wish for the negotiations between the two sides to start quickly to determine what elements of the force should remain and their specialities.

Do you think the British should reduce the size of their 4,100-strong force?

Definitely, there will not be any need for 4,000 troops. The size of the need is determined by the size of the required tasks. For example to train the naval force, how many forces do we need? I don’t know. Also, to train the 14th Division in Basra, how many do we need? (Training on) some technical issues about how to use weapons and equipment. This will be determined in the negotiations.

The Americans plan to leave the Republican Palace by the end of the year. Will you move your office there?

The palace will need more than a year for refurbishment. Our intention is that this will become the headquarters of the Government, the Cabinet and the offices attached to it. The Cabinet now is divided among many buildings. They will all gather in this palace when it is finished in a year or more.

Will the green zone be opened up?

Yes and we have a definite desire that the green zone at the beginning of next year will be open, but security precautions will be taken to guarantee continuing security. Keeping a green zone in Iraq and a red zone in Iraq is finished. The whole of Baghdad must be green.

What about you personally, do you intend to stand for re-election next year?

I did not nominate myself previously so I won’t be doing it now. They chose me for this post.

If they chose you again would you accept?

It would be easier not to accept, but if the national interest requires, then I have to serve Iraq.

Do you enjoy this job?

Never.

What do you do for entertainment or relaxing?

Entertainment is rare in our lives in Iraq. I only do some light sports [at the gym].

A documentary will be broadcast this weekend about the execution of Saddam. It alleges that you pushed hard for a guilty verdict and the death sentence. You allegedly changed a judge at the last minute and then signed the death warrant. Are the allegations fair and do you have any regrets?

My signature to the death warrant was a legal procedure. The Prime Minister has to sign after the ruling of the court. My signature came after the court gave its ruling and was approved by the supreme appeal court. It has to be signed to be carried out.

I would like the documentary to bring a document or a witness saying that the Prime Minister has interfered or exercised pressure on a judge or a court.

In this place, the whole court committee was here at the night before they issued the sentence. They spoke a lot about the trial. When the meeting ended, before they stood to leave, they said that you have not asked about the sentence that will be issued to Saddam. I said that I will find out at the same time as all the other Iraqis tomorrow.

What happened after the execution should not have happened. But these are people who do not have experience in carrying out executions. This was a speciality of the Baath Party. His men were good at executing people quietly.

We were not happy with the way the sentence was carried out. Those who chanted were punished. There was no major violation apart from the chanting... We have punished those who chanted and they are now in jail.

The TURKMENS OF ERBIL: Captives in their city

S O İ T M
The Turkmen of Erbil: captives in their city

Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation

http://www.turkmen.nl/

Date: October 08, 2008
No: Rep.28-J0808

William R. Hay, an English political officer, ruled the Erbil region from 1918 to 1920. He commented on the population of the city as follows:1

“The only two Turkish speaking populations which concern us closely are Erbil and Altun Kopri”. “One mahalla or quarter of the town (Erbil) is purely Kurdish, and in the rest the lower classes resemble the Kurds in appearance and dress. All can speak Kurdish fluently, but the language of their homes is Turkish. In the upper town which contains 6000 inhabitants, the purest Turkish element is found” “Starting from with the Nebi Yunus on the bank of the Tigris opposite Mosul, and running down through Erbil, Altun Kopri, Kerkuk, Kifri and Kizil Rabat to Mendeli we find a line of towns with Turkmen speaking inhabitants”

The Kurdish arrival to the region is portrayed by Hay on several occasions:2, 3

“Dizai tribe descended from the hills about 3 centuries ago, and occupied a few villages round Qush Tappah. In the middle half of the 19th century they started to expand, and rapidly covered the whole country up to Tigris. In the late 1920s, they constitute one third of the Erbil district population.” “It is reported that less than a century ago trees and shrubs were plentiful on the slopes of Qara Choq Dagh; when the Kurds came, however, they were quickly taken for fire woods and no trace of them now remains”

Today Erbil is a heavily populated city and has been declared capital of the Kurdish region. No less than one third of the city’s population is Turkmen. Under the aggressive hegemonic policy of Kurdish tribal parties, the Turkmen of Erbil are marginalized, intimidated and exposed to suppression and assimilation.

Marginalization

The Turkmen parties got only 2000 votes in the Iraqi general election in Erbil. Seats in the city council are shared between members of two Kurdish parties; the KHP & KUP. Policy dictates that appointment of governmental offices and positions are to be made to members of Kurdish political parties only, thus depriving the Turkmen who are not members of Kurdish parties from governmental posts. The estimated number of employees in Kurdish region is about a million.4

Turkmen are being discriminated against and are seldom appointed to hold governmental offices or in the university in Erbil. Those who want to be appointed must show allegiance to the Kurdish parties and support their party’s ideology.

Assimilation

In April 2005, Kurdish security agents broke in to Turkmen institutions and took over 24 buildings: Nine primary and four secondary schools, the buildings for education, health, information, Turkmen Unions and syndicates, Turkmen House, Shifa dispensary, the Turkmen Radio and Television, Turkmeneli print house, the building of headquarters of the Iraqi Turkmen Front in Erbil, the building of Iraqi Turkmen National Party and the building of the Turkmeneli party.

The educational quality in the Turkmen schools was deliberately worsened which lead to a decrease in the number of students; the student registration have been stopped in 2008. The name of the Turkmeneli Television and Radio were changed and are now used as propaganda instruments by those Turkmen that work for the Kurdish parties and whom are paid by the Kurdish authorities. The Turkmeneli newspaper has not been published in Erbil and the Turkmeneli print house has been out of use. The Turkmen department of the Institution for Teachers was closed. Turkmen publications are not allowed to be sold in shops and put in the libraries. Cafés and public houses can not operate Turkmen TV and radio and can not keep the Turkmen publications, such as newspapers in their premises.

Suppression and intimidation

The suppressive policy of the Kurdish administration hinders the appearance of Turkmen civil society activists and stall establishment of Turkmen civil society and political organizations. The Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) is the only Turkmen organization which could resist the suppressive policy of the Kurdish authorities, but its functioning is severely restricted. The ITF is not allowed to realize political, social and cultural activities only inside the small buildings of the organization. Governmental buildings cannot be rented. Those who present logistic support to Turkmen organizations will be intimidated. During election campaigns Turkmen were allowed hang their posters and flags only on their own buildings.

The daily critics to the Turkmen organizations, by the newspapers of which the majority are controlled by the Kurdish political parties puts continuous psychological stress on the Turkmen of Erbil and particularly, on the small numbers of the politicians and activists who could resist the suppression.

Mr. Nadhim Abd al-Karim al-Saig was the chief of the news division of the Turkmeneli Radio and television which was taken over by Barzani’s administration. Resisting the intimidations and threats of the Kurdish authorities, he is active in different fields: media, politics and civil society. He was arrested by Kurdish Peshmerge militia on 30 Augustus 2008 in the center of Erbil city, when he photographed the entrance of the Erbil citadel, which is located in the center of the city and officially considered a historical landmark. When they found a number of Turkmen newspapers with him, he was taken to a center of Peshmerge militia. There he was exposed to a harsh interrogation. He was accused of spying and taken to the inspection department of the Peshmerge headquarters. The authority which received him asked those who brought him if any one knew of his arrest. They answered that his son was with him. It is worth noting that there are thousands of missing persons in the vast regions which controlled by KDP and KUP. The investigation continued for 2 hours and the investigators were a colonel and other with higher rank. He was cursed at, insulted, harshly beaten and accused of different charges. He was put in a prison, where about 40 other prisoners were being detained and he was threatened to be questioned even more harshly. In contrary, the second interrogation was much calmer and he was asked to abandon writing against the Kurdish administration. Later on, he was released and asked not to talk to any one and write about his arrest.

This is one of the many suppressive methods, which the Turkmen of Erbil are exposed to since the institution of the Save Haven in 1991, to intimidate the Turkmen of Erbil. These have decreased severely the engagement of the Turkmen of Erbil in the cultural, social and political activities. The small number of the Turkmen activists who resists the intimidation of the Kurdish authorities lives in fear of arrest, exposure to persecution, disappearance and assassination.

Reference:
1. William R. Hay, “Two Years in Kurdistan 1918 – 1920”, (William Clowes and Sons, Limited, London and Beccles 1921), P. 81 – 83
2. Ibid., P. 77
3. Ibid., P. 19
4. Judit Neurink, “another copy of Saddam Regime”, July 2007,

http://archief.trouw.nl/artikel?REC=TR_ART_00225426

KURDISH GROUPS BEHIND ATTACKS ON ASSYRIANS IN MOSUL: IRAQI MP

GMT 10-12-2008 Assyrian International News Agency

Baghdad (AINA) -- Osama Al Najifi, a member of Iraq's parliament, told the Iraqi Independent Press Agency on Sunday he holds the Iraqi government responsible for what is happening to the Assyrian Christians in Mosul, and accused the "Kurdish militias" for carrying out the acts of ethnic cleansing.

Al Najifi, a native of Mosul, claimed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Kurdish Asayesh intelligence service are carrying out the attacks under the cover of the Iraqi military.

He pointed out the military forces in Mosul are completely infiltrated by the Kurdish militia. Al Najifi said the Kurds carry out the attacks against the minority groups in order to Kurdify the city and change its demographic balance.

Osama Al Najifi is a Sunni Arab and has a long record of defending the rights of the minorities in the Iraqi parliament.

He emphasized that the Kurdish parties have had de facto control over Mosul for more than one year and are trying to control the city and change its demographic identity to serve Kurdish interests.

Al Najifi also blamed the Iraqi government for being absent from Mosul, accusing the "big parliamentary groups" of making political agreements which are preventing the national government from having control over the province of Nineveh and its provincial capital Mosul.

Kurdish militias behind the massacres of the Christians in Mosul

Oct 12, 2008
http://www.roadstoiraq.com/2008/10/12/kurdish-militias-behind-the-massacres-of-the-christians-in-mosul/

Few minutes ago, Aljazeera quoted a statement by the so called “Al-Qaeda” denies any involvement in the bloody campaign against the Christians in Mosul saying:
Al-Qaeda has evidence that the Kurdish militia’s involvement in displacing and killing campaign of the Christians in order to control certain parts of the province.

You can see Iraqi newspaper Azzaman’s confirmation in its headline today “Militias gunmen of powerful government parties roam the streets of Mosul chanting threat slogans“.

Iraqi MP Al-Najafi from the “Iraqi List” confirms this information saying:
Kurdish Peshmerga militias are behind the forced displacement of Christians in the Mosul. The military forces in Mosul are infiltrated by the Kurdish militia using military vehicles to threat the Christians.

Kirkuk’s Archbishop Louis Sako warned last Thursday of campaigns against Christians in Iraq saying:
Brutal political goals (…) to emigrate, or force us to cooperate with parties that we do not want their agendas.
http://www.roadstoiraq.com/2008/10/12/kurdish-militias-behind-the-massacres-of-the-christians-in-mosul/

US using debts to blackmail Iraq

Thu, 09 Oct 2008

Iraqi MPs say the US is using the country's debts as leverage to force Baghdad into signing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). "Baghdad is under pressure by Washington to accept the security deal in exchange for clearing all of Iraq's debts," Iraqi lawmaker Mohammed Kamid al-Humedawi told Press TV on Wednesday.

The US will be allowed to set up permanent military bases, if Iraq signs the agreement. Under the deal the US forces will also be granted immunity from legal prosecution inside their bases in Iraq.

Iraqi parliamentarians, including MPs from the Sadr movement, however, reiterated that they will not approve the deal that is going “to turn the country into a US colony”. "We do not accept any agreement that disregards Iraq's sovereignty" said MP Nassin al-Essawi, adding that "As an Iraqi lawmaker I believe this agreement is not in the interest of the Iraqi people.”

This is while a group of US officials arrived in Baghdad to discuss the controversial deal. But Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has warned that any interference by US officials would only complicate the situation and even could have negative results. The Premier had earlier declared that any agreement with the United States should consider the country's sovereignty and national interests.

SB/RE
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail.aspx?id=71676&sectionid=351020201

Video: THE THIRD NUCLEAR BOMB

Video: THE THIRD NUCLEAR BOMB
THE VETERAN'S ACCUSATION
Maurizio Torrealta, RAINews24


October 9, 2008

TO WATCH THE VIDEO PLEASE CLICK ON:

http://www.uruknet.de/?p=m47860&s1=h1

and

www.rainews24.it/ran24/rainews24_2007/inchieste/08102008_bomba/video_ENG.asp

In the investigative report an American veteran who participated in "Desert Storm" accuses the Us Administration of having used a small nuclear penetration bomb with an energy of 5 kilotons between the Iraqi town of Basra and the border with Iran.

Consulting the "Seismological International Center on line data archive" we found that in the area indicated by the veteran, a seismic event with a power of 5 kilotons was registered the last day of the conflict.

This hint requires a lot of verifications and at RAINEWS24 we want to carry them out involving journalists from other countries, seismological centers that have registered the event, to whom we ask more data about seismic waves and last but not least international organizations that have the task to monitor nuclear activities.


Also in our website:
- Notes on Jim Brown
- The text of our report in Italian and in English
- The video (in Italian and in English)
- Data on the health situation in Basra [The file contains some photoes, crude and realistic, produced by Dr. Jawad al Ali, oncologist of the Basra's hospital] (PowerPoint file - 1,33 MB)
- Data on seismic events in the area registered in February 1991 as reported on the ISC website.
- The 4.2 magnitude datum that we have found during Desert Storm operations
- Comparison table between kilotons and the Richter scale [file doc]
- Seismical data traced in NORSAR seismic monitoring network during March 1, 2 and 3 in 2002 in Afghanistan.
- The text of the 2 letters from the American Defense Department


:: Article nr. 47860 sent on 10-oct-2008 05:20 ECT

www.uruknet.info?p=47860

Link: www.rainews24.it/ran24/rainews24_2007/inchieste/08102008_bomba/video_ENG.asp