jeudi 13 mars 2014

Counter-Terrorism Conference starts in Baghdad






PNA - The First International Counter-Terrorism Conference started in Baghdad.
The Conference started on Wednesday morning as the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, released a statement in its opening session.


Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said in his opening speech of the First Anti-Terrorism International Conference which started in Baghdad today, that terrorism will shift to other grounds of the Arab countries.

The Conference is attended by 56 Arab countries and 12 Arab and International organizations.

EU Parliament resolution of 12th March 2014 on the 2013 progress report on TURKEY


PROGRESS REPORT 2013 (OFFICIAL VERSION)

P7_TA-PROV(2014)0235 – 2013 progress report on Turkey - PE529.640
European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the 2013 progress report on Turkey (2013/2945(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Turkey: 2013 progress report’ (SWD(2013)0417),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 16 October 2013 entitled ‘Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2013-2014’ (COM(2013)0700),

– having regard to its previous resolutions, in particular those of 10 February 2010 on Turkey’s progress report 2009[1], of 9 March 2011 on Turkey’s 2010 progress report[2], of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 progress report on Turkey[3], of 18 April 2013 on the 2012 progress report on Turkey[4] and of 13 June 2013 on the situation in Turkey[5],

– having regard to the Negotiating Framework for Turkey of 3 October 2005,

– having regard to Council Decision 2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey[6] (‘the Accession Partnership’), and to the previous Council decisions of 2001, 2003 and 2006 on the Accession Partnership,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 December 2010, 5 December 2011, 11 December 2012 and 25 June 2013,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the conclusions of the report of 26 November 2013 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, which highlighted the inappropriate conduct of law enforcement officials during the Gezi protests,

– having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas accession negotiations with Turkey were opened on 3 October 2005 and the opening of such negotiations is the starting point for a long-lasting and open-ended process based on fair and rigorous conditionality and the commitment to reform;

B. whereas Turkey has committed itself to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, adequate and effective reforms, good neighbourly relations and progressive alignment with the EU; whereas these efforts should be viewed as an opportunity for Turkey to continue its process of modernisation;

mardi 11 mars 2014

Snowden’s testimony to European Parliament: “Billions of innocents” unlawfully spied upon


Snowden’s testimony to European Parliament: “Billions of innocents” unlawfully spied upon
By Robert Stevens

10 March 2014

On Friday, the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee published the written testimony of US whistleblower and former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden. Snowden agreed to give testimony to the EP’s ongoing inquiry into the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens.

The European Parliament (EP) took his statement despite the fact that it has already agreed to publish a 60-page report based entirely on the secret documents that Snowden made public, which entirely excises any mention of his name. (See “European Parliament kills call to protect Edward Snowden”)

The EP rejected an amendment to the document that would have committed it to offering Snowden protection as a whistleblower.

These decisions were made under pressure from the US government and carried out with the support of the Social Democratic and Conservative groupings in the Parliament.

Snowden’s 12-page testimony consists of a two-page statement and a series of answers to questions posed by Members of the European Parliament.

His testimony was an eloquent and wide-ranging summary of what has been revealed so far about the mass spying operations and a rebuttal of the constant and ongoing lies and falsifications aimed at him from the US political and intelligence elite and its supporters internationally.

Snowden refutes claims by US spy chiefs who “once claimed that 54 terrorist attacks had been stopped by mass surveillance.” He notes that such claims have never been verified, adding that even the “White House’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, determined that the mass surveillance program investigated was not only ineffective—they found it had never stopped even a single imminent terrorist attack—but that it had no basis in law.”

The “greatest success the program had ever produced was discovering a taxi driver in the United States transferring $8,500 dollars to Somalia in 2007,” writes Snowden.

While the whole population was under surveillance, this did not prevent the Boston Marathon bombers from carrying out their operation. Snowden wrote, “Despite the Russians specifically warning us about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the FBI couldn’t do more than a cursory investigation—although they did plenty of worthless computer-based searching—and failed to discover the plot. 264 people were injured, and 3 died. The resources that could have paid for a real investigation had been spent on monitoring the call records of everyone in America.”

Snowden summarises a number of the revelations of mass state surveillance that have been published in several newspapers, particularly the Guardian, stating that the “rights of billions of innocents—and I say billions without exaggeration,” are being unlawfully done away with.

Describing the extraordinary means at the disposal of the NSA to spy on anyone it chooses, Snowden explained his role as an intelligence operative:

“The NSA granted me the authority to monitor communications worldwide using its mass surveillance systems, including within the United States. I have personally targeted individuals using these systems under both the President of the United States’ Executive Order 12333 and the US Congress’ FAA 702.”

He added, “I am telling you that without getting out of my chair, I could have read the private communications of any member of this committee, as well as any ordinary citizen. I swear under penalty of perjury that this is true.”

Shadow Rapporteur, MEP Sophie Int’Veld, vice-chair of the Civil Liberties committee, asked Snowden if he thought that procedures for whistleblowing have been improved. He replied, “No. There has not yet been any substantive whistleblower reform in the US, and unfortunately my government has taken a number of disproportionate and persecutory actions against me. US government officials have declared me guilty of crimes in advance of any trial, they’ve called for me to be executed or assassinated in private and openly in the press, they revoked my passport and left me stranded in a foreign transit zone for six weeks, and even used NATO to ground the presidential plane of Evo Morales—the leader of Bolivia—on hearing that I might attempt to seek and enjoy asylum in Latin America.”

In reply to a question by Rapporteur and MEP Claude Moraes, “on the extent of cooperation that exists between the NSA and EU Member States in terms of the transfer and collection of bulk data of EU citizens,” Snowden explained that such collaboration is central to the operation of the NSA.

He said, “One of the foremost activities of the NSA’s FAD, or Foreign Affairs Division, is to pressure or incentivize EU member states to change their laws to enable mass surveillance. Lawyers from the NSA, as well as the UK’s GCHQ [Government Communications Headquarters], work very hard to search for loopholes in laws and constitutional protections that they can use to justify indiscriminate, dragnet surveillance operations that were at best unwittingly authorized by lawmakers. These efforts to interpret new powers out of vague laws is an intentional strategy to avoid public opposition and lawmakers’ insistence that legal limits be respected, effects the GCHQ internally described in its own documents as ‘damaging public debate’.”

Giving examples, Snowden wrote, “In recent public memory, we have seen these FAD ‘legal guidance’ operations occur in both Sweden and the Netherlands, and also faraway New Zealand. Germany was pressured to modify its G-10 law to appease the NSA, and it eroded the rights of German citizens under their constitution. Each of these countries received instruction from the NSA, sometimes under the guise of the US Department of Defense and other bodies, on how to degrade the legal protections of their countries’ communications.”

Snowden wrote that he would welcome any offer of safe passage or permanent asylum in Europe, but, “Parliamentarians in the national governments have told me that the US, and I quote, ‘will not allow’ EU partners to offer political asylum to me…”

The news of Snowden’s testimony being published first broke last Friday morning. Yet remarkably the Guardian has not commented or even mentioned such important testimony despite the fact that the newspaper played the leading role in publishing Snowden’s revelations from June 2013. Snowden refers to six different stories (including supplying URLs) that were published by the Guardian on different aspects of mass spying operations.

The Guardian’s web site published three articles Friday mentioning Snowden and a further two on Saturday, but without making any reference to his EP testimony.

Is the Guardian suppressing the testimony and, if so, why?

The newspaper has recently published a number of articles and editorials supporting the US-sponsored fascist coup in Ukraine and denouncing the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Guardian denied that fascist forces were involved in the US-backed coup, stating that “the world’s media has [not] yet seen or heard from” such forces.

The Guardian has used the fact that Snowden is in forced exile in Russia to claim that this undermines his struggle to expose the abuses of democratic and human rights being carried out by the US and other powers. A Guardian editorial on July 2, 2013 sought to associate Snowden with human rights abuses carried out by Putin’s government. “As long as he remains in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, however, the real issue remains clouded. This damages Mr. Snowden’s cause,” it wrote.

“He should therefore leave Russia as soon as he practically can,” it added.

Peter Beaumont, foreign affairs editor at the Guardian’s sister newspaper, theObserver, followed up that Snowden was “providing a public relations coup for [Russian President Vladimir] Putin” and has “provided cover for a gross and serial human rights-violating state.”

Could it be that the Guardian’s fulsome support for the installation of an unelected regime in Ukraine, in which a far-right party holds key ministries, and the newspaper’s demands for a more belligerent stance against Russia means that it is no longer considered politic to allow Snowden a voice?

IRAQ WAR Among world's worst events, By David Swanson





lundi 10 mars 2014

European Parliament resolution on the 2013 progress report on Turkey



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT – 2009 – 2014 – Plenary sitting / 7.3.2014 B7 0241/2014 – MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure on the 2013 progress report on Turkey (2013/2945(RSP)) – Ria Oomen-Ruijten on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs - B7‑0241/2014 – European Parliament resolution on the 2013 progress report on Turkey – (2013/2945(RSP))

The European Parliament,



– having regard to the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Turkey: 2013 progress report’ (SWD(2013)0417),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 16 October 2013 entitled ‘Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2013-2014’ (COM(2013)0700),

– having regard to its previous resolutions, in particular those of 10 February 2010 on Turkey’s progress report 2009[1], of 9 March 2011 on Turkey’s 2010 progress report[2], of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 progress report on Turkey[3], of 18 April 2013 on the 2012 progress report on Turkey[4] and of 13 June 2013 on the situation in Turkey[5],

– having regard to the Negotiating Framework for Turkey of 3 October 2005,

– having regard to Council Decision 2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey[6] (‘the Accession Partnership’), and to the previous Council decisions of 2001, 2003 and 2006 on the Accession Partnership,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 December 2010, 5 December 2011, 11 December 2012 and 25 June 2013,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the conclusions of the report of 26 November 2013 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, which highlighted the inappropriate conduct of law enforcement officials during the Gezi protests,

– having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas accession negotiations with Turkey were opened on 3 October 2005 and the opening of such negotiations is the starting point for a long-lasting and open-ended process based on fair and rigorous conditionality and the commitment to reform;

B. whereas Turkey has committed itself to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, adequate and effective reforms, good neighbourly relations and progressive alignment with the EU; whereas these efforts should be viewed as an opportunity for Turkey to continue its process of modernisation;

vendredi 7 mars 2014

What Europe Should Know About US Mass Surveillance By Edward Snowden



What Europe Should Know About US Mass Surveillance

By Edward Snowden

07 March, 2014
CommonDreams.org



Whistleblower Edward Snowden delivers written testimony to European Parliament

What follows is a statement addressed to an investigative panel of the European Parliament looking into the nature and scope of U.S. surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency and its partner agencies in Europe. Subsequent to the statement are specific answers to written questions posed by the panel to Mr. Snowden. The original statement from which this was reproduced is available here as a pdf.

Introductory Statement

I would like to thank the European Parliament for the invitation to provide testimony for your inquiry into the Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens. The suspicionless surveillance programs of the NSA, GCHQ, and so many others that we learned about over the last year endanger a number of basic rights which, in aggregate, constitute the foundation of liberal societies.

The first principle any inquiry must take into account is that despite extraordinary political pressure to do so, no western government has been able to present evidence showing that such programs are necessary. In the United States, the heads of our spying services once claimed that 54 terrorist attacks had been stopped by mass surveillance, but two independent White House reviews with access to the classified evidence on which this claim was founded concluded it was untrue, as did a Federal Court.

Looking at the US government's reports here is valuable. The most recent of these investigations, performed by the White House's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, determined that the mass surveillance program investigated was not only ineffective -- they found it had never stopped even a single imminent terrorist attack -- but that it had no basis in law. In less diplomatic language, they discovered the United States was operating an unlawful mass surveillance program, and the greatest success the program had ever produced was discovering a taxi driver in the United States transferring $8,500 dollars to Somalia in 2007.

After noting that even this unimpressive success – uncovering evidence of a single unlawful bank transfer -- would have been achieved without bulk collection, the Board recommended that the unlawful mass surveillance program be ended. Unfortunately, we know from press reports that this program is still operating today.

I believe that suspicionless surveillance not only fails to make us safe, but it actually makes us less safe. By squandering precious, limited resources on "collecting it all," we end up with more analysts trying to make sense of harmless political dissent and fewer investigators running down real leads. I believe investing in mass surveillance at the expense of traditional, proven methods can cost lives, and history has shown my concerns are justified.

Despite the extraordinary intrusions of the NSA and EU national governments into private communications world-wide, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the "Underwear Bomber," was allowed to board an airplane traveling from Europe to the United States in 2009. The 290 persons on board were not saved by mass surveillance, but by his own incompetence, when he failed to detonate the device. While even Mutallab's own father warned the US government he was dangerous in November 2009, our resources were tied up monitoring online games and tapping German ministers. That extraordinary tip-off didn't get Mutallab a dedicated US investigator. All we gave him was a US visa.

jeudi 6 mars 2014

TURKEY’S MUTED REACTION TO THE CRIMEAN CRISIS By Soner Cagaptay & James F. Jeffrey


PolicyWatch 2219 – March 4, 2014 – By Soner Cagaptay & James F. Jeffrey – Issues such as energy dependence, deep-rooted fears of the Russian military, and Black Sea navigation policy all offer clues to Prime Minister Erdogan’s vacillating response to Russian activities in Crimea.



Russian troop deployment in Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula is likely to trigger a reaction from Turkey. Crimea lies only 173 miles from the Anatolian coastline, across the Black Sea. It is home to a community of Turkic Tatars, who are ethnic and linguistic kin of Anatolian Turks and oppose potential Russian annexation of the peninsula. Turkey has established close ties with Ukraine, a useful buffer with the bear to the north, since that country’s independence and will take issue with violation of Kiev’s sovereignty.At the same time, Turkey’s dependence on Russia for around half of its natural gas imports and historic Turkish fears of the Russians will temper Ankara’s reaction to Moscow’s takeover of Crimea. In case of NATO action in the Black Sea, for instance, Turkey would balance its NATO affiliation with its treaty obligations, rooted in the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the access of nonlittoral powers into the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, including the Bosporus. Ankara could adopt a position in the Crimean conflict similar to its stance in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia, another of Ankara’s Black Sea neighbors, with Turkey playing a balancing game between NATO and Russia. In no case will Turkey ignore the treaty, essential to the country’s sense of Great Power status.

CRIMEAN GEOGRAPHY, THE TATAR ISSUE, AND RUSSIA

Covering ten thousand square miles and home to two million residents, the Crimean Peninsula is connected to the mainland through a narrow, swampy isthmus. It is, however, effectively an island, separated from mainland Ukraine and Russia by the Sea of Azov, a Black Sea gulf nearly as large as the peninsula itself. Crimea’s peculiar geography has allowed it to maintain an identity distinct from the Eurasian mainland to its north for much of its history. In the medieval period, Genoa maintained colonies in Crimea. And in the premodern period, Crimea’s population was almost entirely ethnically Turkic and Tatar speaking, making Crimea a khanate in commonwealth with the Ottoman Empire.

Nevertheless, the Russian Empire gradually established control over the territories of the Crimean khanate as it expanded into the Black Sea basin. In 1774, the Ottomans relinquished control of the Crimean khanate, which then became autonomous but was soon absorbed into the Russian Empire. Thereafter, Russia saw Crimea as a vital outlet to the warm seas, establishing its Black Sea fleet in the Crimean deepwater port of Sevastopol in 1783.

During the ensuing centuries, the czars settled many Russians in the peninsula to solidify their rule. Yet even as religious and political persecution of the Tatars led to their mass migration, Crimea’s population was still 39 percent Tatar at the onset of World War II. After the war, Joseph Stalin furthered Crimea’s Russification by deporting the Tatar population en masse to the Soviet interior, together with other targeted groups, alleging that they had collaborated with Nazi Germany.

In 1954, Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a “gift” to Ukraine. Even then, given Crimea’s strategic importance in Moscow’s eyes, the Tatars were not allowed to return to their homes, although other nationalities deported by Stalin were eventually repatriated to their homelands. In another sign of Crimea’s strategic importance to Moscow, Russia kept its military presence in Crimea. As recently as 2010, Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty leasing the Crimean port of Sevastopol to Moscow for use by the Russian navy until 2042.Since the collapse of communism, many Tatars have returned to Crimea. As of the most recent official Ukrainian census, in 2001, the Tatars constitute more than 11 percent of Crimea’s population. According to the same census, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians constitute 59 and 24 percent of Crimea’s population, respectively.

The Tatars vehemently oppose the return of Russian rule to Crimea. Following the ouster of Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovych on February 22, many Tatars took part in anti-Russia rallies in Crimea, otherwise a bastion of pro-Russia sentiment. On February 26, two Tatars were killed and thirty-five injured in these rallies.

CRIMEAN DIASPORA IN TURKEY

Turkey’s large Crimean Tatar diaspora, numbering in the millions, is concentrated in certain provinces, including Eskisehir, Ankara, and Konya, as well as elsewhere in central Turkey. No doubt, the killing of Tatars in Crimea will rile Turkey’s Tatars, resulting in pressure on the Ankara government to oppose Russian control of Crimea. At the same time, while many of Turkey’s Tatars have a secular outlook in politics and tend to support the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Ukraine issue could be a complicating factor for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government as the country prepares for the March 30 nationwide polls for local government.

TURKEY’S ENERGY DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA, AND TURKISH VIEWS OF RUSSIA

Turkey imports around 55 percent of its natural gas needs and 12 percent of its oil from Russia, and it curiously turned to Russia for its first nuclear plant as well. Dependence on these resources has shaped Ankara’s foreign policy toward Moscow, tempering Turkish frustration with Russian policy. For instance, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known for his mercurial style in foreign policy, often criticizing foreign heads of government in public. That tendency notwithstanding, Erdogan treads carefully around Russian president Vladimir Putin. A case in point is Turkish policy in Syria. Even though Russia has blocked international action against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus, effectively undermining Ankara’s policy of helping Assad’s opponents, Erdogan has shied away from picking a fight with Putin, knowing that his country’s economic growth and his political fortunes depend on his ability to maintain a steady supply of Russian gas and oil. Finally, Turkey does considerable nonenergy business with Russia, ranging from massive Russian tourist flows to Turkish investment, exports, and construction and other contract deals involving Russia.

Beyond the energy issue, Ankara suffers from a deep-rooted historic reluctance to confront the Russians. Between 1568, when the Ottomans and Russians first clashed, and the end of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Turks and Russians fought at least seventeen wars. In each encounter, Russia was the instigator and the victor. Having suffered at the hands of the Russians for centuries, the Turks have a deeply ingrained fear of the Russians. This is the reason Turkey opted for NATO membership and U.S. protection when Stalin demanded territory from Turkey and a base on the Bosporus in 1945. Fear of the Russians made Turkey one of the most committed Cold War allies to the United States. The same fear will now make Turkey reluctant to confront Moscow in Crimea.

TURKISH VIEWS ON THE BLACK SEA

A third factor that will dampen Turkish policy against Moscow in Crimea is Ankara’s static view of Black Sea navigation, which is embedded in the Montreux Convention of 1936. As already noted, this treaty limits the navigational rights of nonlittoral states’ navies on the sea. Unlike the post-World War I treaties, which limited Turkey’s control over the Turkish Straits, the 1936 treaty benefited Turkey, allowing it to militarize the straits and manage traffic coming in and out. The weight limitation for nonlittoral states to sail in the Black Sea can be as low as 15,000 tons, limiting a naval presence to two or three surface combatants. If the United States or NATO were to attempt to patrol actively and frequently in the Black Sea to deter Russian policies, Ankara’s vigorous application of the Montreux Convention would have an impact on operational flexibility.

TURKEY’S CRIMEA POLICY LIKELY TO FOLLOW ITS GEORGIA POLICY

In the 2008 Georgia crisis, all these factors came to bear. Ankara recognized that part of Russia’s motivation for its invasion was to limit competition from Azeri and other Caspian Sea states’ gas and oil shipments to Turkey and on to the outside world via Georgia. But concern about Russia’s retaliatory capabilities, particularly with gas sales, and what Turkey saw as the Georgian president’s reckless behavior tempered Turkish reactions. With some hesitation, Turkey facilitated U.S. naval and air movements into the Black Sea and Caucasus region, but it made clear it wanted full coordination in advance and did not want to be dragged into a confrontation with Moscow.

U.S. POLICY SUGGESTIONS

Putin’s gambit in Ukraine will hit a cultural-historical nerve focused on Crimea. But if he moves to neutralize or dominate all of Ukraine, then Turkey will be in an uncomfortable position. Ukraine has served as a buffer between Russia and Turkey — apart from minor Russian holdings on the Black Sea from Rostov to Sochi — since 1991. If Ukraine cannot maintain full independence, Turkey will be faced to its north with a Russia looking more and more like its czarist predecessor, with a record of successful Black Sea aggression, first against Georgia, then against Ukraine. All this comes at a time when the situation to Turkey’s south is extremely unstable. Normally, these factors would suggest closer Turkish consultations with, and reliance on, the United States. But with Prime Minister Erdogan, times are not normal. His view of democracy has a troubling resemblance to that of Putin, with whom Erdogan has a good relationship. Furthermore, and most dangerously, both share a sense of inferiority vis-a-vis a “West” that supposedly ignores their unique past glories and perceived global potential. In sum, while the United States should consult closely with Turkey, as an ally and as the “corridor” for power projection into the Black Sea, Washington must be aware of how erratic Erdogan is likely to be concerning Russia for ideological, historical, strategic, and energy reasons.

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. His latest book is “The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power” (http://washin.st/RiseofTurkey), published by Potomac Books.

Read about his upcoming book-launch event with NATO commander Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, Ambassador James Jeffrey, and Ambassador Ross Wilson:

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-transformation-prospects-and-limits

James F. Jeffrey is the Institute’s Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/25838