mardi 13 juillet 2010
Flashback: Human Shields founder and former US Marine Ken O'Keefe BBC Hardtalk Jan. 2003
Ken O'Keefe faced Tim Sebastian in a classic Hardtalk in which he predicted virtually all that would happen in Iraq two months before the invasion/occupation. He discusses renouncing his US citizenship, Hawaii, Saddam Hussein, US terrorism, US taxes and US & British criminality in general.
samedi 10 juillet 2010
Temperatures soar to 51 centigrade in Baghdad as electricity supplies worsen
By Fatima Kamal
Azzaman, July 10, 2010
Temperatures in Baghdad hit 51 centigrade in the shade on Saturday and the heat wave is forecast to continue for a few more days, Iraqi meteorologist Mahmoud Latif said.
“This the temperate we have in the shade,” the meteorologists add. “We are one centigrade above the middle boiling point and in the shade.”
Temperatures will certainly break the 51-centigrade barrier, unprecedented in Baghdad’s scorching heat, outside shaded areas.
The heat wave comes amid reports of fresh attacks targeting high-voltage pylons in several areas in the country. At least six such pylons have been destroyed, according to Adel Hameed of the Ministry of Electricity.
Hameed said the ministry has mobilized its resources to repair the damage and that two pylons have already been reconstructed.
Meantime, the health authorities advise Iraqis not to walk under the sun unprotected.
“We advise the citizens not stay under the sun for long periods of time and try to drink as much fluids as possible,” Dr. Karima Mousa said.
Azzaman, July 10, 2010
Temperatures in Baghdad hit 51 centigrade in the shade on Saturday and the heat wave is forecast to continue for a few more days, Iraqi meteorologist Mahmoud Latif said.
“This the temperate we have in the shade,” the meteorologists add. “We are one centigrade above the middle boiling point and in the shade.”
Temperatures will certainly break the 51-centigrade barrier, unprecedented in Baghdad’s scorching heat, outside shaded areas.
The heat wave comes amid reports of fresh attacks targeting high-voltage pylons in several areas in the country. At least six such pylons have been destroyed, according to Adel Hameed of the Ministry of Electricity.
Hameed said the ministry has mobilized its resources to repair the damage and that two pylons have already been reconstructed.
Meantime, the health authorities advise Iraqis not to walk under the sun unprotected.
“We advise the citizens not stay under the sun for long periods of time and try to drink as much fluids as possible,” Dr. Karima Mousa said.
vendredi 9 juillet 2010
Le nouveau mystère de Halabja
Par Gilles Munier
Sur France-Irak Actualité :
http://www.france-irak-actualite.com/article-le-nouveau-mystere-de-halabja-53655182.html
Bien que le massacre de Halabja ait été pendant plus d’une décennie un thème de propagande anti-Saddam Hussein, le procès de l’affaire s’est tenu en catimini (1), si bien que personne ne sait réellement ce qui s’est vraiment passé les 17 et 18 mars 1988, dates de la bataille. En 2005, l’arrestation, puis la libération, maquillée en évasion, de Tarik al-Azzaoui, accusé d’être le pilote ayant gazé le village kurde, sont curieusement passées inaperçues en Occident.
Pilote sur Mig 21 et Mirage F1 au début de la guerre Iran-Irak, Al-Azzaoui qui se déclare « Turcoman d’origine arabe », rejette l’accusation (2). Gravement blessé en décembre 1984, lors de l’éjection de son appareil en feu, il ne pouvait plus voler sur avions de chasse et poursuivait sa carrière comme instructeur. Son carnet de vol ne comporte pas de mention de mission les jours de la bataille. Il passait donc le week-end en famille et affirme n’avoir entendu parler du gazage qu’en 1991 pendant la courte occupation de Kirkouk par les peshmergas.
Après la chute de Bagdad, Al-Azzaoui assurait la maintenance de la base aérienne de Kirkouk pour le compte de la Compagnie Parsons. C’est là que, le 3 février 2005, un capitaine américain le livra à l’Asayish, agence de renseignement kurde. Mis au secret à la prison Gushti, à Soulimaniya, dans une cellule de 90 cm sur 190, torturé des jours durant sans que personne ne lui présente de preuve de ce dont on l’accusait, il finit par signer la confession réclamée. Non seulement les juges du « Haut Tribunal irakien » refusèrent d’enregistrer que ses aveux avaient été obtenus sous la torture, mais ils le menacèrent de nouveaux interrogatoires musclés s’il niait les faits dont on l’accusait, et l’obligèrent à déclarer qu’il ne voulait pas d’avocat.
Le 28 octobre 2007, Seif al-Din Ali Ahmed, directeur de l’Asayish à Soulimaniya, l’informa que le Président Talabani le libérait, mais refusa de lui délivrer un document attestant de son innocence. En décembre, la rumeur courant qu’il s’était évadé et qu’on le recherchait, il quitta l’Irak avec sa famille. Malgré la publication sur le site kurde Avene, en avril 2009, de la lettre ordonnant sa libération (3), il s’estime en danger. Réfugié en Europe, Tarik al-Azzaoui veut bien témoigner devant un tribunal international, mais à condition de ne pas être ensuite extradé en Irak. Il sait qu’au Kurdistan, son cas fait polémique : le Goran, scission de l’UPK, parti de Talabani, affirme que ce dernier a négocié sa libération avec des parlementaires arabes en échange de sa réélection à la présidence de la République.
Note :
(1) Lire : Halabja, procès en catimini, par Gilles Munier
http://www.france-irak-actualite.com/article-halabja-proces-en-catimini-43527829.html
(2) An interview with combat pilot who is wanted for genocide in Halabja (PDF)
(3) Copie de la lettre adressée par Jalal Talabani au directeur de l’Asayish à Soulimaniya
http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hemereng&jimare=521
Paru dans Afrique Asie – juillet 2010
Sur France-Irak Actualité :
http://www.france-irak-actualite.com/article-le-nouveau-mystere-de-halabja-53655182.html
Bien que le massacre de Halabja ait été pendant plus d’une décennie un thème de propagande anti-Saddam Hussein, le procès de l’affaire s’est tenu en catimini (1), si bien que personne ne sait réellement ce qui s’est vraiment passé les 17 et 18 mars 1988, dates de la bataille. En 2005, l’arrestation, puis la libération, maquillée en évasion, de Tarik al-Azzaoui, accusé d’être le pilote ayant gazé le village kurde, sont curieusement passées inaperçues en Occident.
Pilote sur Mig 21 et Mirage F1 au début de la guerre Iran-Irak, Al-Azzaoui qui se déclare « Turcoman d’origine arabe », rejette l’accusation (2). Gravement blessé en décembre 1984, lors de l’éjection de son appareil en feu, il ne pouvait plus voler sur avions de chasse et poursuivait sa carrière comme instructeur. Son carnet de vol ne comporte pas de mention de mission les jours de la bataille. Il passait donc le week-end en famille et affirme n’avoir entendu parler du gazage qu’en 1991 pendant la courte occupation de Kirkouk par les peshmergas.
Après la chute de Bagdad, Al-Azzaoui assurait la maintenance de la base aérienne de Kirkouk pour le compte de la Compagnie Parsons. C’est là que, le 3 février 2005, un capitaine américain le livra à l’Asayish, agence de renseignement kurde. Mis au secret à la prison Gushti, à Soulimaniya, dans une cellule de 90 cm sur 190, torturé des jours durant sans que personne ne lui présente de preuve de ce dont on l’accusait, il finit par signer la confession réclamée. Non seulement les juges du « Haut Tribunal irakien » refusèrent d’enregistrer que ses aveux avaient été obtenus sous la torture, mais ils le menacèrent de nouveaux interrogatoires musclés s’il niait les faits dont on l’accusait, et l’obligèrent à déclarer qu’il ne voulait pas d’avocat.
Le 28 octobre 2007, Seif al-Din Ali Ahmed, directeur de l’Asayish à Soulimaniya, l’informa que le Président Talabani le libérait, mais refusa de lui délivrer un document attestant de son innocence. En décembre, la rumeur courant qu’il s’était évadé et qu’on le recherchait, il quitta l’Irak avec sa famille. Malgré la publication sur le site kurde Avene, en avril 2009, de la lettre ordonnant sa libération (3), il s’estime en danger. Réfugié en Europe, Tarik al-Azzaoui veut bien témoigner devant un tribunal international, mais à condition de ne pas être ensuite extradé en Irak. Il sait qu’au Kurdistan, son cas fait polémique : le Goran, scission de l’UPK, parti de Talabani, affirme que ce dernier a négocié sa libération avec des parlementaires arabes en échange de sa réélection à la présidence de la République.
Note :
(1) Lire : Halabja, procès en catimini, par Gilles Munier
http://www.france-irak-actualite.com/article-halabja-proces-en-catimini-43527829.html
(2) An interview with combat pilot who is wanted for genocide in Halabja (PDF)
(3) Copie de la lettre adressée par Jalal Talabani au directeur de l’Asayish à Soulimaniya
http://www.awene.com/Direje.aspx?Babet=Hemereng&jimare=521
Paru dans Afrique Asie – juillet 2010
mardi 6 juillet 2010
Iraqi Kurdistan: Girls and Women Suffer the Consequences of Female Genital Mutilation
© 2009 Samer Muscati/Human Rights Watch
Related Materials:
“They Took Me and Told Me Nothing”
Q&A on Female Genital Mutilation
Questions and Answers on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in Iraqi Kurdistan
FGM violates women’s and children’s rights, including their rights to life, health, and bodily integrity. It’s time for the regional government to step up to the plate and take concrete actions to eliminate this harmful practice because it simply won’t go away on its own.
Nadya Khalife, Middle East women’s rights researcher
Kurdistan Regional Government Should Outlaw the Practice
June 16, 2010
(Arbil) - A significant number of girls and women in Iraqi Kurdistan suffer female genital mutilation (FGM) and its destructive after-effects, Human Rights Watch said today in a new report. The Kurdistan Regional Government should take immediate action to end FGM and develop a long term plan for its eradication, including passing a law to ban the practice, Human Rights Watch said.
The 73-page report, "‘They Took Me and Told Me Nothing': Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan," documents the experiences of young girls and women who undergo FGM against a backdrop of conflicting messages from some religious leaders and healthcare professionals about the practice's legitimacy and safety. The report describes the pain and fear that girls and young women experience when they are cut, and the terrible toll that it takes on their physical and emotional health. It says the regional government has been unwilling to prohibit FGM, despite its readiness to address other forms of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and so-called honor killings.
"FGM violates women's and children's rights, including their rights to life, health, and bodily integrity," said Nadya Khalife, Middle East women's rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. "It's time for the regional government to step up to the plate and take concrete actions to eliminate this harmful practice because it simply won't go away on its own."
Human Rights Watch researchers conducted interviews during May and June 2009, with 31 girls and women in four villages of northern Iraq and in the town of Halabja. Researchers also interviewed Muslim clerics, midwives, healthcare workers, and government officials. Local nongovernmental organizations say that FGM may also be practiced among other communities in the rest of Iraq, but there are no data on its prevalence outside the Kurdish region.
The prevalence of FGM in Iraqi Kurdistan is not fully known as the government does not routinely collect information on the practice. However, research conducted by local organizations indicates that the practice is widespread and affects a significant number of girls and women.
The evidence obtained by Human Rights Watch suggests that for many girls and women in Iraqi Kurdistan, FGM is an unavoidable procedure that they undergo sometimes between the ages of 3 and 12. In some cases documented by Human Rights Watch, societal pressures also led adult women to undergo the procedure, sometimes as a precondition of marriage.
Human Rights Watch met Gola, a 17-year-old student from the village of Plangan. Gola told Human Rights Watch, "I remember my mother and her sister-in-law took us two girls, and there were four other girls. We went to Sarkapkan for the procedure. They put us in the bathroom, held our legs open, and cut something. They did it one by one with no anesthetics. I was afraid, but endured the pain. I have lots of pain in this specific area they cut when I menstruate."
Young girls and women described how their mothers had taken them to the home of the village midwife, a non-licensed practitioner. They were almost never told in advance what was going to happen to them. When they arrived, the midwife, sometimes with the help of the mother, spread the girl's legs and cut her clitoris with a razor blade. Often, the midwife used the same razor to cut several girls in succession.
Doctors in Iraqi Kurdistan told Human Rights Watch that the most common type of FGM believed to be practiced there is partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or prepuce, also known as clitoridectomy. Health care workers said that an even more invasive procedure was sometimes performed on adult women in hospitals. The practice serves no medical purpose and can lead to serious physical and emotional consequences.
The previous regional government took some steps to address FGM, including a 2007 Justice Ministry decree, supposedly binding on all police precincts, that perpetrators of FGM should be arrested and punished. However, the existence of the decree is not widely known, and Human Rights Watch found no evidence that it has ever been enforced.
In 2008, the majority of members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) supported the introduction of a law banning FGM, but the bill was never enacted into law and its status is unknown. In early 2009, the Health Ministry developed a comprehensive anti-FGM strategy in collaboration with a nongovernmental organization. But the ministry later withdrew its support and halted efforts to combat FGM. A public awareness campaign about FGM and its consequences has also been inexplicably delayed.
The new government, elected in July 2009, has taken no steps to eradicate the practice.
The origins of FGM in Iraqi Kurdistan are unclear. Some girls and women interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were told that it is rooted in a belief that anything they touch is haram, or unclean, until they go through this painful procedure, while others said that FGM was a traditional custom. Most women referred to FGM as an Islamic sunnah, an action taken to strengthen one's religion that is not obligatory.
The association of FGM with Islam has been rejected by many Muslim scholars and theologians, who say that FGM is not prescribed in the Quran and is contradictory to the teachings of Islam. Women and girls interviewed said they had received mixed messages from clerics about whether it was a religious obligation. Clerics interviewed said that when any practice interpreted as sunnah endangers people's lives, it is the duty of the clerics to stop it.
Health care workers interviewed gave mixed responses both about their concerns about the harm FGM causes and about their obligation to raise awareness about the dangers of FGM.
Two studies have been conducted recently to try to determine the prevalence of the practice. In January 2009, the former Human Rights Ministry conducted a study in the Chamchamal district with a sample of 521 students ages 11 to 24. It found that 40.7 percent of the sample had undergone the procedure - 23 percent of girls under age13, and 45 percent of those ages 14 and older.
In 2010, the Association for Crisis Assistance and Development Co-operation (WADI), a German-Iraqi human rights nongovernmental organization, published the results of a study conducted between September 2007 and May 2008 in the provinces of Arbil and Sulaimaniya, and the Germian/Kirkuk region. Interviews with 1,408 women and girls ages 14 and over found that 72.7 percent had undergone the procedure - 77.9 percent in Sulaimaniya, 81.2 percent in Germian, and 63 percent in Arbil.
The wider age range of girls and women interviewed may account in part for the higher overall percentages. The percentage was 57 percent for those ages 14 to 18 in this study.
Human Rights Watch called on the regional authorities to develop a long-term plan that involves government, health care workers, clerics, and communities in efforts to eradicate the practice. The strategy should include a law to ban FGM for children and non-consenting adult women; awareness raising programs on the health consequences of FGM; and the mainstreaming of FGM prevention into policies and programs for reproductive health, education, and literacy development.
The government also should work closely with communities and people of influence in those communities to encourage debate about the practice among men, women, and children, including awareness and understanding of the human rights of girls and women, Human Rights Watch said.
"The government not only needs to take action to end this practice, but to work for public affirmation of a new standard - not mutilating their girls," Khalife said.
"FGM is a complex issue, but its harm to girls and women is clear," Khalife said. "Eradicating it in Iraqi Kurdistan will require strong and dedicated leadership on the part of the regional government, including a clear message that FGM will no longer be tolerated."
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dimanche 4 juillet 2010
The chairman of the Israel Corporation Idan Ofer visited Iraqi Kurdistan
Idan Offer Photo by Motti Kimche
June 25, 2010
SULAIMANIYAH, Kurdistan region 'Iraq', — Idan Ofer, the chairman of the Israel Corporation, visited Sulaimaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan a month ago - reports the French Jewish website JSS and Intelligence Online. JSS revealed that Ofer, accompanied by six businessmen, flew from an unidentified European city on May 27 to meet with senior Kurdistani officials, www.ekurd.net including Vice President Kosrat Rasul Ali and Prime Minister Barham Salih. The visit was to show support for the Kurdish people and help develop economic ties between Kurdistan and Israel.
Ofer is interested in investing in developing oil installations in Kirkuk, reported JSS, as well as building refineries in conjunction with European and Asian partners. Kurdish officials view worsening Turkish-Israeli ties as an opportunity to strengthen their relations with Israel.
Ofer's spokesman said he does not comment on Ofer's schedule or private affairs.- Idan Ofer Chairman since 1999. Prior to being elected Chairman of Israel Corp., Mr. Ofer spent a total of 15 years in Hong Kong, Singapore and the US where he was active in the shipping and offshore oil storage industries. Mr. Ofer serves as Chairman of Better Place and director of numerous Ofer Group companies. He is also engaged in a variety of venture capital and energy projects. Mr. Ofer holds a BA from Haifa University in Economics and Shipping and studied at the London School of Business where since 1999 he holds a Fellowship.
Copyright, respective author or news agency, haaretz com israelcorp com
Kurdish separatism is a threat to the future of the Middle East
by AHMET UYSAL*
Turkey is one of the few democratic countries in the Middle East. With the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, Turkey made major improvements on human rights and democratization.
Turks and Kurds in Turkey have benefited from the consolidation of democracy in the Middle East. The recent rise of terrorist attacks by the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on Turkish military and civilian targets carries major risks of destabilizing the region. There are several domestic, regional and international reasons for the recurrence and the timing of these events.
Who is the PKK and what does it demand? The PKK is an acronym for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Kurdish. It was founded by Ankara-trained Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 and began to use terrorist attacks in 1984 for the first time. It aspires to establish an independent Kurdish state based on communist ideology in the area comprising parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Financially it relies on illegal drug and human trafficking between Iran and Europe.
The early 1990s were the most troublesome period for PKK terrorism due to its internal struggles and instability in Turkey as well as the negative international situation. This was because the PKK movement found fertile ground in northern Iraq after the First Gulf War because Saddam Hussein’s forces were kept out of the north and the two other major Iraqi groups were fighting each other.
On the one hand, Hafez al-Assad’s Syria was supporting the PKK to pressure Turkey on border and water issues. It almost sparked a war between the two countries. However, subsequent events resulted in the capturing of PKK leader Öcalan by Turkey in 1999. It was a major blow to the PKK, which the US, the EU and Turkey consider a terrorist organization.
Unlike before, the AK Party improved Turkey’s human rights record and democratic standards. This also helped the Kurds with the opening of a Kurdish TV channel and Kurdish departments at universities. However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s effort was hampered by Turkish and Kurdish nationalists both adopting a hard-line stance. The major nationalist party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), rejected any bargain or dialogue, fearing that these concessions might lead to the dismemberment of the country. Similarly, Kurdish activists rejected the improvement of ethnic rights without involving Öcalan.
As it often happens, radicals of any kind do not like a middle ground. The continuing terrorist attacks create an emotional environment which results in any democratic initiative being framed as leeway for terrorism. Despite the fact that the Constitution bans any ethnic-based or religious-based parties, the ethnic Kurds had space for themselves within the democratic discourse. However, the political wing, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), of the Kurdish movement did not distance itself from the PKK and terrorism. Therefore, the BDP accepted nothing less than the unimaginable release of PKK leader Öcalan.
BDP limiting itself
Not distancing themselves from violence also limits the BDP’s popularity even among Kurds as it won about 15 percent of the Kurdish vote since most Kurds still vote for the AK Party. In other words, the Kurdish region is the main battleground for the separatist PKK and the pro-integration AK Party. While the former wants a further division in the already divided Middle East, the latter seeks integration within the country and with its neighbors, including Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Iraq and its Kurdish region are considered for such regional integration. The separatist Kurds, not all of them of course, want to dismantle the current Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi territories and establish a communist Kurdish state in their place.
The foundation of a Kurdish state is an impossible project, but it is sufficient to create problems in the region. Such a state has no chance of survival, as Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq (e.g., Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani) have realized, but they continue to play the PKK card for an increased role in Iraq. In recent months their relations with Turkey have improved significantly, but they have to put more pressure on the PKK that is stationed in northern Iraq. Frequent terrorist attacks help hard-liners and make a peaceful solution impossible in addition to poisoning relations with neighbors.
Because of the escalation of terrorism in Turkey, Erdoğan’s AK Party may lose its majority in the upcoming elections next year. The sole alternative would be a coalition between the conservative nationalist MHP and the secular nationalist CHP. Their nationalist policies may alienate the moderate Kurds and even escalate ethnic tension, spreading to Iraq and destabilizing the whole region. Because the PKK is positioned in the mountainous north, the rise of terrorist attacks can force Turkey to turn to Iraq.
The escalation of terrorism and ethnic conflict in Turkey would create a big mess in the conflict-torn Middle East. The West must put more pressure on radical Kurdish activists operating in European cities by cutting the financial and human support they provide to the PKK. Similarly, the US must put more pressure on Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani not to allow the PKK unhindered operation in northern Iraq.
Like the Egyptian president who convinced al-Assad not to host the PKK leader in 1999, Arab governments can help Turkey overcome this terrorism by standing by the people of Turkey. Otherwise, the peaceful and rational Turkish experience led by the AK Party in the region will leave the ground for a nationalist government that might destabilize Iraq and damage relations with Kurds, Arabs and the West. Conflicts all around the greater Middle East can hurt and damage even the most stable countries in the globalized world.
*Ahmet Uysal is an associate professor at Eskişehir Osmangazi University’s department of international relations.
02 July 2010, Friday
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214854-kurdish-separatism-is-a-threat-to-the-future-of-the-middle-east-by-ahmet-uysal.html
Turkey is one of the few democratic countries in the Middle East. With the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, Turkey made major improvements on human rights and democratization.
Turks and Kurds in Turkey have benefited from the consolidation of democracy in the Middle East. The recent rise of terrorist attacks by the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on Turkish military and civilian targets carries major risks of destabilizing the region. There are several domestic, regional and international reasons for the recurrence and the timing of these events.
Who is the PKK and what does it demand? The PKK is an acronym for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Kurdish. It was founded by Ankara-trained Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 and began to use terrorist attacks in 1984 for the first time. It aspires to establish an independent Kurdish state based on communist ideology in the area comprising parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Financially it relies on illegal drug and human trafficking between Iran and Europe.
The early 1990s were the most troublesome period for PKK terrorism due to its internal struggles and instability in Turkey as well as the negative international situation. This was because the PKK movement found fertile ground in northern Iraq after the First Gulf War because Saddam Hussein’s forces were kept out of the north and the two other major Iraqi groups were fighting each other.
On the one hand, Hafez al-Assad’s Syria was supporting the PKK to pressure Turkey on border and water issues. It almost sparked a war between the two countries. However, subsequent events resulted in the capturing of PKK leader Öcalan by Turkey in 1999. It was a major blow to the PKK, which the US, the EU and Turkey consider a terrorist organization.
Unlike before, the AK Party improved Turkey’s human rights record and democratic standards. This also helped the Kurds with the opening of a Kurdish TV channel and Kurdish departments at universities. However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s effort was hampered by Turkish and Kurdish nationalists both adopting a hard-line stance. The major nationalist party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), rejected any bargain or dialogue, fearing that these concessions might lead to the dismemberment of the country. Similarly, Kurdish activists rejected the improvement of ethnic rights without involving Öcalan.
As it often happens, radicals of any kind do not like a middle ground. The continuing terrorist attacks create an emotional environment which results in any democratic initiative being framed as leeway for terrorism. Despite the fact that the Constitution bans any ethnic-based or religious-based parties, the ethnic Kurds had space for themselves within the democratic discourse. However, the political wing, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), of the Kurdish movement did not distance itself from the PKK and terrorism. Therefore, the BDP accepted nothing less than the unimaginable release of PKK leader Öcalan.
BDP limiting itself
Not distancing themselves from violence also limits the BDP’s popularity even among Kurds as it won about 15 percent of the Kurdish vote since most Kurds still vote for the AK Party. In other words, the Kurdish region is the main battleground for the separatist PKK and the pro-integration AK Party. While the former wants a further division in the already divided Middle East, the latter seeks integration within the country and with its neighbors, including Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Iraq and its Kurdish region are considered for such regional integration. The separatist Kurds, not all of them of course, want to dismantle the current Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi territories and establish a communist Kurdish state in their place.
The foundation of a Kurdish state is an impossible project, but it is sufficient to create problems in the region. Such a state has no chance of survival, as Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq (e.g., Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani) have realized, but they continue to play the PKK card for an increased role in Iraq. In recent months their relations with Turkey have improved significantly, but they have to put more pressure on the PKK that is stationed in northern Iraq. Frequent terrorist attacks help hard-liners and make a peaceful solution impossible in addition to poisoning relations with neighbors.
Because of the escalation of terrorism in Turkey, Erdoğan’s AK Party may lose its majority in the upcoming elections next year. The sole alternative would be a coalition between the conservative nationalist MHP and the secular nationalist CHP. Their nationalist policies may alienate the moderate Kurds and even escalate ethnic tension, spreading to Iraq and destabilizing the whole region. Because the PKK is positioned in the mountainous north, the rise of terrorist attacks can force Turkey to turn to Iraq.
The escalation of terrorism and ethnic conflict in Turkey would create a big mess in the conflict-torn Middle East. The West must put more pressure on radical Kurdish activists operating in European cities by cutting the financial and human support they provide to the PKK. Similarly, the US must put more pressure on Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani not to allow the PKK unhindered operation in northern Iraq.
Like the Egyptian president who convinced al-Assad not to host the PKK leader in 1999, Arab governments can help Turkey overcome this terrorism by standing by the people of Turkey. Otherwise, the peaceful and rational Turkish experience led by the AK Party in the region will leave the ground for a nationalist government that might destabilize Iraq and damage relations with Kurds, Arabs and the West. Conflicts all around the greater Middle East can hurt and damage even the most stable countries in the globalized world.
*Ahmet Uysal is an associate professor at Eskişehir Osmangazi University’s department of international relations.
02 July 2010, Friday
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214854-kurdish-separatism-is-a-threat-to-the-future-of-the-middle-east-by-ahmet-uysal.html
samedi 3 juillet 2010
Article 140 Returns to the Iraqi Political Agenda
Posted by Reidar Visser on Wednesday, 30 June 2010 1:34
http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2010/06/30/article-140-returns-to-the-iraqi-political-agenda/
Amid an increasing number of meetings between State of Law and Iraqiyya, it is interesting that there is increasing debate about the stance of the two sides on an issue that could potentially unite them: Article 140 of the constitution relating to so-called “disputed territories”, including most importantly Kirkuk.
Some of this discussion has reflected continued disappointment among Iraqi nationalists about what was perceived as a “soft” (i.e. pro-Kurdish) stance by the State of Law alliance (SLA) headed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki during the debate on the election law last autumn, when their failure to argue for more robust measures against perceived Kurdish heavy-handedness in controlling the elections in Kirkuk was seen as a reversion to the “old politics” of 2005-2007 with Shiites and Kurds united in an ethno-sectarian alliance against Sunnis. However, there are now also growing signs of another – and opposite – trend within State of Law: Attempts to reassure voters that there will be no “sell-out” as far as Kirkuk is concerned, which is pretty much what many Iraqiyya politicians also demand.
One example of this is Sadiq al-Kaabi of State of Law, who recently told reporters that SLA would rather be in the opposition than do a bargain on 140. Kaabi, who currently has a leading position at the new Najaf airport, has an interesting background: Like many in Daawa, he spent long years in exile, but instead of staying in Iran, he completed his education in Cairo and Beirut, thus clearly preferring the environment of the Arab world. In the 1990s he lived in Syria (also like Nuri al-Maliki).
There is nothing new in this. After all, divisions within the old all-Shiite alliance precisely on issues like 140 and Kirkuk were instrumental in bringing about its demise, with Fadila and Sadrists joining Iraqiyya and Hiwar in the 22 July front, and with Maliki adopting many items on the 22 July agenda when he eventually chose to challenge the more pro-Kurdish ISCI in the January 2009 local elections. But it is interesting that these issues should come to the forefront again at this particular time, after de-Baathification had threatened to kill any prospects of the kind of inter-sectarian alliances based on Iraqi nationalism that were seen in 2008 and 2009.
http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2010/06/30/article-140-returns-to-the-iraqi-political-agenda/
Amid an increasing number of meetings between State of Law and Iraqiyya, it is interesting that there is increasing debate about the stance of the two sides on an issue that could potentially unite them: Article 140 of the constitution relating to so-called “disputed territories”, including most importantly Kirkuk.
Some of this discussion has reflected continued disappointment among Iraqi nationalists about what was perceived as a “soft” (i.e. pro-Kurdish) stance by the State of Law alliance (SLA) headed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki during the debate on the election law last autumn, when their failure to argue for more robust measures against perceived Kurdish heavy-handedness in controlling the elections in Kirkuk was seen as a reversion to the “old politics” of 2005-2007 with Shiites and Kurds united in an ethno-sectarian alliance against Sunnis. However, there are now also growing signs of another – and opposite – trend within State of Law: Attempts to reassure voters that there will be no “sell-out” as far as Kirkuk is concerned, which is pretty much what many Iraqiyya politicians also demand.
One example of this is Sadiq al-Kaabi of State of Law, who recently told reporters that SLA would rather be in the opposition than do a bargain on 140. Kaabi, who currently has a leading position at the new Najaf airport, has an interesting background: Like many in Daawa, he spent long years in exile, but instead of staying in Iran, he completed his education in Cairo and Beirut, thus clearly preferring the environment of the Arab world. In the 1990s he lived in Syria (also like Nuri al-Maliki).
There is nothing new in this. After all, divisions within the old all-Shiite alliance precisely on issues like 140 and Kirkuk were instrumental in bringing about its demise, with Fadila and Sadrists joining Iraqiyya and Hiwar in the 22 July front, and with Maliki adopting many items on the 22 July agenda when he eventually chose to challenge the more pro-Kurdish ISCI in the January 2009 local elections. But it is interesting that these issues should come to the forefront again at this particular time, after de-Baathification had threatened to kill any prospects of the kind of inter-sectarian alliances based on Iraqi nationalism that were seen in 2008 and 2009.
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