Robert Tollast talks with Iraq expert Joel Wing about
the outlook for the country in 2013.
The picture that emerges is a Nouri
al-Maliki who seems increasingly secure to do what he wants given the US desire
to put the Iraq experience behind it.
Iraq in 2013: A Discussion With Joel
Wingglobal-politics.co.uk
Iraq in 2013: A Discussion With Joel Wing
From Global Politics
This time last year, I interviewed Iraq writer Joel
Wing whose work has been cited in reports by leading think tanks on both sides
of the Atlantic, as well as publications such as the New York Times, the
Guardian, and countless specialist journals and blogs. His own blog, Musings on
Iraq, is an exhaustive resource for anyone interested in modern Iraq, and his
reporting over the years has made him one of the foremost chroniclers of the
Iraq conflict and its aftermath. It was therefore a great pleasure to have the
chance to conduct another interview looking at the outlook for Iraq in 2013.
Nouri al-Maliki: A dictator who takes “unprecedented
measures”?
RT: This time last year we saw the arrest of Maliki
rival and Iraqiya politician, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. Now there has
been a raid against the security guards of Finance Minister al-Issawi. Some
initial reports suggested over 150 may have been arrested. Again, the timing is
very suspect. With Hashemi, Maliki had a long time to arrest him but waited
until the US had departed to order the raid. Likewise with Issawi, charges of
terrorism had been around for a long time, but the raid to arrest his security
only came after President Talibani, widely considered a mediating force in
Iraqi politics, was taken seriously ill.
The latest crackdown comes on top of a long list of
Iraqi state institutions that Maliki has targeted such as the armed forces, the
Central Bank of Iraq, the electoral commission, the judiciary, and the
integrity commission, in what Michael Knights calls “a culture of direct
control.” Let’s imagine that by pushing the disputed territories/Kurdish oil
dispute to the limit, presiding over the corruption riddled $4 billion arms
deal with Russia and arresting Issawi (testing his nationalist Sunni supporters
in Anbar) a successful no confidence vote is held against Maliki next year.
Maliki has promised “unprecedented measures” against anyone who backs such a
vote. But if he continues down this path, political opposition is going to
grow. Are we going to see Maliki take more “unprecedented measures” in 2013?
JW: There were varying numbers, but now it looks like
just 10 members of Issawi’s security were actually detained. There appears to
be a political deal at work today to resolve the issue, which to me seems like
it was just an intimidation tactic taken by PM Maliki against Issawi to let him
know that he could be arrested as well in the future.
Some members of Iraqiya have called for a new no
confidence vote as a result, but they don’t have the votes. Iraqiya is a party
in name only these days shown by the fact that it will run as 3-4 different
lists in next year’s provincial elections. Parts of the list also want to
preserve their positions in government, and will not threaten that by going
after Maliki. Not only that, but they need the Sadr votes in parliament to get
enough to remove Maliki, and Sadr only talks about the prime minister he
doesn’t take any real action against him.
As for the premier, he’s been doing these things since
2008, so I see no reason why he’d stop in the future as no one has been able to
stand up to him. He’s been a master at using carrots and sticks to divide up
the other parties and maintain and expand his position. Until the other parties
start to see beyond their own personal political power and profits they get out
of being part of the government through corruption I doubt there will be any
real change in Iraq’s political situation.
RT: Last year we talked about the possibility that
fighting in Syria was going to overspill into Iraq. We agreed at the time that
if anything, the fighting in Syria would actually weaken al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
which was already depleted. Fighters would go to Syria where weakening state
control presented the kind of conditions AQI thrive in. Also, with so many
Sunnis in western Iraq still resentful of AQI’s time in control, a comeback,
even with greater strength, was not necessarily on the cards.
This seems to fit with a regional trend where fighters
from as many as 29 countries have gone to Syria, but generally not brought any
revolutionary zeal back home yet. Next year that could change. The border area
around Mosul in northern Iraq remains an untamed badland, and AQI has
apparently doubled in strength. Whatever happens, there will probably be renewed
fighting in Syria after Assad falls, and the possibility that the al-Nusrah
front/AQI will then turn attention to Iraq. AQI are clearly back in control in
some isolated areas. But I think - and hope, that the end of Assad is not going
to bring about a security collapse in Iraq. For al-Qaeda, the new opportunity
will be a battleground in a failed state: Syria. Shi’a militants may fight on
in Syria, but again, this does not necessarily spell trouble for Iraq. Do you
think Assad’s collapse will bring anything worse than worry to Iraq?
JW: Al Qaeda in Iraq made a mini-comeback mainly
because of the withdrawal of US forces. First, thousands of their followers got
released from prison, and many of them appear to have gone right back to AQI
boosting their abilities to carry out attacks. Second, Iraq’s intelligence
agencies lack the equipment, skills, and organization of the Americans, and
haven’t been able to keep up with the militants. Syria offers AQI a new front
to fight on, but I’m not sure it will have that much of an affect upon Iraq. It
looks like Syria will be unstable for quite some time like Iraq was after the
fall of Saddam, so the Islamists will have their hands full. That will offer
bases for AQI to operate out of, and perhaps get even more fighters. At the
same time, they will no longer get the backing and resources of the Assad
regime, which aided them since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, so it looks to be a
wash to me with no real long term affect upon Iraq.
Another bumper year for oil revenues. But real
progress?
RT: This year there have been more reports of normalcy
such as car dealerships and restaurants opening up in Iraq. Oil executive
Hayder Aziz, who I recently interviewed, calls this “consumption,” not a sign
of genuine economic growth - just more oil cash in circulation.
Again, we hear that Iraq will be possibly the fastest
growing economy in the world next year. While some foreign companies are still
queuing up to invest, others are getting cold feet, underlined by what the
World Bank has called a very difficult business environment. Zaab Sethna, who
you interviewed recently, was more positive. Last year I was optimistic. This
year, looking at another delay in the CSSF project (crucial oil infrastructure
project), the seemingly intractable export dispute with the KRG (which is in
part fueled by IOC dissatisfaction with deals in the south) I am beginning to
think things look a lot more fragile. Iraq looks like a rentier state, not the
economic tiger of the Middle East. What do you think?
JW: I agree. Iraq suffers from the oil curse more than
any other country in the Middle East and North Africa. It gains more revenue
and its GDP is more dependent upon petroleum than any other in the region. That
doesn’t mean there isn’t huge growth on the horizon. That’s because it needs so
much after years of sanctions and war. Almost everything in the country needs
to be rebuilt or new things added. There is huge growth in investment in Iraq
as a result, and it’s in a variety of industries such as housing, electricity,
etc. The problem remains that this is all paid for by oil money, and like you
said, the growth in consumption is also by government workers rather than
private sector employees. There is growth in the business sector but it appears
to be in relatively small businesses for now. That does show signs of hope for
the future, but I think it might be a decade or more before Iraq moves out of
its state-run economy and reduces its oil dependency. This is a huge transition
the country is going through, so it’s going to take quite some time for
everything to work out.
The Kurdish question looms large
RT: With President Jalal Talibani out of the picture,
and deals over oil and territory being made and broken between Baghdad and
Erbil seemingly on a monthly basis, do you think 2013 is going to see Maliki go
to war in Kurdistan?
On one level my feeling is no: many Kurds do not want
war, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is greatly opposed and many living in
disputed areas are terrified of it. Maliki has been typically vague, talking
about “needing weapons to fight the terrorists in Iraq’s mountains” whilst also
talking about a “tough legal response” and the much
trampled “Iraqi constitution” in response to the crisis - a convenient
distraction from the Russian arms scandal.
But at the same time there has also been very
aggressive rhetoric from the Peshmerga commander, and people in Maliki’s camp
have compared Barzani to Saddam as troops prepare for war. This has been detailed
extensively in Kirk Sowell’s Inside Iraq (No.51) report. Meanwhile a Kurdish
General in the ISF recently disobeyed an order from Maliki, further undermining
trust between Shi’a and Kurds in the ISF. Perhaps next year it would not take
much more than the recent Tuz Kharmutu firefight to spark a major crisis in the
heavily militarized disputed territories...
JW: The current standoff between the Iraqi Army and
Peshmerga in the disputed areas is pure political theatre created by Maliki to
rally Arab support for his State of Law list before the 2013 provincial
elections. He did almost the exact same thing in 2008 in the Khanaqin district
of Diyala before the 2009 voting. Maliki sent forces into the disputed
territories, told the Peshmerga they had to leave, tried to evict Kurdish
parties from government owned buildings, there was a shooting incident, the
Kurds started calling Maliki the new Saddam. Then it all blew over with the
help of mediation by the US. I don’t think the premier wants war at all and neither
do the Kurds. Both have been able to gain from the confrontation. Maliki wants
to show that he’s not a sectarian Shiite leader and that he will stand up for
Sunnis who are afraid of Kurdish expansionism in the north. President Barzani
was able to portray himself as the protector of the Kurds and rally the other
parties behind him when before he was facing increasing criticism from the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Change list for his autocratic ways. The
problem with these incidents is that they can get out of control, not by the
political leadership but by some commander on the ground making a stupid
decision and shooting at someone. Still, the intent is purely political.
Red lines
RT: The US, EU and more recently the World Bank are
all keen to engage constructively with Maliki’s government. It seems he is
considered the best of a bad bunch of potential Iraqi leaders. While friendly
towards Iran, he is not pro-Iranian, and while conservative, he is far from
being an extremist. But Western policy toward him is beginning to look a lot
like relationships with previous autocrats: we want to engage constructively,
perhaps spurred on by Thomas Friedman’s notion that continuation of free market
trade will eventually lead to the end of autocracy, while sanctions and
isolation will not. And yet every time Maliki acts like an autocrat, we express
concern, but nothing more than that. Congress make their threats to freeze
relations such as security cooperation but memorandums of understanding still
get signed. If Maliki continues down the path he is on do you think 2013 could
be the year where Western governments start to get tough with him? I struggle
to think how many more red lines he has to cross before that happens.
JW: For the US and British governments I don’t think
so. I think both have such a bad taste in their mouths after the invasion that
they want to put Iraq behind them and move on to other issues around the world.
The less they talk about Maliki and Baghdad the better. Whenever a new crisis emerges
they’ll have to respond, but it will be completely reactive. They’re not trying
to really mediate between the different parties on a daily basis like they used
to. Other countries like Turkey and Iran will be playing a much larger role in
the country than anyone in the West as a result.
Joel Wing's Musings on Iraq blog can be found at
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk
Posted on December 29,
2012
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